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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses EU energy policy from a comparative agenda-setting perspective 
providing new theoretical and empirical insights into EU energy policy-making. 
Although two of the founding treaties of the European Communities covered the coal 
and nuclear sectors, the European Union has struggled ever since to establish itself in 
the field of energy policy. In particular, it failed to include an explicit Community 
competence on energy in Community primary law in subsequent treaty revisions – with 
the exception of the new Title XX on Energy introduced with the Lisbon Treaty. 
Nonetheless the European Union has established itself as an important player in 
European energy policy, as reflected in EU directives on energy market liberalisation, 
energy efficiency standards and targets for renewable energy sources. At the same time, 
policymakers at various levels, business, NGOs and experts agree that more EU energy 
policy is needed to face current and future transnational policy challenges, notably, 
climate change and energy security. This has led to numerous studies with policy 
recommendations on EU level action in the field of energy policy. By contrast, very few 
studies have analysed the drivers and barriers of EU energy policy-making and factors 
that can explain policy change and stability. Yet a better understanding of EU energy 
policy-making is a necessary precondition for the development of appropriate policy 
recommendations. This thesis provides an analysis of EU energy policy-making by 
identifying factors that can explain change and stability from an agenda-setting 
perspective. Drawing upon EU studies and agenda-setting literature the analysis 
distinguishes between two different agenda-setting routes, high and low politics, along 
the key stages of an issue career: initiation, specification, expansion and entrance. It 
accounts for the following key variables in EU agenda-setting: contextual factors, policy 
entrepreneurs, issue definition, and institutional venues. These are applied to two 
contrasting case studies of EU energy policy: nuclear energy and renewable energy. The 
study shows how and why Community initiatives failed in an institutionally ‘strong’ EU 
energy policy arena under Euratom, but succeeded in the field of renewable energy 
under the EC Treaty.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Objective of the study 
The objective of this thesis is to explain change and stability in EU energy policy-
making. Drawing upon an EU agenda-setting framework this thesis aims to explain 
policy outputs of EU energy policy-processes. It distinguishes between two EU agenda-
setting routes, low politics and high politics, and shows that each agenda-setting route is 
subject to different agenda dynamics which ultimately affects policy output. In order to 
better understand these agenda dynamics and identify causal mechanisms this thesis 
applies four explanatory concepts: contextual factors, policy entrepreneurs, issue 
definition, and institutional venues. Their explanatory power is tested in two empirical 
case studies. 
 
The thesis compares two EU energy policy measures, a Commission proposal for 
legally binding provisions on nuclear safety and radioactive waste management, the so 
called nuclear package, and a Commission proposal for legally binding targets for the 
share of renewable energy sources (RES) in the EU energy mix. While the nuclear 
package proposed in 2002/03 was rejected by a blocking minority in the Council 
followed by a lengthy consultation process that resulted in a new legal proposal on 
nuclear safety in November 2008, political agreement with the Council and the 
European Parliament (EP) was reached on mandatory national RES targets in December 
2008, after only less than a year of discussion. Why did an energy policy proposal, 
where the European Union and thus the Commission as formal agenda-setter benefits 
from a legally strong position on the basis of Euratom, fail, whereas another energy 
policy proposal based on the Commission’s competences in environmental policy under 
the EC Treaty succeeded? 
 
Answering this question is relevant for several reasons. First, it is now widely 
acknowledged among policymakers, stakeholders, and experts that an EU energy policy 
is essential not only to achieve a competitive internal energy market but also to respond 
to at least two other key challenges: energy security and climate change. New evidence 
on climate change put forward by the IPCC in 2007 and energy disputes between Russia 
and the Ukraine at the beginning of 2009 underlined the transnational nature of key 
challenges of energy policy and thus the need for an increased role of the EU in this 
  
2
policy field. Second, EU energy policy decisions have important ramifications for 
national energy policies in EU Member States, for instance, by imposing institutional 
structures and pre-defining political choices. Finally, despite the recognition of the need 
for EU energy policy and its increasing influence on national energy policy processes, 
there is a significant empirical and theoretical knowledge gap on how EU energy policy 
processes function. This lack of understanding makes it impossible to explain policy 
outputs sufficiently and to derive suitable policy recommendations. 
 
Energy-related issues have been at the core of the European Union (EU)1 from its very 
beginning with two of its founding treaties specifically aimed at energy sources (the 
European Coal and Steel Community created in 1951, which expired in 2002, and the 
European Atomic Energy Community in 1957). However, the EU has struggled ever 
since to establish itself in the field of energy policy, and has failed to expand its formal 
jurisdiction in this policy domain despite regular attempts to establish such a 
jurisdictional expansion during intergovernmental conferences on Treaty revisions. It 
was only with the Lisbon Treaty that came into force on 1 December 2009 and its Title 
XX on “Energy” that such formal jurisdiction was introduced.  
 
Despite this ‘formal failure’ to achieve changes in primary law until the end of 2009, the 
EU had established itself as an important player in the field of energy policy after the 
entry into force of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. This was based on the 
Commission’s jurisdiction in other policy areas, including the internal market and the 
acknowledgement of the Community’s competence to regulate environmental matters 
that are relevant to the functioning of the internal market. These environmental policy 
related provisions were reinforced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the Amsterdam 
Treaty in 1997. This is reflected in a significant amount of EU legislation in the area of 
energy policy. Major legal outputs include three legislative packages on the 
liberalisation of European energy markets, targets for the promotion of renewable 
energy sources and energy efficiency standards as well as numerous interventions on the 
basis of competition policy and state aid control.  
 
                                                 
1 The term European Union is used here as it is commonly used since the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1993. It includes the European Communities. While this thesis is interested in EU energy 
policy-making and thus the EU’s role in energy policy-making, the European Commission as formal 
agenda-setter is of particular interest in the analysis. 
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Very few studies have analysed EU energy policy-making in detail. While there are 
numerous studies for energy policy focusing on specific policy instruments, there are a 
limited number of studies providing an analysis of EU energy policy-making. The 
majority of EU energy policy studies identify specific policy solutions to solve a given 
problem (e.g. energy insecurity, climate change) or to achieve a given objective (e.g. 
energy security, competitive energy markets or carbon emission reduction); these 
studies are often based on economic perspectives (e.g. Helm, 2007). Although they may 
provide a thorough analysis of the problems and the solutions at hand, they generally 
ignore the underlying policy processes that prevent or enable the intended policy 
outputs or, more broadly speaking, policy change. Such an analysis of energy policy is 
however an important pre-condition for developing suitable strategies for policy change. 
This is the fundamental starting point of this study. 
 
To summarise, the objective of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of 
the processes and dynamics of EU energy policy-making. It analyses how certain 
agenda-setting routes influence policy change and stability in EU energy policy-making. 
Agenda-setting is interested in why and how certain issues make it to the formal agenda 
of the policy-making process. Going one step further, the subsequent analysis is 
interested also why an issue that made it to the formal decision agenda was (not) 
formally adopted as policy. The analytical perspective therefore includes both the 
agenda-setting and decision-making processes. The study pays particular attention to 
contextual factors, policy entrepreneurs, issue definition, and institutional venues as 
explanatory factors.  
 
This thesis makes several contributions to knowledge. Empirically, it enables us to 
identify relevant factors and their influence on policy change and stability in EU energy 
policy-making. It contributes to theory building by testing and further developing 
existing frameworks on EU agenda-setting. At the policy level, it provides tentative 
insights into the possible ways of steering change in EU energy policy-making.  
1.2 The argument of the thesis 
The central argument of this thesis is that the issue career, i.e. the way in which an issue 
is initiated, specified, expanded and thus brought onto the political decision agenda, 
affects the degree of policy change in EU energy policy. It is shown that the level of 
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politics at which an issue is initiated, specified and expanded has a particular effect on 
agenda dynamics and ultimately on policy outputs. High politics, e.g. the European 
Council, and low politics, e.g. low-level officials and expert communities, affect EU 
agenda dynamics differently. The study therefore distinguishes between two routes of 
agenda-setting, one that starts at the level of ‘low politics’ and one where issue initiation 
takes place at the level of ‘high politics’. Issue initiation at the level of low politics 
offers different opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to steer proposals into certain 
venues favourable for their policy objectives, whereas issue initiation at the level of 
high politics helps overcome administrative inertia.  
 
However, the study shows that the distinction between low and high politics agenda-
setting routes is not sufficient on its own to explain policy change. Contextual factors 
such as ‘focusing events’ and public opinion are important additional factors that affect 
EU energy policy. Whilst policy initiation at the level of low politics faces the challenge 
of attracting the attention of high politics protagonists, agenda-setting at the level of 
high politics needs to be translated into appropriate proposals at the administrative level. 
Moreover, the thesis explores how policy entrepreneurs can take advantage of the EU’s 
multiple access points to the agenda. The concept of policy entrepreneurs is applied to a 
broad set of actors including not only all three EU institutions directly involved in the 
decision-making process (i.e. the Commission, the Council of Ministers with the 
European Council, and the EP), but also other players with an interest in the relevant 
policy area. The analysis suggests that even formally strong agenda-setters like the 
Commission, with its formal right of initiative, need to act as policy entrepreneurs by 
exploiting policy windows, by putting forward problem definitions favourable to their 
own objectives and interests, by building winning coalitions, and by using the right 
institutional venues. Venue shopping can therefore be a powerful strategy for policy 
entrepreneurs in EU energy policy making. 
1.3 The study’s theoretical foundations and empirical approach 
In developing this argument, the thesis draws upon two strands of literature: EU studies 
and agenda-setting theories. Building on key concepts from Kingdon’s Multiple 
Streams Framework (MSF) and Baumgartner and Jones’ Punctuated Equilibrium 
Theory (PET), the thesis develops an agenda-setting framework for the analysis of EU 
policy-making. The analytical framework follows Princen and Rhinard’s (2006) basic 
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distinction between ‘low politics’ and ‘high politics’. In addition, it draws upon the 
distinction of an issue career in the agenda-setting literature: initiation, specification, 
expansion, and entrance. It integrates key concepts from the agenda-setting literature 
and relevant contributions from EU studies. The proposed framework puts particular 
emphasis on four conceptual elements: contextual factors, policy entrepreneurs, issue 
definition, and venue shopping. 
 
Policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 1995 [1984]; Mintrom and Vergari, 1996) are central 
players who aim for policy change or stability. For this purpose policy entrepreneurs 
need to identify problems, define them in a way that is accessible to relevant audiences, 
and build coalitions. In the absence of strong or well-prepared policy entrepreneurs able 
and willing to seize a policy window, for instance in the case of focusing events, policy 
change is unlikely to materialise (Pralle, 2006). Policy entrepreneurs need to use policy 
windows opened up by contextual factors and construct favourable issue definitions 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) or frames (Nylander, 2001) to achieve policy change. In 
addition, they need to act as “political entrepreneurs” (Broscheid and Coen, 2003) by 
creating new institutional venues or by using existing institutional venues among the 
multiple EU venues receptive for the policy objectives.  
 
The theoretical propositions developed for this study are tested by qualitative 
comparative case study research. Key sources of information were primary and 
secondary documentation, press articles, research articles, and 47 semi-structured 
interviews.    
1.4 The structure of the thesis 
The study is divided into eight chapters. The following Chapter 2 sets the scene for this 
thesis by providing the general context to EU energy policy, the EU’s energy mix and 
major trends in EU energy supply and demand, major policy developments over the last 
decades and its legal basis.  
 
Chapter 3 develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of EU energy policy-
making. After briefly presenting different theoretical approaches to European 
integration that were mainly inspired by the international relations literature, Chapter 3 
argues that a comparative approach to the study of EU policy-making is most suitable 
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for the objective of this study, i.e. to contribute to a better understanding of EU energy 
policy-making. It then develops an EU agenda-setting framework for the analysis of EU 
energy policy-making and concludes with a review of relevant previous studies. 
 
Chapter 4 outlines the research design and methodological approach chosen for the 
empirical analysis. It defends the choice of a qualitative comparative case study 
approach while discussing its potential shortcomings and presenting ways of addressing 
them. It then elaborates the rationale for case study selection and outlines how the key 
concepts of the theoretical framework are operationalised. Finally, strategies for data 
collection and data analysis used in the empirical part of this thesis are presented. 
 
The empirical analysis of two case studies is presented in Chapters 5 and 6. An 
analysis of the policy process on the nuclear package is presented in Chapter 5, the RES 
policy process is analysed in Chapter 6. Both chapters provide a short background 
section to each case study including the EU policy and institutional context. They are 
then structured along the major steps of an issue career: issue initiation, issue 
specification and issue expansion. Chapter conclusions provide a summary of the key 
findings in each chapter. 
 
Chapter 7 presents a comparative analysis of the empirical findings in Chapters 5 and 
6. Building on the operationalisation of the key concepts developed in Chapter 4, it 
discusses the theoretical implications of the empirical findings for each key concept. 
 
Chapter 8 draws the study’s main conclusions together. It answers the research 
questions, summarises the study’s contribution to knowledge, its limitations and 
implications for future research. It concludes with tentative policy implications. 
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2 EU energy policy 
This chapter provides a general introduction to EU energy policy: more case study 
specific information related to EU energy policy is provided in sections  5.2 and  6.2. The 
objective of this chapter is to lay out major trends in the EU’s energy mix, key 
developments of EU energy policy in response to these trends and the legal basis for EU 
energy policy-making. The chapter does not aim to provide a legislative inventory of 
EU energy policy or to give an overview of national energy policies in EU Member 
States.2  
2.1 The EU’s energy mix and recent trends 
In order to understand key arguments in the EU energy policy-making process it is 
necessary to take account of the EU’s energy mix and major trends in the EU energy 
sector. While this section focuses on more recent historical developments in the EU’s 
energy mix since 1990 as the context for the analysed policy processes in this thesis, a 
brief overview on the situation in the early days of EU energy policy is provided as 
background information for major developments in this policy area in the 1970s and 
1980s. 
 
In 1970 the European Community energy consumption was 973 Mtoe of which 64% 
was resourced from oil, 23% from coal, 8% from natural gas and 5% from hydropower. 
It was expected that total demand would increase to 1,995 Mtoe by 1985 with 65% of 
this demand being met from oil, 15% from natural gas and 9% from nuclear energy. As 
a consequence energy import dependence was predicted to increase from 67% in 1970 
to 70% in 1980 (CEC, 1972). It was expected that this trend would only change in 1985 
mainly as a consequence of an increased share of nuclear energy (ibid.). Actual energy 
demand however did not follow the expected growth rates due to ambitious energy 
efficiency policies that were implemented also in response to the oil crises in the 1970s. 
In 1990 gross energy consumption of the EU27 was 1,660 Mtoe and increased to 1,825 
Mtoe in 2006. In 2006 oil contributed nearly 37%, natural gas 24%, solid fuels (mainly 
coal) around 18%, nuclear 14% and renewables 7% to cover EU27 energy consumption. 
While the share of solid fuels had declined since the 1990s, the share of gas increased. 
The contribution of nuclear energy remained rather stable, whereas renewables 
increased from a low level (CEC, 2009c). 
                                                 
2 For a recent overview on EU legislation in the field of energy policy see for example Moussis (2009). 
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Most EU27 Member States have a relatively high share of fuel imports in the total 
energy consumption as shown in Figure 1. The EU27’s share of imports in 2006 was 
over 50%. Before the adoption of the climate and energy package it was expected that 
the overall import share would increase to 65% by 2030 and that the import share in gas 
consumption would increase from 57% to 84% and import share in oil consumption 
from 82% to 93% (CEC, 2007b). While the overall EU import dependence of 50% in 
2006 was considerably lower than in the 1970s, the situation of a forecasted significant 
increase in energy import dependence had not changed significantly since 1970.  
 
As in the past, energy import dependence was used as justification for new policy 
measures at the EU level in order to increase the EU’s energy security. In 2000 the 
Commission presented a Green Paper on the security of EU energy supply that 
identified various energy policy options including nuclear energy and measures on 
nuclear safety and radioactive waste management (see  5.3.1). In January 2007 the EU’s 
energy import dependence was one major rationale for the publication of the climate 
and energy package sparked by the energy crises between Russia and Ukraine (see 
 6.3.1). 
 
Figure 1: Share of imports of solid fuels, gas and oil in EU27 in 2006 (in %) 
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Source: European Commission (CEC, 2009c) 
 
  
9
Apart from security of supply, concerns about climate change constituted a major driver 
for recent dynamics in EU energy policy-making. The energy sector is responsible for 
around 80% of the EU’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (CEC, 2009c). Electricity 
generation alone accounts for around one third of the EU’s GHG emissions and is 
therefore of relevance not only for security of supply reasons but also for the reduction 
of GHG emissions. In 2006 coal was used to generate 28.6% of the EU27’s gross 
electricity output, while gas contributed 21.1%, nuclear energy 29.5% and renewables 
14.6%.  
 
Figure 2 shows the considerable differences in the structure of national electricity 
generation among the EU27 Member States. National power generation portfolios 
ultimately reflect national preferences in energy policy and constitute an important 
factor in EU energy policy related decision-making processes. Extreme examples are 
the nuclear dominated French electricity system, the Austrian nuclear free power 
generation mix, and the Polish coal-based power sector.   
 
Figure 2: Share of energy sources in gross electricity generation in 2006 (EU27) 
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Source: European Commission (CEC, 2009c) 
 
Despite an increase in EU27 gross electricity consumption from 2,622 TWh to 3,357 
TWh between 1990 and 2006, RES could increase their share in gross electricity 
consumption from 11.8% to 14.6% in the same period. Yet, there is still a significant 
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gap compared to the 2010 renewable electricity (RES-E) objective of 21% with 
considerable differences among Member States (see Figure 3) (CEC, 2009c).  
 
Figure 3: Share of electricity from renewable energy sources in total electricity consumption (%) - 
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Source: European Commission (CEC, 2009c) 
 
Hydropower provides the largest component of renewables-based electricity generation 
in EU27. Among ‘new’ RES, biomass and wind (mostly onshore) showed the strongest 
increase in EU27 RES electricity generation since 1990; biomass increased from around 
17 TWh to 90 TWh and wind energy from below 1 TWh to 82 TWh (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Gross RES electricity generation in 2006 (EU27, without pumping) 
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The share of nuclear energy of gross energy consumption in EU27 remained rather 
stable over the last decades. In 2006 the share of nuclear energy in gross electricity 
generation in the EU27 was 23.5% (CEC, 2009c). 
2.2 Major developments in EU energy policy: security of supply, internal market 
and environmental protection 
Trends in the EU’s energy mix had important ramifications for major developments in 
EU energy policy and policy priorities over the last decades. Energy related issues have 
been at the core of the European Communities from the beginning as two founding 
treaties were concerned with the energy industry: the 1951 European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), which expired in 2002, and the 1957 European Atomic Energy 
Community (EAEC). These treaties covered the coal and nuclear sectors and, in 
principle, aimed at the creation of free and integrated markets in both sectors 
(McGowan, 1993).  
 
Although the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) 
in 1957 contained no provisions on energy policy, it had implications for the energy 
industry by its provisions on competition policy, in particular those dealing with state 
enterprises and their conduct; these were hardly used until the 1980s (ibid.). Since then 
the European Commission has struggled to establish itself in the field of energy policy. 
Early attempts resulted in policy proposals and later the Commission also sought to 
include an explicit Community competence on energy in Community primary law in 
subsequent treaty revisions which succeeded eventually in the new Title XX on Energy 
of the Lisbon Treaty3. The last five decades of EU energy policy, or attempts to 
introduce such a policy, have been characterised by changing priorities and policy 
objectives. In the early days competition in the energy market(s) and security of supply 
were key objectives, whereas environmental protection grew in importance from the 
early 1990s. Adjustments in policy priorities were mainly caused by changes in the 
policy context and institutional changes in EU energy policy-making. 
 
Despite the Suez crisis in 1956 and the subsequent increasing concern with secure 
energy supplies, until the oil crisis of 1973, the underlying assumption of Community 
                                                 
3 New Title XX “Energy”, Art. 176A allocates powers to the European Union “in the context of the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve 
the environment”. 
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energy policy was that cheap energy was more important than secure supplies for 
economic growth; furthermore it was assumed that trade with oil exporting countries 
provided mutually beneficial relationships (Alting von Geusau, 1975). The “First 
Guidelines Towards a Community Energy Policy” published in 1968 argued that: “since 
the energy policy is intended to serve the consumers’ interests, its basic guiding factor 
must be competition” (CEC, 1968: 7). However, nothing substantial was agreed by 
Member States regarding whether a Community energy policy should follow this or any 
other direction. National energy markets were dominated by national monopoly utilities. 
 
While the continuous increase in energy demand and the increased share of energy 
imports in the Community’s energy supply mix since the 1950s (see  2.1) had already 
been identified in an earlier Commission analysis (CEC, 1972), the 1973/74 oil crisis 
reinforced a major shift in the EU’s energy policy priorities towards security of supply. 
The 1974 Community strategy therefore put the reduction of the Community’s energy 
dependence at the top of the agenda and R&D policy was considered as “one of the 
important elements of this new strategy” (CEC, 1974: 8). While a Community directive 
on the maintenance of minimum stocks of fossil fuels was adopted in 1975 (CEC, 
1975), this strategy, aimed at a Community energy policy, was not very successful. This 
was expressed in the Commission’s own assessment in 1977: “It is now nearly four 
years since oil prices quadrupled, and the Community's energy policy is still unclear” 
(CEC, 1977: 4). Developments were overshadowed by the establishment of the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) and diverging national interests. After the UK had 
discovered large North Sea oil and gas reserves within its territory, it was opposed to 
any policy development at the European level that could have undermined its national 
sovereignty on these reserves (Black, 1977).  
 
Overall the developments in the 1970s and the attention paid to security of supply 
affected the objective of Community energy policy: policy was to deal with the 
structure of energy balances rather than with the structure of energy markets 
(McGowan, 1993). Despite these ‘formal failures’ to establish a comprehensive 
Community policy McGowan (1996b: 14) argued that by the 1980s the Commission 
had succeeded in establishing a place in energy policy-making. Its role was essentially 
in information gathering, target-setting, and enabling activities through R&D funding 
(ibid.). The main objective of these early attempts towards a Community energy policy 
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was to reduce vulnerability to energy shocks and thereby to ensure the effective 
functioning of European economies. 
 
From the mid-1980s there was a reorientation in Community energy policy towards 
establishing an internal energy market. This was a result of developments in national 
energy markets, changes in Member States governments’ attitudes towards the energy 
industries and a strengthened position of the Commission in Community decision-
making (McGowan, 1993). Besides developments in other sectors with ramifications for 
the energy sector, the key development was the new impetus for the European 
integration process through the Single European Act (SEA), signed in 1985, and the 
Internal Market Agenda adopted in 1986 (Matláry, 1997).  
 
As a result of the SEA the Commission could act more powerfully in the energy sector 
on the basis of majority voting related to the internal market, and as a result of the 
Maastricht Treaty from 1993 – reinforced by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 – with 
respect to environmental issues (Andersen, 2001). The Commission proposed policies 
and regulations, to include the energy sector, and sought to bring the energy industries 
into line with principles of Community law and in particular with competition 
provisions (McGowan, 1996a). Initiatives on energy policy were therefore not driven by 
positive objectives related to energy but by general deregulation policy objectives 
(Andersen, 2001). The Commission assumed that energy policy related objectives 
would be achieved by these more general policy objectives. 
 
In the late 1980s the internal market became the driving force in Community energy 
policy as acknowledged in the 1995 White Paper:  
 
“Market integration is the central, determining factor in the Community’s energy 
policy. Without such integration other activities lose their justification since their 
essential aim is to use Community support instruments, such as the Trans-
European Networks, in order to help in providing production, transport and 
distribution infrastructures enabling the European market to respond to demand, or 
to make supplies to that same market dependable. A fragmented market refers all 
such activities back to national level, and could undermine efforts to improve the 
Community’s competitiveness.” (CEC, 1995b: 3).  
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This market approach was reflected in the first electricity directive that aimed at the 
introduction of a free European electricity market; this was proposed in 1992 and 
adopted in 1996 (CEC, 1997a). A similar directive for the gas market was adopted in 
1998 (CEC, 1998b) and a second liberalisation package was adopted in 2003 (CEC, 
2003b; c) amending both directives with the objective to introduce an integrated 
European energy market by 2007. In reaction to insufficient progress a third 
liberalisation package was announced in 2007 and adopted in 2009 in order to ensure a 
fully integrated and competitive European energy market (CEC, 2009a; b).  
 
Apart from energy market liberalisation the new policy dynamic after the adoption of 
the SEA was most visible in the area of environmental protection (McGowan, 1996a). 
Building on the European Environmental Action Programmes first published in 1973, 
the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) was proposed by the Commission in 
1983 on the legal basis of Art. 100 and 235 EEC. It was adopted in 1988 on the legal 
basis of the new Art. 130s EEC as a measure against acid rain (Council, 1988). This 
trend towards environmental objectives in EU energy policy was reinforced after 
environmental objectives were enshrined in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties (see 
2.3). Moreover, in 1990 climate change emerged formally on the EU agenda leading to 
joint conclusions by the Energy and Environment Council that called for a stabilisation 
of CO2 emissions at the 1990 level by 2000. Since the 1990s several energy efficiency 
directives and regulations as well as RES targets have been adopted (see also  6.2).  
 
Although the liberalisation agenda was the predominant driver in the early 1990s, 
environmental issues, and in particular climate change, gained in importance in the late 
1990s particularly after the Kyoto summit in 1997 (Collier, 2002). The Commission, 
and in particular DG Environment, was increasingly keen to establish itself as a global 
leader in climate change policy as incorporated in the EU’s emissions trading system 
(ETS) (Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2008). 
 
Increasing oil prices, and the recognition of climate change as global policy challenge, 
strengthened the Community’s drive to focus on security of supply and climate change 
alongside the ongoing drive for energy market liberalisation (CEC, 2000b). This 
resulted in new initiatives in the area of nuclear energy and renewable energy sources. 
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Climate change and energy security as key priorities in Community energy policy were 
apparent in the latest wave of Community energy policy-making, initiated at the 
informal European Council at Hampton Court in autumn 2005, and led to the 
publication of the climate and energy package at the beginning of 2007 (for more details 
see Chapter  6). 
2.3 Legal basis of EU energy policy 
After the expiry of the ECSC in 2002, the EAEC remains as the only fuel specific 
Treaty providing the Community with a legal basis to deal with issues related to nuclear 
energy. The EC Treaty was applicable to all other types of fuel until the Lisbon Treaty 
came into force on 1 December 2009, but did not lay down any specific legal basis for 
energy policy except for trans-European networks (Art. 154).  
 
However, Community competence in a certain policy area cannot only be derived from 
a specific legal basis included in the Treaties, but also from horizontal policy objectives 
enshrined therein (Cameron, 2007a). On the basis of the EC Treaty two mechanisms 
were the basis for the gradual establishment of an EU energy policy (Delvaux and 
Guimaraes-Purokoski, 2008: 21-27): first, Community action by enforcing general EC 
Treaty provisions and, second, by adopting secondary legislation on the basis of 
Community competences in the internal market and in relation to environmental 
objectives. Relevant EC Treaty provisions include the rules on the free movement of 
goods (Art. 28-31), the rules on the right of establishment and the free movement of 
services and capital (Art. 43-60), the rules on competition (Art. 81-82 and 86), and the 
rules on State aid (Art. 87-88). Secondary legislation was mainly based on Art. 95 
relating to measures to achieve the internal market, Art. 174-176 on environmental 
policy and Art. 308 allowing Community action to achieve objectives enshrined in the 
EC Treaty in the absence of specific provisions.  
 
Among the objectives of Community environmental policy under Art. 174, those most 
relevant to energy policy were “preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the 
environment” and the “prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources”. These 
provided a legal basis for policy measures in the field of energy efficiency and the 
promotion of ‘clean’ energy sources such as renewable energy (see also  6.2.1). 
According to Art. 175 decisions based on Art. 174 are, in general, subject to the co-
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decision procedure under Art. 251. However, “measures significantly affecting a 
Member State’s choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its 
energy supply” (Art. 175(c)) require unanimity among Member States after consultation 
with the EP (as well as the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions). Art. 176 allows Member States to maintain or introduce more stringent 
protective measures than those adopted under Art. 175, as long as these measures are 
compatible with the Treaty and are notified to the Commission. 
 
Thus, while proposals on the basis of Art. 308 and Art. 175(2) need to be adopted 
unanimously by the Council after consulting the EP, decisions under Art. 95 and Art. 
175(1) are subject to the co-decision procedure under Art. 251. This was after the 
Amsterdam Treaty extended the co-decision procedure as standard procedure in 
environmental policy legislation. Thus there is no procedural difference between Art. 95 
and Art. 175(1).  
 
To sum up, this brief overview shows that the legal basis for nuclear energy has 
remained unchanged over the last decades, whereas the legal basis for other areas of 
energy policy has changed considerably due to changes in EU environmental policy. 
The introduction of an explicit EU competence in environmental policy, and the gradual 
full involvement of the EP in this policy area, enabled new policy initiatives in the field 
of energy efficiency and renewable energy in particular. Sections  5.2 and  6.2 will 
elaborate this further in view of the two case studies of EU energy policy analysed in 
this thesis. 
2.4 Chapter conclusions 
This brief overview of EU energy policy has shown that contextual and institutional 
changes have significantly affected major developments in EU energy policy since the 
late 1960s. Concerns on import dependence were a key driver for the development of 
energy policy objectives at the Community level. In the 1990s it was environmental 
concerns that became a central driver for EU energy policy initiatives. This was also 
due to increasing concerns about climate change and stimulated by changes in EU 
primary law that enabled new EU policy initiatives in the environmental policy area. 
The following chapter develops a theoretical framework to better understand how 
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different factors – including contextual and institutional elements – influenced EU 
energy policy-making. 
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3 Theoretical framework 
3.1 Introduction 
This thesis draws mainly upon two strands of literature: EU studies and agenda-setting 
theories. The chapter argues that an agenda-setting framework is a suitable and 
theoretically robust framework to explain stability and change of EU energy policy. The 
next section discusses theoretical frameworks for the analysis of public policy in the 
context of EU policy-making and justifies the choice of agenda-setting frameworks. It 
then reviews two key contributions to the agenda-setting literature: Kingdon’s Multiple 
Stream Framework (MSF) and Baumgartner and Jones’ Punctuated Equilibrium Theory 
(PET). Building on these two frameworks the section elaborates an agenda-setting 
framework for the analysis of EU policy-making to serve as a basis for the subsequent 
analysis. It thus integrates key concepts from the agenda-setting literature and relevant 
contributions from EU studies. The proposed framework puts particular emphasis on 
four conceptual elements: contextual factors, policy entrepreneurs, issue definition, and 
venue shopping. This framework will finally be discussed in the context of energy 
policy analysis. 
3.2 EU policy-making and the analysis of public policy-making 
3.2.1 Understanding European integration 
This section briefly reviews European integration theories in order to locate previous 
studies and my analysis of EU energy policy in the European integration literature. The 
early European integration literature builds strongly on frameworks developed for the 
analysis of international relations as reflected in early neo-functionalist and 
intergovernmentalist accounts of European integration (Rosamond, 2000)4.  
 
Neo-functionalist approaches to European integration assume that functional integration 
at the economic or legal level will eventually lead to political unification as a result of 
functional spillover effects (Haas, 1958 [1968]; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970). 
According to this perspective it is not nation states and their respective governments but 
national elites who are key actors in European integration. It is expected that, for 
                                                 
4 Rosamond underlines the central role of theories when analysing EU integration and EU policy-making: 
“’Integration theory’ […] matters not just because of what it can tell us about the development of the EU 
or processes or regionalization, but also because of what it can tell us about the use of a fertile empirical 
location for the conceptual and theoretical development of the political sciences […]”Rosamond (2000: 
18). 
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example, interest groups that used to act at the national level with national governments 
and institutions as their target groups increasingly seek to influence the supranational 
level. With increasing awareness of the benefits of market integration this creates 
pressure for progress in political integration. Neo-functionalists expect Member States’ 
power to weaken whereas transnational and supranational actor coalitions gain in 
influence and power. The slow down in European integration in the 1960s and 1970s 
questioned this theoretical perspective5, although it regained attention as a result of the 
integration push associated with the SEA in the mid 1980s and by the Maastricht Treaty 
in the early 1990s (Burley and Mattli, 1993).6  
 
By contrast, intergovernmentalists argue that neo-functionalist theory underestimated 
the shelf life of the European nation state. They argue that Member States as the central 
actors in the integration process were strengthened rather than weakened by abandoning 
their sovereignty (Hoffmann, 1966; Milward, 1992). In contrast to neo-functionalist 
theory where national preferences are determined by the constellation among Member 
States at the international level, intergovernmentalists argue that domestic issues 
influence Member States’ positions at the EU level. This was further developed by 
Moravcsik (1993) into liberal intergovernmentalism. That approach combines 
intergovernmentalism with a liberal theory of governments’ preferences and rational 
choice theory in international relations where Member States agree to shift power to the 
supranational institutions to underline their mutual commitment that is in their own 
interest. Thus, power shift from the national to the supranational level is not only 
determined by the international context. 
 
Although there are important differences between these two strands of literature, 
Hooghe and Marks argue that neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists “talked past 
each other” (Hooghe and Marks, 2009: 4), the former focusing on day-to-day policy-
making, the latter interested in major treaties.   
                                                 
5 In the foreword to the 1968 edition of his book, Haas himself had already acknowledged several 
shortcomings of neo-functionalist theories to European integration one of which was the re-emergence of 
nationalism in some Member States (e.g. France) that limited the predicted integration mechanism to 
materialise Haas (1958 [1968]). 
6 For a more recent assessment on neo-functionalist approaches to European integration see Börzel 
(2005). 
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3.2.2 EU policy-making 
While these theoretical perspectives on European integration will help to better 
understand studies of European integration in the field of energy policy (see  3.4.2), in 
the early 1990s the dominance of international relations in EU studies that regarded the 
EU predominantly as an international organisation was increasingly questioned. Instead 
analytical tools of comparative politics were brought forward as an alternative route in 
EU studies (Sbragia, 1992). The international relations perspective, central to European 
integration studies, was increasingly challenged by scholars interested in the EU as a 
political system applying theoretical frameworks mainly developed for the analysis of 
national policy processes to EU studies (e.g. Pollack, 2005: 26ff).  
 
New institutionalism that emerged in the political science literature in the 1980s 
emphasised the role of institutions as intervening variables in the policy process. New 
institutionalism’s main points can be summarised as follows: “Without denying the 
importance of both the social context of politics and the motives of individual actors, 
the new institutionalism insists on a more autonomous role for political institutions” 
(March and Olsen, 1984: 738). From this perspective the processes of politics are as 
much of analytical interest as the decisions or outputs of the policy process themselves. 
New institutionalism was picked up by European integration scholars and resulted in the 
development of three ‘branches’ of new institutionalism in European integration 
studies: rational choice, historical, and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 
1996; Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000). 
 
In 1994 Hix (1994) argued that comparative politics7 had a more important role to play 
in the analysis of EU politics in order to “shed light on the nature of decision-making at 
the European level, rather than on the importance of organised interests for the 
development of national positions towards integration” (Hix, 1994: 14). More insight 
into the dynamics of policy-making at the EU level was considered necessary. It was 
argued that the EU could be regarded as a political system comparable to national 
political systems. From this it follows that analytical frameworks for the analysis of 
public policy developed in national contexts can be applied ‘off the shelf’ to the 
analysis of EU policy processes (Hix, 2005), or as concluded elsewhere: “the approach 
                                                 
7 I follow Hix’ definition of “comparative politics” defined by “its discourse rather than its method”. Hix 
differentiates between “comparative politics (the study of the internal politics of political systems) and 
comparative analysis (a particular method of enquiry)” Hix (1994: Endnote 2). 
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of the EU as a ‘polity like’ entity does appear to be an appropriate analytical device to 
use, at least as far as sectoral EU policy analysis is concerned” (Pallis, 2006: 154).  
 
As for any other political system scholars studying EU policy-making and the EU 
policy process agree that there is no single model of EU policy-making. Instead the 
underlying policy process varies systematically across issue areas and over time (e.g. 
Wallace, Wallace et al., 2005b; Richardson, 2006). Wallace, Wallace et al. (2005a: 9) 
argue that “[d]ifferent lenses may be needed depending on the division of powers and 
influences between these different levels and arenas of policy development”. While the 
EU institutions involved need to play a central role in the analysis of the EU policy 
process country-level processes including the national and infra-national dimension, as 
well as the global level also need to be taken into account (ibid.).  
 
This is reflected in the multi-level governance perspective on EU policy-making 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Bache and Flinders, 2004; Jordan and Schout, 2006; Kohler-
Koch and Rittberger, 2006; Tömmel, 2008a), which argues that authority and influence 
on the EU policy-making process are shared across multiple levels of government, 
including sub-national, national and supranational levels. Multi-level governance 
(MLG) approaches question a state-centric model on European integration and EU 
policy-making. National governments have no monopoly on EU policy-making or on 
the aggregation of national interests. MLG scholars assign independent influence to 
supranational institutions in EU policy-making, and recognise the influence of non-state 
actors at the various levels involved:  
 
“National governments no longer monopolize EU decision making, partly because 
the European Parliament has become a co-legislator over much EU policy; 
increased public scrutiny of EU decision making increases the weight of public 
opinion on government policy; and national governments have limited control 
over supranational agents, such as the European Commission and the European 
Court of Justice” (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 8). 
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No policy model can readily be applied to the EU policy process due to the strong 
variations among different EU policy processes.8 Any choice for a particular theoretical 
lens for the analysis of an EU policy process needs to be justified on the grounds of the 
policy field studied as well as the level and timing of the analysis. The choice of the 
theoretical framework in this thesis is based on the assumption that EU energy policy-
making is closer to the garbage can model than to a rational choice model. The latter 
assumes that policy-making is based on clear policy objectives against which rational 
solutions are developed, adopted and implemented.9  
 
As in a garbage can model originally developed by Cohen, March et al. (1972), the EU 
energy policy process is characterised by, first, poorly defined preferences and a loose 
collection of ideas, second, unclear technology with respect to decision processes, and, 
finally a fluid participation in the process. The introduction to European energy policy 
has illustrated these characteristics in this policy field (see Chapter  2). Changing energy 
policy objectives revealed a lack of clarity in preferences and ideas – reinforced by the 
involvement of a diverse range of national preferences and ideas. Decision processes 
were unclear due to the absence of a jurisdictional competence in this policy field – 
apart from the Euratom Treaty. The strong increase in stakeholders involved and 
interested in European energy policy over the last two decades showed fluid access to 
the policy process. In the following section it is argued that agenda-setting theories can 
serve as an appropriate framework to shed light into the ‘garbage can’ of EU energy 
policy-making. 
3.2.3 Agenda-setting frameworks for policy analysis 
The process of public policy-making – the subject of this study – is here defined as 
“[…] the manner in which problems get conceptualised and brought to government for 
solution; governmental institutions formulate alternatives and select policy solutions; 
and those solutions get implemented, evaluated, and revised” (Sabatier, 1999: 3). 
Problem or issue definition, as well as the formulation of alternatives, might however 
not only happen within governmental institutions but can involve a wide range of policy 
entrepreneurs. 
                                                 
8 The variations in EU policy processes and their multi-faceted nature are well illustrated in Nugent 
(2006): see in particular chapters 17, 18 and 19 on the budget policy, agricultural policy, and external 
relations. 
9 On general arguments why the EU policy-making is closer to a garbage can model than a rational choice 
model see for example Richardson (2006). 
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In the policy analysis literature it was suggested to distinguish between different stages 
in the policy process (e.g. problem definition, agenda-setting, policy formulation, and 
implementation) (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995). This stages perspective has been 
criticised for portraying the policy process misleadingly as a process of more or less 
independent stages (Parsons, 1995; Hill, 2005). It is now widely acknowledged that the 
policy process does not happen in independent stages but in highly interdependent 
sequences. Nevertheless, the stages model is considered as a useful heuristic device to 
order the research process (John, 1998). Here it is suggested to use a basic distinction 
between the processes before and after the formal adoption of a policy, i.e. agenda-
setting and policy formulation as opposed to policy implementation and evaluation.  
 
The study of agenda-setting processes is a well-established research field in the political 
science literature and was originally interested in the question of how an issue becomes 
an issue on the agenda. Agendas can be distinguished between formal agendas, where 
issues receive serious attention from decision makers, as compared to the public agenda 
“which consists of issues which have achieved a high level of public interest and 
visibility” (Cobb, Ross et al., 1976: 126). In general terms an agenda can be defined as 
“the set of issues that are seriously considered in a polity” (Princen, 2007: 28). 
Theoretical frameworks for the analysis of agenda-setting were developed in the US 
context and are mostly interested in formal agendas (Cobb, Ross et al., 1976; 
Baumgartner and Jones, 1991; Kingdon, 1995 [1984]). Kingdon (1995) distinguishes 
between the ‘governmental agenda’ and ‘decision agenda’, where issues on the 
governmental agenda attract serious attention by decision-makers and issues on the 
decision agenda are up for an active decision by decision-makers.  
 
The term ‘agenda building’, used in the early agenda-setting literature, can be defined as 
follows: “The process by which demands of various groups in the population are 
translated into items vying for the serious attention of public officials […]” (Cobb, Ross 
et al., 1976: 126), and the basic interest is to “account for variation in the ways issues 
get on the agenda and in rates of success at achieving agenda status” (ibid.). In their 
model Cobb et al. (1976) distinguish between four stages in an issue career starting 
from issue initiation followed by issue specification and issue expansion until the 
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entrance to the formal agenda. These stages are different according to the underlying 
agenda-building process.  
 
Three such processes can be distinguished: first, the outside initiative model where 
issues arise in nongovernmental groups; second, the mobilisation model where issues 
come from inside government and are very likely to become part of the formal agenda 
and decision-makers seek issue expansion from the formal agenda to the public agenda, 
e.g. for the purpose of implementation; finally, the inside initiative model where the 
issue also arises within the governmental domain, but is not intended to be expanded to 
the public agenda. In the latter case decision-makers aim to prevent expansion on the 
public agenda and seek instead “a more ‘private’ decision within the government” 
(Cobb, Ross et al., 1976: 135). 
 
Before coming back to these models of agenda-building in the EU context, the 
following paragraphs will briefly present two major agenda-setting frameworks: 
Kingdon’s (1995 [1984]) Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) and Baumgartner and 
Jones’ (1993) Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET). It is these two theories that serve 
as the main theoretical basis for the analytical framework applied in the subsequent 
analysis. They are considered as robust analytical frameworks in this area of research 
because their concepts and propositions are relatively clear and have been used widely 
by scholars in the political science literature (Sabatier, 2007).  
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework 
Kingdon’s MSF differentiates between governmental agenda and decision agenda, 
where issues on the governmental agenda attract attention within government and issues 
on the decision agenda are up for active decision as mentioned above. The MSF aims to 
explain why some issues make it to the decision agenda while others do not, and why in 
some cases alternative policies are considered and in others are not. It distinguishes 
between three independent streams or processes: problems, policies, and politics. These 
streams are captured by a number of variables. The problems stream includes focusing 
events and changing or new indicators (e.g. statistics), the policy stream is mainly 
concerned with new solutions and proposals, and the politics stream includes public 
opinion or administrative changes. Only if all three streams come together at one point 
in time, a policy window for an issue to make it to the governmental agenda opens. 
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According to Kingdon the initial step in terms of opening a policy window is usually 
caused by developments in the problem or politics stream – not in the policy stream 
(Kingdon, 1995 [1984]: 173f).  
 
However, the opening of policy windows is necessary but not sufficient for change in 
the governmental agenda. Kingdon highlights the role of policy entrepreneurs for the 
coupling of the three different streams as a precondition for agenda and policy change. 
Policy entrepreneurs are defined as “advocates who are willing to invest their resources 
– time, energy, reputation, money – to promote a position in return for anticipated future 
gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits” (Kingdon, 1995 [1984]: 
179). Kingdon differentiates between different bureaucratic incentives for action, 
although in Kingdon’s framework the term ‘policy entrepreneur’ is not limited to 
bureaucrats but includes all advocates with an interest in the policy field. Bureaucratic 
incentives include material gains that can be linked to personal issues, such as 
maintaining or furthering one’s career, or to broader dimensions such as expanding 
administrative jurisdiction, purposive benefits that refer more to the values or beliefs of 
policy entrepreneurs, and solidary incentives which refer to the wish of being close to 
the power and where the decisions are taken as part of a team. To achieve one or all of 
these benefits, policy entrepreneurs need to use policy windows defined as “an 
opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to 
their special problems” (Kingdon, 1995 [1984]: 165).  
 
Whilst Kingdon’s framework has attracted much interest by policy analysts, it has been 
criticised for being not specific enough about the processes and for assuming that the 
three streams (problems, policies, and politics) are largely independent from each other 
(e.g. Zahariadis, 2007). The lack of detail makes it difficult to clearly distinguish 
between dependent and independent factors in the policy process and therefore to 
identify the causes for change. Its lack of specification and its strong emphasis on 
situational or temporal factors were identified as other shortcomings (Mucciaroni, 
1992). Mucciarioni (1992) suggests four improvements to strengthen Kingdon’s MSF 
framework: first, to use it as a general framework to develop a more concrete 
proposition about the political and institutional conditions under which issues make it to 
the agenda or not; second, to include structural factors in the framework; third, to embed 
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agenda change in broader historical patterns; and, finally, to acknowledge the 
interdependence between the three streams. 
Baumgartner and Jones’ Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) 
In addition to Kingdon whose focus was on the question why an issue makes it to the 
decision agenda, Baumgartner and Jones’ PET aims to explain policy change and 
stability. Instead of a general equilibrium in the policy process that leads to path 
dependency in the policy process, they argue for a punctuated equilibrium where 
stability “may be maintained over long periods of time by two major devices: the 
existing structure of political institutions and the definition of the issues processed by 
those institutions” (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 15). Issue definition is considered as 
the “driving force in both stability and instability” (ibid.: 16), also because it can 
mobilise new actors. Issue definition depends however on the political institutions in 
place. Stability is characterised by a negative feedback process where changes are 
refuted, while positive feedback processes through mobilisation and the entry of new 
participants contribute to the redefinition of issues. This can shift an issue to the 
‘macropolitical agenda’ and cause large-scale policy change as part of a positive 
feedback process. Such a positive feedback process can be caused by a change in policy 
images and in institutional venues (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).  
 
Baumgartner and Jones (1991: 1045) define policy image as “the interaction of beliefs 
and particular values concerning a particular policy”. A favourable interplay between 
policy image and institutional venue can lead to policy subsystems that are highly 
favourable to a given industry or technology. However, policy images and venues can 
sometimes change quite rapidly as a consequence of issue re-definition as a result of 
mobilisation by new entrants and a positive feedback-process. Institutional (or policy) 
venues are defined as “institutional locations where authoritative decisions are made 
concerning a given issue” (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 32). They do not narrowly 
refer to formal institutions or a spatial dimension, but include informal institutions 
within or across formal institutions such as informal cross-departmental working 
groups. Furthermore, building on this definition, the concept can be applied to all 
relevant decisions that lead to the formal adoption of a policy. The perception of a 
certain policy image will depend on the institutional venue. Since each institutional 
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venue “has its own language, set of participants, and limitations” (True, Jones et al., 
2007: 162) it affects the agenda-setting process and finally policy outputs. 
 
Drawing upon Schattschneider’s (1960) work on conflict expansion in the policy 
process, Baumgartner and Jones introduce the concept of venue shopping. When policy 
entrepreneurs cannot reach their goals in a given policy venue, they try to expand or 
shift a policy issue from one policy venue to another in order to reach a venue that is 
more receptive to their policy objectives. The objective can be policy change or 
stability. The search for the appropriate policy venue is, however, complicated. “[N]one 
is inherently better than any other. Policymakers use manipulation of the understandings 
of polices as purposive tools in their search for the policy venue which will be most 
favourable to their interests” (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 36). To achieve issue 
expansion into new policy venues, actors need to justify why new venues should 
consider the issue in question. This can be achieved by using changing policy images.  
 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argue that a new understanding or a new image for a 
given problem or solution is important for policy change. Moreover, they consider issue 
definition as “central to political processes in disequilibrium” (Baumgartner and Jones, 
1993: 23) and therefore policy change. Furthermore, policy images are identified as 
important elements in expanding issues beyond a rather closed policy subsystem or 
policy monopolies. Policy monopolies have a clearly defined institutional structure that 
limits access to the policy process, and a powerful supporting idea associated with the 
institution, ideas that are often related to core interests of political systems (e.g. 
economic growth) (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). As Baumgartner and Jones (1991: 
1049) put it: “The degree to which problems are tightly linked to images is related to the 
degree to which a single arena of policymaking exerts monopolistic control over a 
policy”. The entrance of new participants with their values, beliefs and interests in the 
policy process often affect the issue definition and the policy image.  
 
Of similar importance is the definition of alternatives – alternative problem definitions 
or alternative solutions to the problem. In his seminal work Schattschneider concludes 
that “the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power […] because 
the definition of the alternatives is the choice of conflicts, and the choice of conflicts 
allocates power” (Schattschneider, 1960: 66). Subsequent studies suggest the distinction 
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between three levels of political conflict (Baumgartner, 1989): first, the existence of a 
problem; second, the best solution for a problem; and, finally, the best means for 
implementation. At each level of conflict (re-)definition plays an important role in 
enabling and restricting participation (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994). Yet, Baumgartner’s 
analysis of nuclear power in the US and France shows that there is not necessarily a 
conflict over problem definition (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991). The socio-political and 
institutional context is an important component as well. In some cases dominant values 
or rules exclude alternative problem definitions (Bosso, 1994: 198f).  
 
Despite being “an excellent and theoretically well informed” (John, 1998: 182) 
analytical framework, John identifies three shortcomings of PET: first, the approach is 
mainly descriptive that suggests associations but less causal relationships; second, it 
assumes a ‘bottom-up’ approach where people from the outside can influence the 
agenda-setting process and thus the policy outcome, while neglecting the influence of 
political decision-makers on the agenda and policy outcome; finally, it does not capture 
changes outside the studied policy sector that initiate change. 
 
Both agenda-setting frameworks, MSF and PET, have been developed in the context of 
the US political system and they have been mostly applied to national policy process 
and contributed to a better understanding of national policy-making. MSF was used to 
explain agenda-setting in British telecommunications and rail sectors (e.g. Zahariadis, 
1992; Zahariadis, 1996). PET became subject of a large research programme since the 
early 1990s, using longitudinal data collections to explain policy change and stability 
with a more recent interest in comparative agenda analysis (John, 2006).10 
3.2.4 Alternative frameworks for policy analysis 
Besides MSF and PET, different theoretical frameworks have been developed in the 
public policy literature to analyse policy change (for a recent overview see for example 
Sabatier, 2007). Major alternative theoretical frameworks include the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (ACF) and Policy Network Analysis (PNA).  
 
ACF, originally developed in 1988 (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1988), has since then 
been frequently used for the analysis of environmental and energy policy (for an 
                                                 
10 For more information on the Policy Agendas Project see http://www.policyagendas.org/. 
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overview see Sabatier and Weible, 2007). It was also put forward as useful tool to 
analyse EU policy process (Sabatier, 1998). Key to policy change in the ACF 
framework are exogenous perturbations that change resources and beliefs among 
different advocacy coalitions. Policy brokers need to exploit such opportunities for 
policy change. The ACF framework was applied to various EU policy processes in 
different policy fields and was considered a useful framework (e.g. Radaelli, 1997; 
Dudley and Richardson, 1999; Nedergaard, 2008)11. However, Radaelli (1997) argues 
that it does not pay enough attention to endogenous elements of change in the EU policy 
process. Although the ACF framework has been revised and the role of internal process 
and the role of policy entrepreneurs acknowledged, its focus is still on stable advocacy 
coalitions over a long period of time, and change is mainly stimulated by external 
shocks, policy-oriented learning or “hurting stalemate” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 
208). While external perturbations have been crucial in the development of EU energy 
policy in the past, it is assumed here that internal EU policy dynamics play an equally 
important role. Furthermore, the institutional dimension seems to be not sufficiently 
considered in the ACF framework, which has been proved as an important factor in the 
EU policy process as the literature on EU energy policy-making ( 3.4.2) shows.  
 
PNA attracted increasing attention among scholars of EU studies in the 1990s when the 
transnational dimension of EU politics was increasingly acknowledged. PNA was 
considered as a useful analytical tool because the EU is not composed of typical 
institutions providing bargaining opportunities to different kinds of actors, and because 
policy formulation is of central importance for policy outcomes (Peterson, 1995a).12 In 
addition PNA should allow the consideration of various levels and actors involved in 
EU politics (Risse-Kappen, 1996). PNA puts particular emphasis on resource 
dependencies among different actors and has often been used in the analysis of EU 
policy-making (Richardson, 2006).  
 
However, the arguments put forward in support of PNA can equally be applied to the 
other frameworks of public policy analysis. One major shortcoming of PNA is that it is 
                                                 
11 Hirschl (2008) applied the ACF framework to EU RES policy-making within a multi-level policy 
analysis of German RES policy. 
12 For a comprehensive discussion of different conceptions of policy networks in EU studies see Börzel 
(1998), for a more recent discussion on the role of networks in EU governance research see Börzel and 
Heard-Lauréote (2009). 
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more of a descriptive tool used to identify relationships between key players in the 
policy processes and nodes in these networks, without allowing the identification of 
clear causal linkages between the identified networks and the developments in the 
policy outcomes (John, 1998). In the EU context, PNA was criticised for not being able 
to fully grasp the fluidity and fragmentation of EU policy-making, for not taking into 
account the institutional complexity of the EU that affects EU decision-making and for 
the difficulty in setting clear boundaries (Kassim, 1994)13. 
 
To summarise, on the basis of this brief review of frameworks for the analysis of public 
policy, this thesis puts agenda-setting frameworks in the centre of its analytical 
framework. The above review of MSF and PET suggests that both frameworks are 
complementary. Each of them provides concepts that can help in the analysis of EU 
policy-making processes. As will be discussed in the next section, more recently 
agenda-setting frameworks have been put forward as useful tools for the analysis of EU 
policy-making and applied systematically to EU policy processes. These studies 
indicate that this analytical perspective can be a promising approach to improve our 
understanding of the dynamics of EU policy-making. Kingdon’s MSF fits well with the 
EU policy process, in particular with respect to the role of policy entrepreneurs who 
need to use policy windows to achieve formal agenda status. PET adds other important 
concepts: the role of institutional venues and the influence of the dominant policy image 
or issue definition for policy change and stability. By emphasising the role of new 
entrants PET reinforces the role of policy entrepreneurs in EU agenda-setting.  
3.3 A framework for analysis of EU policy processes 
As Richardson (2006: 25) underlined “the complexity of the EU policy process means 
that we must learn to live with multiple models and learn to utilise concepts from a 
range of models in order to help us describe it as accurately as possible”. In order to 
respond to this challenge this section develops an analytical framework that integrates 
central concepts of the agenda-setting literature as reviewed in Section  3.2.3, and 
includes additional insights from EU studies in relation to the four central concepts of 
the framework: contextual factors, policy entrepreneurs, issue definition, and venue 
shopping.  
                                                 
13 For a reply to Kassim’s critique on PNA see Peterson (1995b). 
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3.3.1 EU agenda-setting research 
In the EU context agenda-setting is a rather new strand of research which could make 
several contributions to EU studies in general (Princen, 2007: 22): a better 
understanding of EU policy-making, possibly identifying structural biases in the EU 
policy-making process, and finally providing insights into the EU integration process. 
This thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of EU energy policy-making by 
using an agenda-setting framework. According to Princen (2007: 34) EU agenda-setting 
is different from domestic agenda-setting in three ways: the role of public mobilisation 
is limited; the EU’s limited jurisdictional basis as compared to nation states makes it 
more difficult to get certain issues on the EU agenda; and the EU decision-making 
process requires strong majorities to have a proposal passed. 
 
Most studies that have used agenda-setting approaches to EU policy processes applied 
rational choice models to analyse the relationship between EU institutions and Member 
States and their respective influence on EU policy-making (Pollack, 2003), or focused 
on the role of individual EU institutions within the agenda-setting process (Jones and 
Clark, 1999; Schmidt, 2000; Tallberg, 2003; Burns, 2004). These studies indicate that 
an agenda-setting perspective can be a useful tool to improve the understanding of 
policy change in the EU (Princen and Rhinard, 2006; Princen, 2007). In EU policy 
making, with its many actors, complex procedures, and multiple veto points, agenda-
setting powers are “extremely important” (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 21). The above 
discussion has shown that the US focus of the agenda-setting frameworks requires 
adapting these to the particular features of the EU policy process.14  
 
Overall the EU agenda-setting process is quite complex due to its transnational nature 
and the wide range of state and non-state actors involved in the EU policy process 
(Mazey and Richardson, 1993). Only a small number of scholars have explicitly worked 
on EU agenda-setting research. Princen and Rhinard (2006) applied the existing US 
focused agenda-setting literature systematically to EU policy-making. They argue that 
out of the three models of agenda-building processes suggested by Cobb et al. (1976) 
(see  3.2.3) only two are suitable models for the EU policy process: the ‘outside 
                                                 
14 It is worth noting that strictly speaking there is no EU agenda, but each EU institution will follow its 
own agenda. Although it is important to keep this difference in mind for the empirical analysis, for the 
purposes of theorising agenda-setting processes it can be assumed that there is one overall political 
agenda in the EU (Princen, 2007: 29). 
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initiative’ model and the ‘inside initiative’ model. According to Princen and Rhinard 
(2006) the third model called ‘mobilization model’ is not applicable due to the fact that 
public involvement in EU decision-making is considered as very limited. The EU lacks 
a general public and therefore the pre-condition for public mobilisation. While 
‘Western’ national political systems provide structural features that enable public 
mobilisation, i.e. a public space for the exchange of ideas and problems mainly with the 
help of media and often based on a common language or symbols, the EU policy system 
does not provide these structural features for public mobilisation. There are, for 
instance, 23 official languages and the media are still strongly linked to geographical, 
political or cultural borders. As a consequence, it can be expected that EU decision-
makers are less prone to use expansion to the general public as a means to gain agenda 
access. Princen argues that “EU decision-makers are […] much less likely to be 
vulnerable to public mobilization than domestic decision-makers” (Princen, 2007: 31). 
 
Addressing the particularities of EU policy-making, Princen and Rhinard (2006) argue 
that, in the case of the EU policy-making process, it is more useful to distinguish 
between high and low politics as two agenda-setting routes. ‘High politics’ is more 
political (e.g. issue initiation by the European Council) as compared to ‘low politics’ 
which is more technocratic (e.g. issue initiation by low-level officials or expert 
communities).15 Both routes are assumed to follow the four stages of an issue career: 
initiation, specification, expansion and entrance. Depending on how the issue is initiated 
they distinguish different characteristics for each stage in the issue career. In the high 
politics route political leaders initiate an issue due to a politically salient event and they 
formulate political consensus on an EU response in the European Council. This 
consensus is then expanded towards lower levels of decision-making in the EU and 
political momentum eventually results in the entrance to the formal agenda. By contrast, 
a low politics agenda-setting route is initiated out of professional concerns by expert 
                                                 
15 The distinction between high and low politics in European integration studies was first introduced by 
Stanley Hoffmann in the 1960s (Hoffmann, 1966). ‘High politics’ referred to issues that were closely 
related to the very existence of the states including defence, foreign policy, law and order – policy areas 
where Hoffmann questions functional integration theories as opposed to ‘low politics’ such as economic 
policy. By contrast, in Peterson and Bomberg (1999) ‘high politics’ refers to “history-making” decisions 
by political leaders at the level of EU summits, as compared to “policy-setting” decisions at the systemic 
level in inter-institutional bargaining between the Council and the EP, as well as “policy-shaping” 
decisions at the sub-systemic level between the Commission, Council working groups and EP 
committees. In the agenda-setting context the term ‘high politics’ is closer to Peterson and Bomberg’s 
definition in that it refers to decisions taken by heads of state and government at European summits.  
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communities. Proposals are elaborated by expert groups, and then expanded towards 
higher political levels that might eventually build sufficient impetus – ideally a “point of 
no return” (Princen and Rhinard, 2006: 1122) – to achieve entrance to the formal 
agenda. Although called expert communities, it is important to note that experts in most 
cases represent certain interests and are not ‘neutral’ players in the policy process (see 
also  3.3.3). Table 1 summarises the main characteristics of both agenda-setting routes.  
 
Table 1: Characteristics of two agenda-setting routes 
 
Stage in issue 
career High politics route Low politics route 
Initiation By political leaders due to politically salient event 
Out of professional concerns in 
epistemic communities 
Specification 
Formulation of political 
consensus on an EU response in 
the European Council 
Formulation of specific and 
technical policy proposals in 
Expert Groups and Working 
Parties 
Expansion Towards lower levels of decision-making in the EU 
Towards higher levels of 
decision-making in the EU 
Entrance By creating political momentum By gradually building impetus 
Source: Princen and Rhinard (2006: 1122) 
 
Based on this heuristic, Princen and Rhinard formulate two expectations for the 
subsequent policy process. First, institutional structures strongly influence the framing 
of new proposals and the existence of multiple EU venues can lead to different issue 
specifications. Second, “in the expansion stage, the complexity of EU institutional 
structures will offer opportunities for actors to steer proposals into certain venues, and 
to call upon sympathetic expert communities to build support” (Princen and Rhinard, 
2006: 1123). The results of their empirical analysis show that high politics initiation 
processes can reinforce each other, while low politics initiation can get stuck in the 
agenda-setting process. Low politics initiatives need to confront high politics including 
intergovernmental bargaining and public salience effects. On the other hand, high 
politics initiatives have to face bureaucratic dynamics and institutional venue choice at 
the level of low politics. A dynamic interaction and intersection of the two processes 
can be expected and can lead to the blockage of the agenda-setting process favouring 
incremental policy change. If “common frames, like-minded actors and sympathetic 
venues” (Princen and Rhinard, 2006: 1130) emerge, more radical policy change appears 
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to be possible. This strongly reflects key concepts of the agenda-setting frameworks 
discussed in section  3.2.3. 
 
The analytical framework used in this thesis follows Princen and Rhinard’s (2006) basic 
distinction between ‘low politics’ and ‘high politics’, as well as the common distinction 
in the agenda-setting literature of an issue career: initiation, specification, expansion, 
and entrance. By doing so, the framework allows the testing of two assumptions as 
suggested by Princen and Rhinard. First, it can show if issue initiation at the level of 
low politics offers opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to steer proposals into certain 
venues favourable for their policy objectives. Second, it can be tested if issue initiation 
at the level of high politics helps to overcome administrative inertia, or whether political 
momentum is lost as soon as political salience16 disappears.  
 
Given the high political salience of energy and climate change issues during the time 
period analysed, public opinion might have played a role in the analysed agenda-setting 
and decision-making process. Recent contributions to European integration studies 
point to the increasing politicisation of European integration since the early 1990s, and 
the role of public opinion in European integration (Börzel and Risse, 2009; Hooghe and 
Marks, 2009; Schmitter, 2009). This questions Princen and Rhinard’s view that there is 
low mobilisation inside the EU which would include public opinion as one element of 
public mobilisation. 
 
Both the agenda-setting frameworks discussed above and the EU agenda-setting 
research point towards four key elements in the analysis of agenda-setting processes: 
contextual factors, policy entrepreneurs, issue definition, and venue shopping. For the 
purpose of the operationalisation of these concepts for the empirical analysis, the 
remainder of this section discusses each concept in the context of EU policy-making.  
3.3.2 Contextual factors 
All agenda-setting frameworks discussed in Section  3.2.3 point implicitly or explicitly 
to the influence of contextual factors on the policy process. Most explicitly, Kingdon’s 
                                                 
16 Political salience is defined here as the level of political attention paid to an issue that can be reflected 
in political statements by individual policy-makers, communications by the Commission or conclusions 
by the Council and European Council. In the political science literature the term “salience” was originally 
used by voting behaviour scholars to indicate the importance individual voters attach to different issues 
(Wlezien, 2005). 
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MSF refers to factors such as focusing events17 (problems stream) or public opinion and 
administrative change (politics stream). Contextual changes can open a policy window 
that policy entrepreneurs can, in turn, exploit to put an issue on the agenda (see  3.2.3). 
Various case studies about policy change in the EU confirm the influence of contextual 
factors on the EU agenda. Rising unemployment and economic downturn prevented 
progress in social policy (Wendon, 1998) or gender equality rights (Mazey, 1998), but 
stimulated progress in tax reforms (Radaelli, 1995).  
3.3.3 Policy entrepreneurs 
The role of policy entrepreneurs in the agenda-setting process has been highlighted at 
various points in this chapter. Policy entrepreneurs aim for policy change or stability 
according to their future anticipated gains (Kingdon, 1995 [1984]). They are interested 
in “selling ideas designed to bring about dynamic policy change” (Mintrom and 
Vergari, 1996: 423). For this purpose policy entrepreneurs need to identify problems 
and build coalitions; problems need to be defined in a receptive way to relevant target 
audiences; strategies need to be developed to build coalitions around certain problem 
definitions by pre-testing problem definitions and by adapting them accordingly (ibid.). 
In the absence of strong or well-prepared policy entrepreneurs to size a policy window 
in the case of focusing events or venue change, policy change is unlikely to materialise 
(Pralle, 2006). 
 
In the specific EU institutional context of the subsequent analysis, key policy 
entrepreneurs are representatives from the Commission, the Council and Member 
States, the European Parliament (EP), industry and NGOs “who are willing to invest 
their resources – time, energy, reputation, money – to promote a position in return for 
anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits” 
(Kingdon, 1995 [1984]: 179). Institutional actors cannot be regarded as single policy 
entrepreneurs. Instead, organisational units or individuals representing these 
organisations can act as policy entrepreneurs pushing for their policy objectives.  
 
No single policy entrepreneur can be put in the central position in EU agenda-setting. 
Different views persist in the literature on how the EU’s institutional setting and policy-
making procedures affect agenda-setting and decision-making. Majone (2006) argues 
                                                 
17 On the particular role of focusing events in agenda-setting see Birkland (1998). 
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that the EU is a typical example of agenda control similar to that found in the US 
legislative system, particularly the role played by congressional committees. From this 
perspective the Commission enjoys a formal monopoly of agenda-setting due to its 
monopoly of legislative initiation in the EU system (Art. 211 TEC). By comparison, 
others argue that in contrast to the US with the Congress as the focal point for policy 
entrepreneurs’ action, the European level does not have an equivalent since “the EU’s 
supranational institutions enjoy no monopoly on informal agenda setting, which 
depends more on expertise and persistence than on the formal right to propose or amend 
policies” (Pollack, 2003: 51).  
 
Following Pollack’s argument that takes informal norms into account, the concept of 
agenda-setter and the role of policy entrepreneurs have to be applied to a broader set of 
actors. This includes not only the three EU institutions directly involved in the decision-
making process, i.e. the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European 
Council (including Member States), as well as the EP, but also other players with an 
interest in the policy area. Eising argues that “the EU organizations are largely restricted 
to agenda setting and policy formulation” (Eising, 2002: 89). While according to Eising 
none of the EU institutions has “complete control” over the “policy agenda”, he puts the 
Commission in “a central position in the phases of agenda setting and policy 
formulation” (Eising, 2002: 102). 
European Commission 
With respect to the Commission’s role as policy entrepreneur, Laffan summarises that 
“the Commission is in a position to take advantage of opportunities as they present 
themselves in the policy process to enhance policy integration and collective solutions 
to policy problems” (Laffan, 1997: 424). Legislative initiation – as opposed to policy 
initiation – and drafting of new legislation is the sole responsibility of the Commission.  
 
The Commission’s right of initiative was however affected by formal and informal 
changes over time that have increased the Council’s and EP’s influence on agenda-
setting (Rasmussen, 2007: 247-51). In general, Commission proposals are not drafted 
‘secretly’ within the Commission but in consultation with key actors in the decision-
making process such as the Council and the EP. In addition, both the Council and the 
EP can invite the Commission to produce proposals (Art. 208 and Art. 192 TEC 
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respectively). Furthermore an increasing number of adopted proposals include deadlines 
for new or follow-up proposals.  
 
Another important development that modified the Commission’s formal right of 
initiative has been the increasing role of the European Council in setting long-term 
strategic goals, putting the Commission in “a more bureaucratic role of fulfilling the 
Member States’ agenda” (Rasmussen, 2007: 250). Actors’ influence on the policy 
process depends also on the stage of the policy process. During the conciliation 
procedure between the Council and the EP under co-decision procedure the 
Commission’s influence is rather low due to the Council’s general search for unanimity 
that allows them to depart from the Commission’s initial proposal.18  
 
Thus, “policy initiation in the European Union is a multi-actor activity” (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2001: 14). Nugent notes that policy initiation takes place at all levels of the EU 
policy process, and the “Commission – important though it is – does not have a totally 
free hand in what it does” (Nugent, 2006: 167). From very early on in the policy process 
the Commission needs to take into account outside voices to increase the chances for 
success of a policy initiative. Despite its institutionally strong role in legislative 
initiation and drafting, Commission officials have rather limited control over the 
subsequent decision-making process. They need to act as policy entrepreneur and assess 
their proposal against dominant positions and build winning coalitions within the 
Council and the EP. An extensive network of informal and formal advisory committees 
and working groups for consultation provide the Commission with access to 
independent information and legitimacy19 (Marks and Hooghe, 1996: 359). This can 
help align the Commission’s and outside actors’ positions and thus create strong 
majorities among key actors at the early stage of the policy process.  
 
Wendon (1998) underlines the importance of the Commission’s role as policy 
entrepreneur in the context of a legally weak position such as in social policy where the 
                                                 
18 Unanimous support in the Council is necessary to accept amendments with which the Commission does 
not agree. Furthermore the Commission can amend, or even withdraw, proposals at any time of the policy 
process under the consultation, cooperation and co-decision procedures, except of the third stage of the 
co-decision procedure, i.e. the conciliation procedure. For an overview see Nugent (2006: 398-414). 
19 Legitimacy refers to the justification and acceptance of political power. Legitimacy can be based on 
processes and norms in a given political system (Mandt and Kaase, 1998). In general terms legitimacy in 
politics can be defined as “The property that a regime's procedures for making and enforcing laws are 
acceptable to its subjects” (WG, 2009). 
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EU does not have an explicit competence to act. Commission officials are therefore at 
the same time a target for policy entrepreneurs (interest groups) and policy 
entrepreneurs themselves “by identifying policy problems, proposing and selling policy 
proposals and brokering compromises” (Wendon, 1998: 344). Wendon underlines the 
importance for the Commission to connect policy images to problems in a convincing 
manner in order to overcome Member States’ opposition. Hennessy’s (2007b) analysis 
of the Commission’s role as agenda-setter in the case of pension fund reform shows that 
an effective agenda-setting tool was the elimination of particularly controversial issues 
from the negotiation process, e.g. taxation which was eventually “organized out” of the 
agenda. The Commission should however not be regarded as a monolithic agenda-setter 
but as consisting of “frame entrepreneurs” (Nylander, 2001: 293) from different DGs or 
units.  
 
The Commission’s appeal to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) can play a particular 
role in helping the Commission as policy entrepreneur also to expand and maintain its 
competences against explicit opposition from the Council (Tömmel, 2008b). Legitimacy 
based on public concerns as well as the support by the EP and EESC can be important 
elements for the Commission to overcome opposition against policy proposals (Pallis, 
2006). Moreover, Pallis shows how a consensual approach, instead of an ‘ideology 
driven’ approach, by the Commission can help reach agreement. In the case of EU 
maritime policies the Commission successfully used a strategy of “selective agenda-
setting” that responded to the lack of progress at international level or the insufficient 
implementation of international rules in EU Member States. Overall the Commission 
took a “multi-directed consensus-building role” (ibid.). 
 
To sum up, “the Commission’s leverage on setting the agenda depends on its ability to 
anticipate and mediate demands, and its capacity to employ expertise derived from its 
role as the think tank of the European Union” (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 16). 
Council of Ministers and Council Presidency 
The Council of Ministers – and increasingly so the European Council – plays a 
particularly important role in EU agenda-setting as reflected in the high politics agenda-
setting route suggested by Princen and Rhinard (see  3.3.1). Although the Commission is 
the formal agenda-setter when it comes to new legislative proposals, the Council can 
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invite the Commission to prepare reports or legislative proposals as mentioned above. 
Furthermore, the Council Presidency is technically responsible for the agenda of 
individual Council meetings in its various formations, including the Council’s working 
parties (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006). This means that Member States who hold 
the Presidency have particular influence on the formal EU agenda.  
 
Setting the agenda is a key institutional power for Council Presidencies to put forward 
their pet issues (Tallberg, 2008). Tallberg (2003) argues that the Presidency’s powers 
have often been underestimated due to an overemphasis on agenda-setting understood 
as the launch of new political initiatives. Tallberg therefore introduces the term 
“agenda-shaping” as a conceptual category that includes agenda-setting, agenda-
structuring and agenda-exclusion. Agenda-structuring refers to the influence on the 
attention an issue already on the agenda attracts, whereas agenda exclusion stands for 
the omission of issues from the policy agenda. The Presidency can contribute to agenda-
setting by raising awareness to new policy problems, by developing concrete proposals 
for action, or by developing new institutional practices. Agenda-structuring can be 
achieved by determining the frequency of meetings within a policy area, by arranging 
informal meetings, and by the structure of actual meeting agendas. Finally, exclusion 
from the agenda can be achieved by just not dealing with a topic, by removing it from 
the decision agenda, or by tabling unacceptable compromise proposals. 
 
Nugent (2006) highlights the mutual dependence between the Commission and the 
European Council. Not only does the European Council sanction policy initiatives, but 
the Commission uses this forum to legitimise its own policy preferences. 
EP 
The EP has considerable agenda control under the co-decision procedure, but has very 
limited influence under the consultation procedure. While the former is normally used 
for renewable energy policy proposals, the latter is applicable under Euratom (see  2.3). 
However, Jones and Clark (1999) argue that, even under the consultation procedure, the 
EP can have an important role in agenda-setting if they and the Commission reach 
agreement or “interlock” to build a united front. The Commission can then use the 
position agreed between the EP and the Commission in dealings with the Council. 
Power of delay and informal contacts can be used by the EP to exert influence in the 
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policy-setting stage (Jones and Clark, 1999: 131f). Other important elements include the 
rapporteur’s and EP committee’s relationship to the Commission. The rapporteur can 
play an important role to align the EP’s agenda with the Commission’s agenda – or 
create divergence. Another instrument available to the EP to put an issue on the agenda 
is the publication of own-initiative reports under Art. 192 EC Treaty, and thus “request 
the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters on which it considers 
that a Community act is required for the purpose of implementing this Treaty”. Since 
these own-initiative reports need to be backed by an absolute majority of MEPs, it can 
be a powerful instrument for the EP. The EP’s environment committee successfully 
used this instrument to shape the EU’s environmental agenda (Judge, 1992). 
Interest groups 
Interests groups constitute another army of potential policy entrepreneurs who aim to 
influence EU policy processes according to their policy objectives. Greenwood argues 
that “the most striking feature about the system of interest representation in the […] EU 
is its degree of institutionalization” (Greenwood, 2007: 1). Interest groups play a 
particular role in EU decision-making since they can provide output and input 
legitimacy of EU public policy.20 Interest representatives can use the national level or 
the EU level to put forward their position in the EU decision-making process (ibid.). 
Like the Commission, interest groups use ad hoc coalition building to put forward their 
interest in the policy process (e.g. Mazey and Richardson, 1997). Factors that influence 
the success of interest groups include control of key information, adequate resources as 
well as their economic and political weight (Nugent, 2006: 313ff).  
 
There is no straightforward classification of EU interest groups, although Greenwood 
(2007), for example, distinguishes between groups and non-groups, on the one hand, 
and between business, professional, labour, citizen, and territorial interests, on the other. 
Another possible distinction is between producer and diffuse interest groups. Whilst 
producer interest groups seek to export their national standards to other Member States, 
diffuse interest groups defend collective interests held by large numbers of individuals 
including environmental protection (Pollack, 1997). 
                                                 
20 “[…] output legitimacy of EU public policy [is] concerned with the supply of information, ideas and 
expert resources for the technical quality of such policies, and the legitimacy which derives from inputs 
[is] concerned with the support for public policy deriving from the ability to participate in it and 
confidence in the means used to formulate and implement it. [italics in original]” (Greenwood, 2007: 1). 
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‘Experts’ or ‘professionals’ can be part of any of these interest groups and therefore of 
interest representation in EU policy-making. This is particularly true when expert 
groups are used to prepare legislation (Greenwood, 2007: 34) and thus influence the 
formal decision agenda. Experts are then among the relevant stakeholders with their 
own interests and objectives in the policy process.21 
3.3.4 Issue definition and framing 
Issue definition22 is important at all stages of an issue career within the agenda-setting 
process because it predetermines possible solutions to the problem and influences the 
access of actors to the decision arena (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). The chances of a 
problem attracting the attention of particular political institutions which all have 
different selection procedures will be influenced by problem definition (Weiss, 1989; 
Rochefort and Cobb, 1994). 
 
While problem definitions pre-determine possible solutions, actors’ access, and the 
institutional framework within which the problem is dealt with, they do not necessarily 
include a solution to the problem, and they do not set clear institutional rules about the 
inclusion or exclusion of specific actors in the agenda-setting process. By contrast, 
framing23 does fulfil these functions. It includes problem definition, a solution to the 
problem, rules about who should be involved in the subsequent policy process, and a 
justification for action. The latter is particularly relevant at the EU level since every 
action at the EU level needs to be very well justified in order to overcome resistance by 
Member States, including various national actors (Princen, 2007). Thus it is not only 
                                                 
21 An epistemic community can be another route for experts to influence agenda-setting and thus policy 
stability and change. An epistemic community can be defined as “a network of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular policy domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992: 3). This strand of research is mainly 
interested in the role of scientific information in policy process, and the mechanisms by which new ideas 
and knowledge about certain problems enter the policy arena and thus influence policy-making. 
22 In the literature, issue definition and problem definition are often used interchangeably. It has been 
argued that issue definition is a more appropriate term in lieu of problem definition since it allows for the 
distinction between political issues that are defined as problems and those that are not (Daviter, 2007). 
23 Framing can be defined as “[…] a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a 
complex reality so as to provide guideposts for knowing, analysing, persuading, and acting. A frame is a 
perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined problematic situation can be made sense of and acted 
upon” (Rein and Schon, 1991: 263). Frames used in the policy process can reveal causal relations that 
actors establish between particular policy proposals and policy problems. Thus the major aim of frame-
critical analysis is to identify the underlying assumptions of actors or advocacy groups in the policy 
process, which allows them to put certain policy proposals on the governmental decision agenda. Framing 
studies are predominantly based on discourse analysis. 
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institutions in general that “structure debate, determine access to decision making and 
constrain policy choices, but, also, problems themselves and the development of ideas 
for their solution are significant constraints on the degree of choice which policy actors 
possess” (Mazey and Richardson, 1997: 111).  
 
A problem definition or issue expansion that enables agenda access can however at the 
same time hinder a problem definition that leads to the adoption of the intended policy 
(Dery, 2000). Broad framing can aim to build consensus by consulting interests, and 
narrow framing can restrict interest groups’ access to the policy-making process 
(Nylander, 2001). In his analysis of EU electricity market liberalisation, Nylander 
(2001: 310) points at the importance of a “master frame”: “skilful policy entrepreneurs 
are able to frame issues in congruence with master frames in innovative ways, and they 
are able to build coalitions so that deadlocks can be broken”. Policy entrepreneurs need 
therefore to link their arguments to the dominant “master frame” in a given policy area. 
 
Analysing the role of policy frames in the development of EU environmental policy, 
Lenschow and Zito (1998) suggest that the extent to which policy frames impact upon 
policy outcomes depends also on the degree of their institutionalisation analysed in 
terms of the organisational, procedural and normative structure. Organisational and 
procedural structures are mainly reflected in the organisational characteristics and 
institutional rules, whereas normative structures can be derived from policy instruments 
and the rhetoric used. It was, for example, shown that framing of environmental 
regulation as a contributor to competitiveness was not only important to gain the 
‘external’ support by Member States and the public, but also to achieve ‘internal’ 
support from other DGs and within the college of Commissioners (Lenschow, 2005). A 
crucial element in the agenda-setting process is therefore not the objective problem load 
(e.g. air pollution) but a plausible definition of the problem and the dominant policy 
image (Jann and Wegrich, 2007: 46). 
3.3.5 Institutional venues or ‘venue shopping’ 
The importance of strategic framing of an issue is closely related to the institutional 
venue (Princen and Rhinard, 2006). Venue choice is strongly related to issue framing 
because an issue frame can influence which venue is assigned to an issue, and a venue 
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can influence how an issue is considered (Baumgartner, 2007). In this context 
Baumgartner and Jones introduced the concept of ‘venue shopping’ (see  3.2.3).  
 
‘Venue shopping’ is here defined as “[…] finding a decision setting that offers the best 
prospects for reaching one’s policy goals” (Pralle, 2003: 255). It assumes that policy 
entrepreneurs look for policy arenas where they see an advantage over their political 
opponents due to institutional rules, norms or procedures. The importance of the ‘right’ 
institutional venue is also underlined by a limited “agenda carrying capacity of any 
institution” (Birkland, 2007: 65). Consequently, policy entrepreneurs need to “compete 
with each other to get their issues and their preferred interpretations of these issues on 
the agenda” (ibid.). The prospect for success might also depend on the available 
capacity to put things forward on the agenda. In times of strong demand initial agendas 
need to be crowded out when it comes to concrete policy proposals.  
 
‘Venue shopping’ can be understood in two different ways in the context of EU policy-
making: first, from a multi-level governance perspective (see  3.2.2) sub-national and 
national actors can use EU level processes to reach policy objectives that are not 
achievable at the national level (Mazey, 1998; Princen, 2007); second, as the choice 
between different institutional venues at the EU level. In his literature review on 
agenda-setting research in the EU Princen (2007) argues for a venue approach as a 
general starting point for further research in this area. It has also been identified 
elsewhere as an important factor in the EU context (True, Jones et al., 2007). In general 
multiple access points for policy entrepreneurs in the EU system (Peters, 2001) point to 
the importance of strategic venue choice in EU policy-making. 
 
Since policy entrepreneurs cannot be entirely sure from the start how policy proposals 
are perceived in certain venues, ‘venue shopping’ needs to be understood as “a trial-
and-error process or an evolutionary search” (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991: 1048). 
Strategic issue expansion into other venues can be of particular relevance in the EU 
system where the use of issue expansion via the mass public is very limited. Pralle 
(2003) argues that policy entrepreneurs are not always rational in choosing an 
institutional venue and opt for change when this seems irrational. Furthermore they opt 
for a particular venue not only to advance a certain policy goal but also to comply with 
or support organisational needs. Finally, Pralle’s study indicates that policy learning 
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might change venue shopping strategies over time. She concludes that not only formal 
opportunities as found in political and institutional environments play a role in venue 
shopping, but also belief systems of advocacy groups and their ability of information 
processing and policy learning. New venues can serve as locus of learning in the 
framework of deliberations on problem-solving and best practices (Hennessy, 2007b). 
 
The usefulness of the venue shopping concept has been demonstrated in the context of 
EU agricultural policy (Sheingate, 2000). Policy entrepreneurs aiming for stasis or 
change in a policy area try to choose the appropriate institutional venue where they see 
the highest chance of achieving their initial objective. This will depend on the formal 
rules (e.g. legal decision rules such as unanimous or majority voting) and participants’ 
interests, values and beliefs. The Council’s vertical differentiation in terms of different 
arrangements from technical working groups to the European Council can help to 
overcome “issue specific rigidities” (Eising, 2002: 115) by shifting negotiations to 
higher political levels which are more likely to reach political compromise. 
 
From the Commission’s perspective, one way of applying the concept of venue change 
to achieve its policy objectives is to create new institutional venues by using process 
legislation. Cram showed that by the use of process legislation the Commission 
succeeded in establishing “an alternative set of institutions capable of making 
legislation” (Cram, 1993: 343). Institutional venue does therefore not only apply to the 
permanent institutions such as the Commission, Council or the EP with their 
subordinate institutions such as Council formations (including COREPER – the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives) and EP Committees, but also to ‘softer’ 
institutions such as ad hoc working groups.  
 
In addition, from the Commission’s perspective the establishment of institutional fora 
can serve informational and legitimacy aims. In policy domains with high political 
salience institutional fora can restrict actors’ access and thus help to provide better 
information from lobbyists to decision-makers; in highly technical policy areas with low 
political salience they can ensure high quality of information and thus improve the 
informational basis for policy-making (Broscheid and Coen, 2007). Broscheid and Coen 
conclude that the Commission has learnt to manage the process as “political 
entrepreneur”, i.e. “institutional engineering in the service of political entrepreneurship” 
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(Broscheid and Coen, 2003: 180f). Although expert groups do not have political 
authority to take decisions, their technical authority can make it difficult for political 
actors to reject or seriously question their conclusions (Gehring, Kerler et al., 2008). 
Using the example of the Commission’s Consultative Committee system, Mahoney 
(2004) shows that EU institutions can use formal arenas of policy debate to select 
certain interest groups that are “most in-line with its agenda” (Mahoney, 2004: 462).  
 
The analytical interest here is the effect of such institutional fora on the policy process 
in terms of agenda-setting and decision-making dynamics. Previous research on 
institutional fora has overwhelmingly focused on formal institutions under the 
comitology procedures or their implications for the ‘democratic deficit’ (Pollack, 1994). 
It is assumed that political entrepreneurship or ‘institutional engineering’ at the EU 
level is not restricted to the Commission but can equally be used by other players such 
as the Council. 
3.4 Analysing European energy policy 
After having reviewed the agenda-setting literature and its relevance to EU policy-
making, this sub-section shows why an agenda-setting framework is appropriate for the 
analysis of EU energy policy-making. It first briefly outlines the particular challenges 
for energy policy analysis in general, and then reviews previous studies on EU energy 
policy. 
3.4.1 Energy policy analysis 
For the purpose of the analysis of EU energy policy-making, energy policy is defined as 
follows: “Energy policy is concerned with the coal, electricity, gas and oil industries, as 
well as newer technologies such as nuclear power, renewable energy and activities to 
enhance the efficiency of energy supply and consumption” (McGowan, 1996a: 132). 
McGowan argues that “any attempt to define ‘energy policy’ more analytically runs into 
all the problems associated with the word ‘policy’” (ibid.). Since energy policy deals 
with energy sources and technologies, specific challenges arise. 
 
Energy policy is heavily path-dependent due to huge capital assets, long lead-times of 
investments, and dominance by a few incumbent players that have often been publicly 
owned with close links between government and industry (Kitschelt, 1983). Technical 
and institutional components of the energy system are heavily interdependent, and 
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changes in one component often require adaptations in other parts of the system 
(Hughes, 1983; Mayntz and Hughes, 1988). Institutional barriers for change include 
administration or values of the key players involved in the policy process (Mez and 
Midttun, 1997). This ‘lock-in’ of the energy system into a complex set of technical, 
institutional and ideational factors constitutes a particular challenge to introduce 
deliberate policy change (Unruh, 2000; Scrase and MacKerron, 2009).  
 
Despite the importance of these structural features of energy policy and their 
ramifications for the introduction of policy change in the ‘making’ of energy policy, the 
majority of energy policy studies provide an analysis for energy policy. These studies 
identify specific policy solutions to solve a given problem (e.g. energy insecurity, 
climate change) or to achieve a given objective (e.g. energy security, competitive 
energy markets or sustainability) and are often based on economic perspectives (e.g. 
Helm, 2007). Although they may provide a thorough analysis of the problems and the 
solutions, they regularly ignore the underlying policy processes that prevent or enable 
the intended policy outputs and outcomes. An analysis of the energy policy process is 
therefore an important pre-condition for an analysis for policy change. This is the major 
objective of this thesis by shedding light on EU energy policy-making and thereby 
addressing a major research gap in energy policy related EU studies. 
3.4.2 Previous studies on EU energy policy 
This literature review concentrates on studies that include an analysis of EU energy 
policy decision-making processes and neglects the substantial amount of literature 
providing an analysis for EU energy policy. The latter takes a predominantly economic 
perspective on European energy policy, with a particular focus on the liberalisation of 
the European electricity and gas markets. From this perspective, studies analysed the 
challenges for EU electricity and gas market liberalisation24, the consequences of 
European energy legislation on Member States25, and how to further develop the 
                                                 
24 For an economic perspective on the liberalisation of the EU electricity market see for example 
Newbery (2002); the liberalisation of EU gas markets and potential scenarios for the future development 
is discussed in more detail in Ellis, Bowitz et al. (2000). 
25 See for example Glachant (2001). Glachant distinguishes between three dimensions against which the 
impact on national electricity markets is analysed: the legal and regulatory framework, technical 
infrastructures, and industrial ownership structures. Although this strand of literature is not reviewed here 
in detail, this does not imply that various changes introduced by European legislation in the energy sector 
are not relevant for the subsequent analysis. By contrast national interests and position at the EU level 
may have changed as a consequence of these changes as shown in the discussed literature in this section. 
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internal energy market agenda (Glachant and Lévêque, 2009).26 Studies on other related 
policy fields, such as EU environmental policy (Lenschow, 2005), EU climate policy 
(Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2008) or EU external policy (Lavenex, 2004) provide 
additional insights on certain aspects of EU energy policy processes, but their key 
research interest is related to other policy fields. 
 
The topics addressed in the literature that deals specifically with EU energy policy-
making reflect to a certain extent the historical development of EU energy policy (see 
 2.2). Early studies on the development of a European energy policy were mainly 
interested in why integration in this policy field did not materialise, despite the fact that 
two founding treaties were related to energy. Studies tried to explain the lack of any 
substantial progress in energy policy integration mainly by analysing national interests 
and positions that, according to their perspective, were strongly influenced by energy 
specific structural features in Member States. Bailey (1976) argues that in the 1970s the 
UK, as a new Member State with considerable gas and oil reserves, did not have an 
interest in a European energy policy and prevented major progress in this field. 
Similarly, France’s non-membership of the IEA was identified as an impediment for the 
development of a common European energy policy after the first oil price shock 
(Ehrhardt, 1975). Besides these factors different national positions on economic policy 
and regulatory approaches to economic sectors among the then nine Member States 
were also a barrier for a common European energy policy (Ray and Dean, 1975).   
 
In her key contribution to EU energy policy studies Matláry (1997) aims to explain the 
emergence of a European energy policy and the persistence of this topic at the EU 
agenda since the late 1980s. Matláry (1997) puts Member States at the centre of her 
analysis despite the fact that a central question was how policy progress was possible 
despite some Member States’ resistance to this development. Applying Putnam’s two-
level game framework, Matláry assumes that governments are the only significant 
actors in the policy process and that all policy outcomes can be traced back to 
governmental positions. While she acknowledges that intergovernmental approaches – 
as chosen in her analysis – had been criticised, she justifies her choice by the lack of 
other suitable analytical frameworks. Her analysis confirms that intergovernmentalist 
                                                 
26 For a comprehensive legal over on EU energy policy with an emphasis on competition in energy 
markets see Cameron (2007a). 
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approaches are insufficient to explain developments in EU energy policy over time. She 
concludes that main factors in the development of European energy policy were less 
positions of national governments, but rather the emergence of transnational issues 
(environmental issues), external events (supply disruptions) and institutional changes as 
a result of the SEA, namely the introduction of majority voting. Linked to that was the 
emergence of a broader set of actors that gained interest in European energy policy and 
consequently tried to influence the policy process at the EU level according to their 
interests and put the role and influence of national governments into context. 
 
Intergovernmentalist approaches have been questioned from very early on: “It would be 
erroneous to conclude […] that diverging national interests […] have been the primary 
reasons for the absence of a common energy policy” (Alting von Geusau, 1975: 186). 
Alting von Geusau argues that the Commission’s approach to energy policy was at least 
of similar importance. This resonates with neo-institutionalist accounts of European 
integration where formal and informal institutions are considered not only as 
instruments but also as explanatory factors for European integration (see  3.2.2). With 
the increasing success of the Commission in developing a European energy policy 
under the internal market agenda on the basis of competences in other policy fields, the 
predominant question in the literature was how this progress was possible given the 
resistance by some Member States.  
 
Padgett (1992) argues that the slow progress to establish an internal energy market in 
the late 1980s was as much linked to the dynamics of EC policy-making as to technical 
and legal obstacles in the energy sectors 27. According to Padgett, early attempts by the 
Commission to establish an internal energy market reflected the “fragmented 
organizational structure and the incrementalist, consensus orientation of the 
Commission” (Padgett, 1992: 59). In particular, the Commission’s role as the 
responsible actor for formulating policy proposals and the need for consensus building 
prevented any major step changes in this sector. In line with these results Eising (2002) 
argues that intergovernmentalism alone cannot explain the adoption of the first 
electricity liberalisation directive. Instead he suggests a framework that integrates 
                                                 
27 It can be argued that these obstacles might have been used to defend national interests. 
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bounded rationality28, neo-institutionalism and policy learning. Eising (2002) argues 
that the EU institutional setting has considerable influence on the policy outcomes at the 
EU level by influencing not only Member States’ bargaining strategies, but also their 
basic policy preferences.  
 
Andersen (2001) argues that, due to the lack of clear competences in the field of 
European energy policy, it has in many cases been introduced “from the side” by 
Directorates General (DG) other than the DG explicitly responsible for energy, e.g. DG 
Competition for the energy market liberalisation packages.29 Another process whereby 
energy policy has emerged at the European level was described as “from above” (ibid.) 
through high level initiatives at political summits (e.g. Energy Charter).  
 
Both of these driving forces for European energy policy indicate a lack of clear 
ownership of the energy policy process at the EU level. Linked to that was the gradual 
loss of exclusive control by traditionally strong actors in the energy policy arena since 
the early 1990s (Andersen, 2001). A wider range of interests such as represented by 
consumer and environment groups gained access to the arena from the early 1990s 
(McGowan, 1996b). Energy companies were no longer the only targets and 
beneficiaries of EU energy policy.  
 
To sum up, the literature review on European energy policy shows that there are only a 
very limited number of scholarly studies analysing the dynamics of the EU energy 
policy-making processes at the EU level. It also suggests that an analytical framework 
that puts Member States and the role of national governments in the centre of the 
analysis, cannot sufficiently explain the policy dynamics in this policy field. Studies 
that integrate institutional and procedural elements and focus more on the processes at 
the EU level can therefore be expected to provide additional insights in EU energy 
policy-making processes. In addition, studies on the development of EU policy-making 
                                                 
28 The term “bounded rationality” was developed in the economics literature studying human behaviour. 
It captures the “boundedness of human rationality” in processing information (Simon, 1982). This 
limitation of human beings, e.g. in terms of the amount of information that can be processed at one 
moment in time, has important ramifications for decision-making, problem-solving and learning and thus 
for public policy in a broader sense. 
29 Policy initiation in terms of bringing a topic on the informal agenda, e.g. Commission internal 
discussions, it is still the formally responsible DG that needs to bring forward a formal proposal, i.e. in 
the early stages of the liberalisation DG XVII (now TREN). However, some key people in the 
liberalisation process at the time had joined DG XVII from DG IV (now COMP). 
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over the last decades strongly reflect key concepts of the agenda-setting literature: 
interdependence of institutional structures, the role of issue definitions and actors’ 
access to the policy arena.  
3.4.3 Research questions 
The suggested framework for the subsequent empirical analysis distinguishes between 
two routes of agenda-building, one that starts at the level of ‘low politics’ and the other 
one where issue initiation takes place at the level of ‘high politics’. This distinction will 
show whether issue initiation at the level of low politics offers opportunities for policy 
entrepreneurs to steer proposals into certain venues favourable to their policy objectives, 
and whether issue initiation at the level of high politics helps to overcome 
administrative inertia or whether political momentum is lost as soon as political salience 
disappears. To test these propositions and the underlying dynamics, the analytical 
framework puts particular emphasis on four conceptual elements: contextual factors, 
policy entrepreneurs, issue definition, and institutional venues. This leads to the 
following key research questions that are addressed in this thesis: 
 
• How did agenda-setting routes (low politics vs. high politics) affect policy 
change and stability in EU energy policy-making? 
 
• How did contextual factors, policy entrepreneurs, issue definitions, and 
institutional venues influence agenda-setting dynamics in EU energy policy-
making? 
3.5 Chapter conclusions 
The dynamics of EU energy policy-making and the reasons for policy change and 
stability are rather poorly understood. Previous studies on EU energy policy reveal 
shortcomings of intergovernmental approaches that put too much emphasis on domestic 
issues. Furthermore EU studies in general suggest that comparative analytical 
frameworks can be useful to study EU sectoral policy-making. Thus this chapter has 
argued that an agenda-setting framework can be a useful analytical tool in shedding 
light on EU energy policy-making. It draws upon central concepts from agenda-setting 
frameworks developed in the US and recent systematic approaches to EU agenda-
setting research. The interest here, however, is not only why an issue becomes an issue 
on the political agenda, but also why an issue that made it to the political agenda was 
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(not) formally adopted as a policy. The analytical perspective therefore spans from 
policy initiation over to the subsequent decision-making process. This analytical 
framework is operationalised in the next chapter outlining the research design and 
methods used. 
  
52
4 Research Design and Methodology  
 
This chapter elaborates the research design and methodology, i.e. “the logical structures 
and procedures of scientific enquiry” (Andersen, 2003: 2), used in this thesis.  
4.1 Introduction 
Studies on agenda-setting used both quantitative and qualitative approaches and proved 
that both can generate valid and generalisable results on the dynamics of agenda-setting 
and policy processes.30 Quantitative research designs appear to be particularly useful for 
comparative research designs across different political systems (Baumgartner, Green-
Pedersen et al., 2006) since unified coding of various data sources helps to ensure 
common standards31. However, legal acts or parliamentary processes may have a 
different institutional significance depending on the political system and culture that 
hints at the limitations of quantitative research designs. Qualitative in-depth case study 
research on agenda-setting is therefore important to provide detailed accounts of policy 
change and stability as they “can offer insights into and information about the causal 
process at work” (John, 2006: 983). A number of studies on agenda-setting show that 
qualitative case study designs are an appropriate research approach (e.g. Tallberg, 2003; 
Pralle, 2006; Princen and Rhinard, 2006; Timmermans and Scholten, 2006).  
 
Given the relatively limited number of previous studies on EU agenda-setting in 
general, and in the field of EU energy policy in particular, there is scope for further 
study to gain a better understanding of causal mechanisms taking into account 
contextual factors. Thus, for the analysis of agenda-setting in EU energy policy a 
qualitative research design seems to be particularly suitable. It allows tracking and 
analysing a broader picture including contextual factors within which policy processes 
take place. Although quantitative research methods have been portrayed as being ‘more 
scientific’ than qualitative approaches due to the ‘hard numbers’ used, many convincing 
arguments have been put forward in support of qualitative research designs (e.g. King, 
Keohane et al., 1994; Yin, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2006). This will be elaborated further in the 
following sections of this chapter which outlines the qualitative case study research 
                                                 
30 For an overview see, for example, the special issue “Comparative studies of policy agendas” of the 
Journal of European Public Policy (2006), Volume 13, Issue 7. 
31 See for example the “Policy Agendas Project” that collects data from various archived sources to trace 
changes in national policy agendas and public policy outcomes on the basis of a unified policy content 
coding system. For more information see the project’s website: www.policyagendas.org. 
  
53
design used in the subsequent empirical analysis, and explains the operationalisation of 
key concepts, data collection strategies, and methods used for data analysis. 
4.2 Case study research 
The advantages and opportunities of qualitative case study research – here defined as 
“the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test 
historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (George and Bennett, 
2005: 5)32 – have been well summarised in Yin (2003: 2): “[...] the distinctive need for 
case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena. In brief, 
the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events […]”. Along with the general advantages of qualitative 
research methods, the case study approach allows the studying of the complexity of a 
given subject in detail, including contextual factors, because it does not restrict the 
analysis to a limited number of quantifiable variables. Due to the complexity of policy 
processes (e.g. Sabatier, 1999) the case study approach is considered as most 
appropriate for the analysis of EU agenda-setting processes. As the aim of the analysis 
is to explain policy change that requires “attention on significant broad-scale 
relationships within policy systems” (Stewart, 2006: 184), a qualitative case study 
approach is chosen. A particular strength of case study research is the ability to explore 
causal mechanisms by looking at a large number of intervening variables and identify 
unexpected aspects in the policy studies process (George and Bennett, 2005). 
 
There are several “misunderstandings” (Flyvbjerg, 2006)33 of qualitative case study 
research which include the bias of materials interpreted by a researcher with its own set 
of values and beliefs, and the ‘weak’ basis for scientific generalisation. Case study 
research is, however, not more exposed to bias than other research methods since 
arbitrary subjectivism can equally influence the choice of categories and variables for 
                                                 
32 Apart from the case study approach George and Barnett (2005: 5ff) distinguish between two other 
research methods: 1) statistical method “estimating the generalized causal weight or causal effects of 
variables”; 2) formal models using “rigorous deductive logic […] to develop both intuitive and 
counterintuitive hypotheses about the dynamics of causal mechanisms”. By contrast, Gerring (2007) 
argues that case study research is not necessarily based on a qualitative research design, and that case 
study research should not be defined on the basis of a certain method of data collection but on the basis of 
the explicit research goals (see Chapter 2 in Gerring, 2007). 
33 Flyvbjerg (2006) convincingly refutes five misunderstandings of qualitative research: 1) general, 
theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more valuable than concrete, practical (context-
dependent) knowledge; 2) case studies cannot contribute to scientific development; 3) case study as a 
method for generating hypotheses instead of testing hypotheses and theory buildings; 4) case study 
research’s bias toward verification; 5) difficulty in developping general propositions and theories. 
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quantitative or structural investigation (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 235). Inference is inherently an 
imperfect process independent of it being a quantitative or qualitative research design, 
and researchers need to address this by pointing at the uncertainties and limits of their 
conclusions (King, Keohane et al., 1994: 8).  
 
With regard to generalisation, it is important to distinguish between analytical 
generalisation and statistical generalisation. Since the latter is not possible on the basis 
of qualitative research results, qualitative research needs to aim for analytical 
generalisation. The objective is then to expand and generalise theories – often existing 
ones upon which specific propositions have been elaborated and which are verified or 
falsified in the case study – and not to derive statistical frequencies (Yin, 2003: 10). The 
key point is that while it is therefore not possible to draw statistical generalisation from 
qualitative case study research, it is possible to generalise analytically, i.e. expand and 
generalise theories.  
 
As far as the analysis of EU policy processes is concerned, the ability to generalise is 
limited because research projects often deal with single policy areas based on single 
case studies. This focus on single case study research “has a strong rationale, given the 
vicissitudes of European integration, the uniqueness of decisions of ‘high politics’, and 
the sector-specificity of European policy-making, all of which make it difficult to draw 
on more than a single case study” (Schmidt, 1996: 234). While the particularities of EU 
policy-making as outlined by Schmidt need to be taken into account for the analysis of 
EU policy-making, the challenge to generalise across different policy areas applies 
similarly to national policy-making. Although this thesis deals only with one policy 
field (energy policy), which limits its scope for generalisation across different areas of 
EU policy-making, the research design and the selection of two case studies of EU 
energy policy-making tries to address this methodological limitation (see  4.3).  
 
Stake (2005) suggests the differentiation between intrinsic case study and instrumental 
case study research. The intrinsic case study is interested in a better understanding of a 
particular case, the instrumental case study aims to “provide insight into an issue or to 
redraw a generalization” (ibid.: 445). In the latter the case serves as an instrument to get 
a better understanding of a bigger picture. This does not mean that the case is analysed 
in less detail, but contexts and activities are analysed in the same depth. It is not always 
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possible to draw a clear-cut distinction between intrinsic and instrumental case study 
research. This thesis is located in between because its research objectives are to 
contribute to a better understanding of the analysed case studies, while at the same time 
aiming for generalisable insights in relation to EU energy policy-making.  
 
Using the theoretical framework identified in the previous chapter the case studies 
therefore contribute to theory building (George and Bennett, 2005)34 by assessing the 
validity and scope of suggestions from the EU agenda-setting literature on the basis of 
two empirical case studies. Its objective is theory building rather than theory testing 
since the key framework on EU agenda-setting as suggested by Rhinard and Princen 
(2006) – the distinction between low politics and high politics agenda routes in EU 
agenda-setting – cannot be considered as fully fledged theory. According to the 
definition by Schlager (1999: 234) a framework provides “a foundation for inquiry by 
specifying classes of variables and general relationship among them, that is, how the 
general classes of variables loosely fit together into a coherent structure”, but it does not 
provide “explanations for, or predictions of, behaviour and outcomes”.  
 
The case study analysis in this thesis aims to contribute to the development of the 
suggestions made by Princen and Rhinard, building on robust theoretical frameworks on 
agenda-setting developed in the context of national political systems. The key research 
objective of this thesis is to explain EU policy change and stability by analysing EU 
agenda-setting dynamics. Thus the dependent variable to be explained is policy outputs. 
Based on the theoretical framework key independent variables are policy entrepreneurs, 
institutional venues, issue definitions and contextual factors.  
4.3 Case study selection 
The selection of the case study is a crucial step in case study research, and a 
fundamental requirement is that the selected cases are relevant to the research objective 
(George and Bennett, 2005: 83f). Cases can be selected in order to test a certain theory, 
or a theory can be chosen subsequently to explain certain cases (ibid.). In this thesis 
both approaches were followed.  
 
                                                 
34 George and Bennett (2005: 74-76) differentiate between six different types of theory-building case 
study research: atheoretical/configurative idiographic, disciplined configurative, heuristic, theory testing, 
and plausibility probes, “Building Block” studies. 
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At the initial stage case study selection was empirically driven in that the thesis was part 
of a larger research programme on energy policy analysis. The first research objective 
of this thesis was to provide a better understanding of energy policy-making processes 
at the EU level. This predetermined EU level processes as the main level of analysis 
although relevant linkages to the national or regional level in the context of multi-level 
governance need to be taken into account. On the basis of the literature review on EU 
policy-making and EU energy policy, the theoretical framework elaborated in the 
previous chapter was developed.  
 
Secondly, case studies of EU energy policy-making had to be selected in order to apply 
and test the theoretical framework. The key task was to identify cases of EU energy 
policy-making that were suitable to test the agenda-setting framework developed in the 
previous chapter. A basic criterion for them to be valid cases for EU energy policy-
making was that the policy initiative had to be under the responsibility of the 
Commission’s DG TREN. Climate change policy initiatives were therefore ruled out as 
they were under the responsibility of DG ENV. Since a key research interest is to assess 
how the issue career, and in particular policy initiation, influences the subsequent 
decision-making process, only policy initiatives that were formally proposed could have 
been considered as case studies.35 Suitable EU energy policy proposals had therefore to 
be identified as a unit of analysis. This was then further narrowed down to the supply 
side of the energy system, i.e. energy generation, which ruled out demand-side policy 
measures such as most energy efficiency policies.  
 
On this basis two proposals were chosen as case studies: the nuclear package proposed 
in 2002/2003 and the binding 20% EU RES target by 2020 put forward by the 
Commission in a RES Road Map at the beginning of 2007 followed by a directive 
proposal in January 2008. The two case studies constitute rather polar cases with respect 
to the key theoretical interest of this study, which is the impact of low politics and high 
politics agenda-setting routes on EU energy policy-making. Polar or extreme cases with 
respect to a study’s research objective are considered as a useful basis to contribute to 
theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989; Pettigrew, 1990).  
 
                                                 
35 Policy initiatives not published as formal policy proposals could have been chosen as examples for 
failure to achieve access to the formal decision agenda. 
  
57
The nuclear package followed predominantly a low politics agenda-setting route, 
whereas the RES target remained largely at the level of high politics. Whilst nuclear 
energy had achieved a relatively high share in the EU electricity supply mix by the early 
1980s, the contribution of renewable energy sources (in particular if large hydro 
installations are excluded) was virtually zero (see  2.1). Nuclear energy benefited from 
its special status under the Euratom Treaty with strong implications for the institutional 
setting in this policy field. The EP has only a consultative role and the Commission 
enjoys a clear jurisdictional basis and is therefore in a legally ‘strong’ position. By 
contrast, RES policy initiatives need to be based on internal market or environmental 
competences with full involvement of the EP under co-decision procedure.  
 
In order to be able to analyse policy change, the period analysed should span over at 
least 10 years (Sabatier, 1998) due to the stability and long-term dynamics in policy 
subsystems. Both case studies include a brief review of relevant developments in both 
fields that precede the actual policy proposal which go back to the early 1970s. The key 
period of the analysis spans the years from the late 1990s until the end of 2008. Setting 
an end date to the analysis of an ongoing policy process proved particularly challenging. 
In both case studies important milestones were achieved in November and December 
2008. In November 2008 the Commission published a new policy proposal in a follow-
up to the nuclear package and in December 2008 political agreement was reached on the 
RES directive. 
4.4 Validity of the research design 
In general, validity is built into qualitative research designs by the triangulation of 
results from different methods for data collection and analysis. Triangulation can be 
defined as “using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of 
an observation or interpretation” (Stake, 2005: 454). In practice, multiple perceptions 
are captured by using different data sources such as primary and secondary documents, 
interviews and observations. Yin (2003: 98f) refers to a distinction between four types 
of triangulation: data triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation and 
methodological triangulation. While investigator triangulation is not possible in a 
doctoral research project, the other three types of triangulation were used in this thesis. 
Theory triangulation has been applied in the construction of the theoretical framework 
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in the previous chapter. Data and methodological triangulation will be elaborated further 
in the sub-section below on data analysis. 
 
The validity of the case study research design can further be ensured using three tests 
(Yin, 2003: 34-39): construct validity, internal validity, and external validity. Construct 
validity is achieved by two steps (Yin, 2003: 35): first, selection of specific types of 
changes that are to be studied and how they are related to the original objectives of the 
study; and second, demonstration that the selected measures of these changes are 
suitable to indicate the specific types of change that have been selected (see  4.5). 
Internal validity is achieved through various tactics when analysing the data as will be 
elaborated in more detail below (see  4.7). External validity is achieved through the use 
of established theories as demonstrated in the previous chapter.  
 
While generalisation – or external validity – is a key concern for scientific research in 
order to achieve context independent knowledge for an explanation of a given 
phenomenon, it is ‘only’ one consideration among others when designing case study 
research. Internal validity might be more relevant than external validity in a single case 
study that is interested in understanding causal mechanisms of a social phenomenon 
such as an agenda-setting process.36 Despite the importance of achieving generalisable 
results from scientific research, case studies can also generate “concrete, practical 
(context dependent) knowledge” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 221-224) and thus provide a better 
understanding of the particular case analysed. The generation of both context 
independent (generalisable) and context dependent knowledge can be an important 
contribution of qualitative case study research. 
4.5 Operationalisation of key concepts 
Since “the EU is a complex and heterogeneous configuration, both in structural terms 
and in terms of the kind of processes […] the question is not primarily how to measure, 
but what to measure” (Andersen, 2003: 6). In order to respond to this methodological 
challenge of EU policy studies, the theoretical framework is operationalised in three 
steps: the application of the stages of an issue career is explained, key variables are 
broken down in sub-research questions, and policy change is defined.  
                                                 
36 Trade-offs and considerations of case study research designs comparing case study and cross-case 
study research designs are discussed in Gerring (2007: 37-63). 
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While policy processes do not take place in stages (see  3.2.3), the stages of an issue 
career – issue initiation, issue specification, issue expansion and issue entrance – are 
used as an heuristic framework to guide the empirical analysis in order to structure 
policy processes analytically from an agenda-setting perspective following Princen and 
Rhinard (2006). Differences between the various stages are fluid. Issue initiation 
captures the phase when an issue arises either due to shared political attention at high 
politics or out of professional concerns at the level of low politics. The former can be 
reflected in Council conclusions, the latter in calls for policy action from expert 
communities or from Commission officials. Issue specification refers to the stage when 
general issues are specified in policy proposals. This phase is considered here as the 
Commission drafting process of new policy proposals taking into account that in both 
policy processes policy proposals were formally published by the Commission. Issue 
expansion relates to the stage when an issue moves “beyond the initial actors in specific 
venues to a wider set of participants” (Princen and Rhinard, 2006: 1122); this can be top 
down (from the European Council to the Council and Commission) or bottom-up (from 
low politics to higher political levels). It is considered here as the phase when the 
Commission proposals are published and the issue is formally expanded to other venues 
including the Council and the EP. Issue entrance, the final stage of the issue career, 
“occurs when an issue gains access to the formal agenda of EU decision-makers” 
(Princen and Rhinard, 2006: 1122).  
 
The operationalisation of the last stage (issue entrance) requires a clear definition of 
what is meant by the EU’s “formal agenda”. Princen and Rhinard do not provide an 
explicit definition of the term. It is difficult to apply the generic definition from the 
agenda-setting literature to EU policy-making that defines the “formal agenda” as an 
agenda where issues receive serious attention from decision makers (see  3.2.3). Serious 
attention could refer in EU policy-making to various indicators such as: an issue’s 
inclusion in the conclusions of the European Council, an issue being subject to a 
Commission’s drafting process, an issue being on the agenda of COREPER or Council 
of Ministers meetings. Issue entrance can therefore be applied to various stages of EU 
policy-making and it is here understood as a generic category that captures the entire 
agenda-setting route. This use of issue entrance is also reflected in Princen and 
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Rhinard’s empirical case studies on EU bioterrorism and non-smoking policies (Princen 
and Rhinard, 2006). 
 
The analysis in this thesis is not strictly limited to agenda-setting (why an issue 
becomes an issue?), but how the way an issue was put on the formal agenda affected the 
subsequent policy process and thus how the agenda-setting route can explain policy 
change and stability in EU energy policy. Agenda-setting and decision-making cannot 
be clearly distinguished. The decision-making process itself is a continuous struggle 
over the agenda as illustrated by Tallberg’s (2003) analysis of the agenda-shaping 
powers of the Council Presidency. 
 
While the distinction between the low politics and high politics route can provide 
interesting insights in EU agenda dynamics, building on the agenda-setting literature 
four more specific explanatory variables were identified in order to explain EU energy 
policy-making as argued in the previous chapter: contextual factors, policy 
entrepreneurs, issue definitions, and institutional venues. In order to answer the two key 
research questions (see  3.4.3), based on the previous literature review the different 
elements of the theoretical framework were operationalised for the empirical analysis by 
formulating specific sub-research questions as summarised in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Operationalisation of the theoretical framework 
 
EU agenda-setting routes High politics vs. low politics (Princen/Rhinard 2006) 
• Issue initiation: Why and how was the issue initiated (by political leaders or out of 
professional concerns in expert communities)? 
• Issue specification: How was the issue specified (by political consensus or technical 
discussions in expert groups and working parties)? 
• Issue expansion: How was the issue expanded to lower/higher levels of decision-making in the 
EU?  
• Issue entrance: How did the issue enter the decision-agenda (political momentum or gradually 
built-up impetus)? 
Contextual factors 
• Did contextual factors (e.g. economic downturn, focusing event, public opinion, administrative 
changes) affect EU energy policy-making and/or open a policy window (Mazey 1998; Radaelli 
1995; Wendon 1998)? 
Policy entrepreneurs 
• Who were the dominant policy entrepreneurs and what was their “pet proposal” (Kingdon 
1994[1984])? 
• What were the policy entrepreneurs’ anticipated future gains: bureaucratic (expansion of 
jurisdiction), purposive (values and beliefs), solidary (being close to power) (Kingdon 
1994[1984])? 
• Did policy entrepreneurs identify a policy problem, build coalitions and therefore define 
problems in a receptive way to relevant target audiences by pre-testing problem definitions and 
adapting them accordingly (Mintrom and Vergari 1996)? 
• Did the Commission assess its proposals against dominant positions and build winning 
coalitions by consensus-building and selling proposals (Nugent 2006; Pallis 2006; Wendon 
1998)? 
• Did the Commission (try to) eliminate controversial issues from the agenda to help political 
agreement (Hennessy 2007)? 
• Did the Commission use advisory committees and working groups to access independent 
information and to build legitimacy (Marks and Hooghe 1996)? 
• To what extent did legitimacy on the basis of public concerns and support by the EP help the 
Commission to expand in new policy fields despite resistance from important actors (Pallis 
2006)? 
• To what extent did the ECJ help the Commission to expand its jurisdiction (Tömmel 2008b)? 
• Did the Commission use the European Council to legitimise its proposals (Nugent 2006)? How 
did the European Council sanction or legitimise Commission policy initiatives (Rasmussen 
2007)? To what extent did Council initiatives diminish the Commission’s influence on the 
agenda (Rasmussen 2007)? 
• How did Council Presidencies use their agenda-shaping powers (agenda-setting, agenda-
structuring and agenda-exclusion) to influence the decision-making process (Tallberg 2003)? 
• Did the EP influence the decision-making process by initiative reports, delays, informal 
contacts or other means (Jones and Clark 1999; Rasmussen 2007)? 
• Did interest groups influence the decision-making process by providing legitimacy to 
proposals by providing key information, adequate resources or economic and political weight 
(Nugent 2006; Greenwood 2007)? 
Issue definition 
• To what extent did issue definition predetermine the solution to the problem and influence 
actors’ access to institutional venues (Baumgartner and Jones 1993)? 
• Did new entrants to the policy field contribute to the redefinition of issues, changes in policy 
image and institutional venue and thus create positive feedback processes for policy change 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993)? 
• To what extent were policy frames (problem definition and solutions) institutionalised 
(Lenschow and Zito 1998)? 
Institutional venues 
• To what extent were issues expanded into new venues that were more receptive to certain 
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policy entrepreneurs’ objectives (Baumgartner and Jones 1993)?  
• To what extent did issue expansion into specific institutional venues lead to non-decision 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993)? 
• To what extent was the choice in institutional venues influenced by organisational needs, 
beliefs, the ability to process information, or policy learning (Pralle 2003)? 
• Did the Commission use process legislation to establish venues capable of making legislation 
(Cram 1993)? 
• Did EU institutions use institutional venues to select interest groups that are most in line with 
their agenda (Mahoney 2004)? 
• To what extent did the Council’s vertical differentiation of venues help to overcome “issue 
specific rigidities” by shifting negotiation to higher political levels (Eising 2002)? 
• Did institutional venues restrict actor access if there was high political salience and deliver 
high quality information to improve the basis for policy-making if there was low political 
salience on a highly technical issue (Broscheid and Coen 2003)? 
• Were the conclusions reached within institutional venues made by experts not seriously 
questioned by political actors and did they therefore affect the agenda-setting process (Gehring 
et al. 2008)? 
 
 
Finally, policy change needs to be specified. Although policy change has been the 
subject of countless public policy studies, the literature does not provide a single clear-
cut definition of policy change. Instead “empirical studies tend to assume, rather than to 
define ‘policy change’” (Stewart, 2006: 184). Since policy can be considered as 
changing constantly, it does not make sense analytically to distinguish between change 
and stability, but rather to distinguish among different types of policy change (Hogwood 
and Peters, 1983). Despite the difficulty in establishing a clear classification of policy 
changes because of their complexity and variety in practice, ideal types of policy change 
can be distinguished (Hogwood and Peters, 1983: 26-29): policy innovation (entry of 
government in a new field), policy succession (replacement of existing policies in the 
same area of activity), policy maintenance (continuous replacement), and policy 
termination (end of policy including public expenditure).  
 
While policy innovation rarely occurs in industrialised society because governmental 
policies stretch over all policy relevant fields (Hogwood and Peters, 1983), at the EU 
level the Commission has often sought to expand its competences into new fields. The 
two case studies analysed therefore cover policy innovation37 (the nuclear package) and 
policy succession and maintenance (the RES directive). The analysis seeks to explain 
the underlying decision-making process of these intended policy changes measured 
                                                 
37 The term “policy innovation” is used here as defined above by Hogwood and Peters. It does not, 
therefore, imply a radical policy change but the expansion of jurisdictional powers into a new policy area. 
As will be seen in Chapter 5 the nuclear package was an attempt by the Commission to expand its 
competences to a new policy field. 
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against achieved policy outputs, i.e. objectives and instruments incorporated in a 
legislative or regulatory act, by analysing agenda dynamics. 
4.6 Data collection 
Data collection was based on primary and secondary documents as well as interviews. 
This triangulation of data collection methods should mitigate any bias in data collection. 
Primary and secondary documents were used at the initial stage of the analysis to track 
the issue career for each case study in as much detail as possible in order to prepare a set 
of interview questions for semi-structured interviews at the second stage of the case 
study research. Main sources for primary documents were the online document archives 
of the Commission, the Council and the EP as well as the Commission’s main library in 
Brussels, DG TREN’s library in Brussels and the Commission’s CIRCA38 database.  
 
In order to complement these ‘raw’ data with information on contextual developments 
and reactions by other policy entrepreneurs, professional news archives and journals 
were searched. These included the online database Factiva, Platts’ Nucleonics Week, 
Platts’ Power in Europe, Agence Europe, ENDS Europe daily as well as European 
Voice. Positions of key players were investigated further on the basis of position papers 
and other statements available online.39 In addition the limited range of available 
secondary literature was analysed. The analysis of these various documentary sources 
provided a detailed overview of each policy process and each step of the issue career 
including relevant policy entrepreneurs, institutional venues, issue definitions and 
contextual factors.  
 
On this basis interview questions were developed for semi-structured interviews. While 
the aim was to guide the interview along key issues in relation to the research questions 
(see below), they provided enough freedom for respondents to elaborate on issues that 
seemed most important from their perspective to ensure that all relevant factors were 
identified (Hakim, 2000: 34). The guideline was adapted according to the interviewee’s 
                                                 
38 Communication and Information Research Centre Administrator (CIRCA) was used to access 
documents related to the European High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management, for 
further information see: http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/tren/nuclear_safety_and_waste/home. 
39 Thus, as opposed to some previous studies on agenda-setting (e.g. Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) this 
thesis does not analyse media coverage of the two case studies as an independent variable to explain the 
developments of the governmental decision agenda. Kingdon (1995 [1984]) concluded, for example, that 
media coverage did often not reflect what interviewees described as high on the governmental agenda. In 
addition the absence of “European” – as opposed to nationally biased – media coverage of EU policy-
making strongly limited the scope to follow such a methodological approach here. 
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position in the process and the information gathered in previous interviews and 
documents. The aim was to verify and falsify the previously gathered information and 
thus to validate factors that have influenced agenda dynamics and ultimately policy 
change. 
 
In total 47 semi-structured interviews were conducted with Commission officials, 
Council officials, officials from Member States and national nuclear safety authorities, 
MEPs, MEP assistants, and interest group representatives. The interviewees were 
chosen combining a positional and reputational approach. The former identifies key 
actors on the basis of their position in the policy process; the latter relies on other 
interviewees’ assessment on who played a relevant role in the policy process – also 
referred to as a ‘snowball’ strategy of interviewing (Arksey and Knight, 1999).  
 
During the selection of interviewees attention was paid to avoiding a selection bias for 
each case study. Within the Commission, officials from different DGs and different 
rank (members of cabinet, heads of unit and administrators), with presumably different 
views on the policy process were interviewed. MEPs or MEP assistants from different 
political groups were interviewed. In all cases attempts were made to avoid a cultural 
bias by interviewing people with different national backgrounds. Since it was not 
possible to conduct interviews with officials from all 27 Member States, the objective 
was to get the view of key participants in each case study. Interviewees were granted 
anonymity and therefore only their institutional affiliation is indicated (for full list of 
interviews conducted for this thesis see Appendix C). Most interviewees agreed that the 
interview was recorded; otherwise hand-written notes were taken. Both were 
subsequently documented. 
 
A first round of 25 interviews was conducted between June and October 2008 on the 
nuclear package, a second round of 22 interviews followed between March and June 
2009 on the RES directive. Most interviews were carried out in person; a few interviews 
were carried out on the phone. Interviews were conducted in English, German or French 
and generally took between 30 and 90 minutes. 
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4.7 Data analysis 
The analysis of qualitative data can be divided into three components: data reduction, 
data display, and conclusion drawing and verification (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Data reduction comprises the simplifying and transforming of the original data towards 
the actual research questions. Data display includes the organised and compressed 
display of the previously condensed dataset to allow for conclusions drawing and 
verification. In order to facilitate the latter, data display needs to identify themes and 
trends in the overall data in view of the originally proposed framework for analysis and 
the derived propositions. Based on contrasting case studies it was proposed to identify 
similarities and thus to draw some more generalisable conclusions on EU energy policy-
making. 
 
This approach to data analysis was used in the empirical analysis. It was guided by the 
sub-research questions summarised in Table 2. Besides the reliance on theoretical 
propositions as a general strategy for data analysis, alternative interpretations were 
considered throughout the empirical analysis to prevent bias in the data analysis. Due to 
the inherent difficulty in verifying interpretations by interviewees, particular attention 
was paid to the triangulation of data sources and/or methods of data collection. Thus 
data were only used if they were confirmed either by several interviewees and/or backed 
up by written data sources. Furthermore it was recognised that interviewees with a 
similar position in the policy process tend to have the same views on the process. It was 
therefore particularly important not to be biased by similar accounts by different 
interviewees if it was not to describe a particular position or perspective on the process. 
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5 Case study I: The nuclear package 
5.1 Introduction 
During the 1990s nuclear energy did not play a major role in the EU energy policy 
debate that was dominated by the internal energy market liberalisation packages and 
increasingly energy efficiency and renewable energy (see also  2.2). However, nuclear 
energy-related issues gradually re-emerged onto the EU energy policy agenda due to 
various contextual factors. Against this background some in the Commission tried to 
use a window of opportunity to keep the nuclear option open and to expand its 
competences in the field of nuclear energy policy by publishing a ‘nuclear package’ in 
November 2002. The nuclear package included two directive proposals under the 
Euratom Treaty covering nuclear safety, decommissioning funds, and radioactive waste 
management. The nuclear package was, however, opposed by a blocking minority in the 
Council. The political discussion resulted in lengthy consultation processes in different 
institutional venues. The nuclear package was never adopted in the Council. Instead the 
Commission tabled a new proposal on nuclear safety in November 2008. This new 
proposal sets the end date of the empirical analysis in this chapter (for a timeline of this 
policy process see  Appendix A).  
This chapter analyses how the way in which the nuclear package was initiated by the 
Commission influenced the subsequent policy process. It examines how other policy 
entrepreneurs influenced the agenda-setting (and thus the policy) process by analysing 
the role of issue definitions and institutional venues. Against the theoretical framework 
elaborated in Section  3.3, it is argued that unclear problem definition by the 
Commission and its exclusion of expert communities within existing institutional 
venues weakened the agenda-setting process in terms of content and process. This 
helped opposing Member States to block the nuclear package in the Council.  
It is shown that despite – or rather because of – its formally strong position as an 
agenda-setter under Euratom, the Commission was not an effective policy entrepreneur. 
It failed, for example, to sell ideas to Member States and their nuclear regulators during 
the drafting process and was therefore unable to build winning coalitions on the basis of 
appropriate issue definitions and/or institutional venues. By contrast, opposing Member 
States – in particular with the help of national nuclear regulators – acted as policy 
entrepreneurs by proposing convincing alternative policies and processes. The case 
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study underlines the view that agenda-setting, and in particular the influence on the 
subsequent policy process, depends less on the formal position of a policy entrepreneur 
in the policy process than on its ability and willingness to combine a window of 
opportunity with favourable problem definitions and institutional venues sympathetic to 
its policy goals.  
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section outlines the ‘special’ institutional 
basis for EU nuclear energy policy under the Euratom Treaty and takes account of 
institutional elements relevant to nuclear safety and radioactive waste management at 
the Community and international level. This overview shows why the nuclear package 
constituted a radical policy change in this policy field. The subsequent analysis of the 
agenda-setting and decision-making process is structured along the stages of an issue 
career: policy initiation, issue specification, and issue expansion.  
Policy initiation started in the late 1990s due to various contextual factors. In late 2001, 
after the publication of the Advocate General’s Opinion, issue specification started with 
the Commission’s internal drafting process. The issue expansion phase was entered 
when the nuclear package was published in late 2002. This phase spanned over several 
years starting with several consultation processes launched by the Council in mid-2004 
and ending with a new Commission proposal on nuclear safety published in November 
2008. Each step of the issue career is analysed using the key concepts elaborated in 
Section  3.3: contextual factors, policy entrepreneurs, issue definition, and institutional 
venues. 
5.2 Nuclear energy and Community energy policy 
5.2.1 The Euratom Treaty 
Nuclear energy enjoys a ‘special status’ in the EU institutional framework since it is 
based on a dedicated jurisdictional basis. The Euratom Treaty, signed in 1957 and 
coming into force in 1958, established the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EAEC) with special provision for the nuclear sector. Although the Executives of the 
ECSC, the EEC and the EAEC were merged in 1967 in a single Council and a single 
Commission as a result of the Merger Treaty, and the ECSC and the EEC merged with 
the EU in 1992 as a consequence of the Maastricht Treaty, the EAEC retained its 
separate legal personality and its provisions remained unaffected by the EC Treaty (Art. 
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305(2) EC Treaty), but it shared the EU institutions. As a result ‘new’ policy objectives 
and legal provisions that were incorporated in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties 
such as environmental objectives or the precautionary principle do not apply to the 
Euratom Treaty (Hummer, 2008: 512ff). The Lisbon Treaty has not affected the 
EAEC’s ‘special status’40. 
 
The major objective of the Euratom Treaty has been the support of the formation and 
development of Europe’s nuclear industries to secure the Community’s energy supply. 
Nuclear energy was considered as a cheap energy source that would help Europe 
become less dependent on oil imports. Cameron notes that “the authors of the Euratom 
Treaty took an almost gung-ho approach to their subject” (Cameron, 2007b: 73). Issues 
related to radioactive waste management are, for example, virtually absent in the 
Euratom Treaty because it was not considered as an important issue in the 1950s. With 
the help of a Community framework, it was hoped all Member States could benefit from 
the development of atomic energy. Art. 1 of the Euratom Treaty states: 
 
“It shall be the task of the Community to contribute to the raising of the standard 
of living in the Member States and to the development of relations with the other 
countries by creating the conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and 
growth of nuclear industries.” (Euratom Treaty, Art. 1) 
 
From this it follows that the prime task of the EAEC was the promotion of the civil 
nuclear industry and thus implicitly the promotion of nuclear energy as energy source 
within the EAEC.  
 
Specific tasks of the Treaty include the protection of the workforce and the general 
public from radiation (Chapter 3, Art. 30-39), the secure supply of nuclear fissile 
materials (Chapter 6, 52-76), and safeguarding the nuclear fissile supply chain to 
prevent abuse for military purposes (Chapter 7, Art. 77-85). The Commission disposes 
of supranational competences in these three areas. In addition the Commission tasks 
include the promotion of R&D in the field of nuclear energy and the dissemination of 
                                                 
40 The Lisbon Treaty amends the Euratom Treaty by its Protocol No 2. The Euratom provisions continue 
to have their full legal effect and Euratom keeps its own legal personality outside the framework of the 
EU. The amendments are only intended to adapt the Euratom Treaty to the new rules laid down in the 
Lisbon Treaty, in particular in the institutional and financial fields. 
  
69
research results (Art. 4-11). Furthermore, the Commission shall facilitate investment in 
nuclear energy and ensure the availability of basic installations necessary for nuclear 
energy. According to Art. 37 of the Euratom Treaty Member States need to report 
‘general data’ to the Commission on the siting and surroundings of a new nuclear 
installation. Under Art. 40 of the Euratom Treaty the Commission is obliged to publish 
periodically illustrative programmes (so called PINC) indicating nuclear energy 
production targets and all the types of investment required for their attainment, in order 
to facilitate action and stimulate investments41. According to Articles 41 and 42 of the 
Euratom Treaty any new investments related to nuclear activities have to be 
communicated to the Commission.  
 
Although the Euratom Treaty was considered an important building block in European 
integration, in particular between France and Germany after the failed European 
Defense Community in 1955 (Lake and O’Driscoll, 2002), it did not result in a common 
approach to a European nuclear energy policy. This was prevented by the persistent and 
divergent national interests in this sector. Due to the close link between the 
development of civil nuclear technology and the military technology “the same culture 
of secrecy […] pervaded the civil nuclear sector” (Lake and O’Driscoll, 2002: ii).  
 
This lack of transparency has also been reflected in the decision-making procedures and 
particularly the weak role of the EP (or the “Assembly”) under Euratom. The 
Commission and the Council only have to consult the EP in legislative procedures under 
Euratom.42 Despite attempts to change this institutional setting, Euratom was never a 
core issue on the EP’s agenda for intergovernmental conferences, and the majority of 
Member States were always successful in preventing any substantial changes despite 
support from Member States such as Austria and Ireland to end the special role of 
EAEC (Lake and O’Driscoll, 2002).  
                                                 
41 Art. 40 of the Euratom Treaty says: “In order to stimulate action by persons and undertakings and to 
facilitate coordinated development of their investment in the nuclear field, the Commission shall 
periodically publish illustrative programmes indicating in particular nuclear energy production targets and 
all the types of investment required for their attainment. The Commission shall obtain the opinion of the 
Economic and Social Committee on such programmes before their publication.” 
42 Until the SEA came into force in 1987, the consultation procedure was the only procedure for non-
administrative legislation. The cooperation procedure introduced by the SEA, and the co-decision 
procedure introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, gave more influence to the EP, but these changes 
did not affect the decision-making procedure under Euratom which remains subject to the consultation 
procedure. However, the EP is also the co-budgetary authority for all expenditure under Euratom. 
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The key actors under Euratom are therefore the Commission and the Council. Within 
the Council the Working Party on Atomic Questions (WPAQ)43 is the central 
institutional venue that deals with all matters related to Euratom. It is composed of 
national officials and includes a Commission representative. The EP does not have 
formal access to the WPAQ. The WPAQ can be considered as “the most important 
forum for the implementation of the provisions of the Euratom Treaty and the secondary 
legislation deriving from it” (Lake and O’Driscoll, 2002: 139). Although its role is 
technically the preparation of documents for the Council of Ministers or COREPER, it 
“would seem to be the de facto decision-making body with respect to the Euratom 
Treaty” (Lake and O’Driscoll, 2002: 139). One explanation for this key role is the 
importance of expertise in the field of nuclear safety and radioactive waste management 
(ibid.).  
 
Within the Commission Euratom related responsibilities were mainly shared among DG 
TREN and DG ENV until 2000 when nuclear competences were concentrated in DG 
TREN. Until 2000 DG ENV’s Directorate C, “Nuclear safety and civil protection”, 
dealt with radiation protection, safety of nuclear installations, radioactive waste 
management and civil protection, whereas DG TREN led on general issues related to 
nuclear energy policy (e.g. publication of PINCs), and its Directorate E, “Safety Control 
Euratom”, was mainly responsible for nuclear safeguards under Euratom.44  
5.2.2 Community activities on nuclear safety and radioactive waste management 
The high expectations for the future role of nuclear energy in the European Community 
were strongly reflected in various energy policy statements by the Commission, e.g.: 
“As far as nuclear energy is concerned, its security of supply and its price characteristics 
make every possible acceleration of its development desirable” (CEC, 1972: 8-9). 
Nuclear energy was valued as an economic option to reduce dependency on oil and thus 
as a measure to increase energy security in Europe. The Commission’s aspiration for 
nuclear energy was further underlined in the 1974 energy strategy, where energy policy 
objectives for the year 1985 were developed. One objective was to supply 50% of 
electricity needs in the EC by using nuclear energy (CEC, 1974). It even went as far as 
                                                 
43 Often referred to as the ‘Atomic Questions Group’ (AQG) 
44 See official interinstitutional directories published by the European Commission. 
  
71
to forecast that “at least 50% of total energy requirements around the year 2000 could 
be covered from this source [nuclear energy]” (CEC, 1974: 9). It was argued that 
nuclear energy’s economic performance had “now become economically competitive 
with all other sources of primary energy” and therefore “production of electricity in 
nuclear power stations must be increased as quickly as possible for security reasons” 
(CEC, 1974: 20).  
 
However, in its second assessment report of the 1985 objectives – three years later – the 
Commission conceded that the nuclear target would not be achieved and that this was 
due to increasing “public doubts” (CEC, 1977: 7), but argued that the expansion of the 
nuclear programme was still considered as “vital”. Tensions between the official 
Commission opinion that nuclear was needed within the Community’s energy supply 
mix, and increasing problems of public acceptance of nuclear power, became a 
predominant characteristic of Community debates from then on: “Given the 
contribution of nuclear energy to all the Communities’ energy objectives, this option 
has to be kept open, but its future depends to a large extent on its acceptability by 
society and political leaders” (CEC, 1995a: 24). Public concerns on the safety of nuclear 
energy were therefore one reason why Community activities in the field of nuclear 
safety and radioactive waste management were reinforced. 
 
The Council had supported the Commission’s work towards a European approach to 
nuclear safety and radioactive protection since 1975 (Council, 1975). A Council 
Resolution requested Member States to “collaborate effectively at Community level” 
with the aim of a “progressive harmonisation of safety requirements and criteria in order 
to provide an equivalent and satisfactory degree of protection of the population and of 
the environment against the risk of radiation resulting from nuclear activities” (Council, 
1975). Yet, despite the existence of the Euratom Treaty and political agreement to work 
towards harmonisation in the area of nuclear safety, it was however difficult to pursue 
Community rules and standards in the early days of the civil nuclear programmes (CEC, 
1993). 
 
The main consultative bodies to work towards progressive harmonisation were the 
Reactor Safety Working Group (RSWG), bringing together representatives of the 
national safety authorities and their technical support organisations, plant operators and 
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manufactures, and the Nuclear Regulators’ Working Group (NRWG), consisting of 
national regulatory, licensing and control authorities. Both were Commission working 
groups. From the Commission’s point of view these groups should have enabled 
“systematic cooperation and concertation with the parties responsible for nuclear safety 
in the Member States” (CEC, 1993: 13).45 RSWG was abolished in 1998 and unfinished 
work was taken over by NRWG46 (Council, 2006e). NRWG aimed mainly to contribute 
to the harmonisation of methods and practices in Member States on the basis of best 
practice. It did not deal with specific safety standards. It mainly served as a forum to 
take a European perspective on issues that were similarly discussed in international fora 
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the OECD’s Nuclear 
Energy Agency (NEA). The NRWG saw its work as a “convergence process, i.e. 
harmonisation through consensus on common positions, not through mandatory legal 
ways, leaving to each National Safety Authority the responsibility to adapt national 
regulations” [emphasis in original] (CEC, 2002c: 30f). Indeed, for the Commission, the 
“network built by the NRWG members is somewhat in the heart of a harmonisation 
process” (CEC, 2002c: 7).  
 
In the light of the transformation in Central and Eastern European countries after 1989, 
the main objectives of the 1975 Council Resolution were reiterated in a Council 
Resolution in 1992 where Member States were requested “to ensure greater concerted 
effort between the national safety authorities in the Community on safety criteria and 
requirements on the incorporation of the conclusions reached into the practice followed 
in the Member States, in order to arrive at a system of safety criteria and requirements 
recognized throughout the Community” (Council, 1992b). This resulted in the 
establishment of new working groups such as CONCERT (CONCertation on European 
Regulatory Tasks) and RAMG (Regulatory Assistance Management Group). 
CONCERT supported the cooperation between nuclear safety authorities in candidate 
countries; RAMG assisted with the coordination of nuclear safety authorities in Central 
and Eastern European states and Newly Independent States.  
 
                                                 
45 Until 1992 NRWG was called WG1A and RSWG was called WG1B. They were both created by the 
Commission in 1972 as advisory working groups. For more information on the history of NRWG (and to 
a lesser extent RSWG) see (CEC, 2002c). 
46 NRWG was abolished in 2005 (see below). 
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In the field of radioactive waste management, Community level activities have been 
ongoing since 1973 when the Community Environmental Programme underlined the 
need for Community measures covering the “particular case of the handling and storage 
of radioactive waste” (Forsström and Taylor, 2000). A first Community Action Plan 
was approved by the Council in 1980 and extended in 1992 until 1999. One requirement 
of the action plan was that the Commission should produce regular reports on the 
situation of and prospects for nuclear waste in Member States. The fourth and last report 
before the publication of the nuclear package was published in 1999 (CEC, 1999a). It 
discussed potential areas of harmonisation at Community level such as definition and 
classification of radioactive waste and the financing of radioactive waste management. 
A number of external studies on elements of this strategy were commissioned which 
“could form the bases for draft Council Directives” (CEC, 1999a: 5) in this policy field.  
 
In 1994 the Commission presented a Community strategy for radioactive waste (CEC, 
1994), which envisaged “an approach towards harmonization at Community level, 
where practicable, of the radioactive waste management principles” on the grounds of 
nuclear safety and environmental protection. The proposed strategy referred to the 
following elements that could benefit from a Community approach: definitions and 
classifications of radioactive waste, the minimisation of radioactive waste, the transport 
of radioactive waste, the treatment and disposal of radioactive waste, public 
information, and the financing of radioactive waste management.  
 
In 1992 the Council had adopted a Council Directive on shipments of radioactive waste 
between Member States into and out of the Community that sought compliance with 
Community and national provisions, and with international agreements on the transport 
of radioactive material (Council, 1992a). This was updated in 2006 (Council, 2006d) – 
also in the light of the IAEA Joint Convention on spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management. 
5.2.3 IAEA Conventions on nuclear safety and radioactive waste management 
Nuclear safety and radioactive waste management were also subject to international 
conventions within the IAEA framework: the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) 
(IAEA, 1994), and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and 
on the Safety of Radioactive Waste management (JC) (IAEA, 1997). These frameworks 
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strongly affected activities at the Community level and are therefore discussed in more 
detail. 
 
The CNS was adopted in 1994 and came into force in 1996. It includes obligations 
related to siting, design, construction, operation, the availability of adequate financial 
and human resources, the assessment and verification of safety, quality assurance and 
emergency preparedness of nuclear power plants (Art. 6-19). It is an incentive 
instrument without direct controls and sanctions involved. Parties commit themselves to 
high levels of nuclear safety; they have to produce national reports on the 
implementation of their obligations and how they addressed issues raised in the 
previous review meeting. These reports are subject to a peer review procedure during 
regular review meetings of the Parties; these are held every three years. The main issues 
addressed are related more to regulatory and legislative issues than technical details. All 
EU Member States with nuclear power plants are member of the CNS. 47 
 
The JC was adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2001. It constitutes the first 
international document with obligations on spent fuel and radioactive waste resulting 
from civilian nuclear reactors and applications that are managed under civilian 
programmes. Contracting parties are obliged to produce reports on the measures taken 
to implement the obligations of the JC (Art. 4-28). Although obligations are based on 
IAEA Safety Standards, there are no standards specified which need to be considered in 
national reports or during the review process. Parties’ reports are subject to peer-review 
at review meetings that take place every three years. Although obligations under JC are 
binding in states that have ratified the JC, it is also an incentive instrument based on 
peer-review mechanisms without real sanctions. All EU Member States with the 
exception of Malta are parties to the JC.48 
5.2.4 Summary: cooperation at the Community level 
Since the early 1970s several initiatives have been launched at the Community level to 
enable information exchange on nuclear safety and radioactive waste management with 
                                                 
47 More information on the CNS can be found in the final report of Subgroup 1 of the Working Party on 
Nuclear Safety (Annex 1) (Council, 2006e). 
48 While the IAEA’s conventions set requirements with reporting requirements in relation to nuclear 
activities, the OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency provided a framework for technical expertise on nuclear 
related issues. EU advisory groups such as the NRWG intended to provide a European perspective that is 
complementary to the NEA’s international technical committees’ work (CEC, 2002c). 
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the view of developing a more coordinated approach to these issues. These initiatives 
were based on the involvement of national actors including national nuclear authorities 
and plant operators. The emphasis was on cooperation and developing a common 
understanding based on consensus rather than mandatory legislation. In parallel, at the 
international level, conventions were agreed and ratified that included binding 
obligations but were incentive instruments based on peer review without enforcement 
mechanisms. Against this background of reporting and information exchange 
requirements, the Commission’s nuclear package constituted a radical change in 
Community nuclear energy policy. 
5.3 Policy initiation: a window of opportunity? 
Since the early 1990s nuclear safety and radioactive waste management increasingly 
attracted public and political attention in Europe. In particular it was the transformation 
process in Central and Eastern Europe that brought the issue of nuclear safety and 
radioactive waste management back on the international and European agenda (see also 
 5.2). However, there was no consensus within the EU on the most appropriate response 
to this challenge.  
 
Member States, the Commission and the EP, as well as nuclear regulators tried to push 
for their own policy objectives. Four issues were predominant at the stage of policy 
initiation: the lack of common nuclear safety standards at the Community level, the 
long-term security of EU energy supply, public concerns related to nuclear energy and 
market distorting effects of decommissioning funds. For a chronological overview of 
the policy process related to the nuclear package see Appendix A. 
5.3.1 Contextual factors and emerging issue definitions 
Since the early 1990s nuclear safety in Eastern Europe had been a major concern within 
the EU. The Commission, as negotiator with candidate countries for EU membership, 
played an active role in dealing with nuclear safety standards outside the EU (e.g. von 
Sydow, 1995; CEC, 1998c; 2000a), but did not have an equivalent role inside the EU 
where nuclear safety standards were dealt with at the national level. In this context it 
was argued within the Commission that the enlargement process underlined the need for 
new legislation in this field to formalise the Commission’s role within the EU 
(Interview 3). This view was not shared by all Member States in the Council.  
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The European Council first discussed nuclear safety in the enlargement context under 
the Austrian Council Presidency at the Vienna European Council in 1998 (European 
Council, 1998). The Austrian initiative had already been prepared under the preceding 
UK Presidency who wanted to ensure that the Council would lead any assessment 
process (Interview 9). The Helsinki Presidency conclusions in 1999 underlined “the 
importance of high standards of nuclear safety in Central and Eastern Europe” and 
called on the Council “to consider how to address the issue of nuclear safety in the 
framework of the enlargement process in accordance with the relevant Council 
conclusions” (European Council, 1999b: para. 7).  
 
Thus, both Commission internal discussions and Council conclusions pointed to the 
importance of nuclear safety in the context of the enlargement process. However, the 
Commission and some Member States diverged on whether this should result in new 
legislative proposals at the EU level, and thus to a competence shift from the national to 
the Community level. The Commission was of the opinion that its responsibility for 
nuclear safety standards should not be limited to outside the Community where its 
responsibility was accepted as part of its role as negotiator with candidate countries for 
EU membership, but – reinforced by the experience during the enlargement process – 
extended to the Community area and therefore to all EU member states. This view was 
also underlined in the Commission’s Green Paper on security of energy supply putting 
forward additional justifications for action, namely security of energy supply and 
climate change (CEC, 2000b).  
 
Due to concerns about the EU’s long-term energy supply balance, nuclear energy was 
considered as an important energy source enabling the EU to become more independent 
from high and volatile fossil fuel prices. In addition it was framed as an important 
contribution in achieving the EU’s climate policy objectives: “concerns about global 
warming have changed the perception of energy supply constraints” and this was 
“particularly pertinent for nuclear energy” (CEC, 2000b). The Commission 
communication therefore argued that nuclear energy needed to be kept open as a policy 
option for Member States who wished to use this energy source. It noted that nuclear 
energy could only develop if “[…] the waste issue finds a satisfactory solution with 
maximum transparency” (CEC, 2000b: 34). The final report to the Green Paper in 2002 
concluded that “one major lesson to be drawn from the Green Paper debate is that the 
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future of this industry depends on finding a clear and unequivocal answer to the 
question of the processing and transportation of radioactive waste” (CEC, 2002b). It 
also referred to the need for common standards of nuclear safety within the EU. 
 
From the Commission’s point of view, one major barrier for nuclear energy within the 
EU was public concern over nuclear safety and radioactive waste management. From 
the early 1990s the EU was confronted with low levels of public acceptance for nuclear 
power. Eurobarometer surveys showed that, during the 1990s, nuclear energy was 
increasingly associated with “unacceptable risk” and should therefore be abandoned 
(e.g. CEC, 1997c: 34ff). Based on a survey from 2002 about different safety related 
policy issues, the Commission argued that public action in the area of nuclear safety and 
radioactive waste management was considered as among the most important issues for 
EU citizens in the context of energy technologies (CEC, 2002a: 74).  
 
In addition to concerns related to nuclear safety and radioactive waste management, in 
2002 the EP asked the Commission to deal with the potentially market distorting effects 
of decommissioning funds using the discussion on the second energy market 
liberalisation package. In its first report to the second electricity market directive, the 
EP adopted an amendment that called for separate accounting for decommissioning 
funds on the grounds of fair competition (amendment 68) (EP, 2002a). It was argued 
that this was relevant in the context of the internal energy market because some 
European energy companies used their decommissioning funds to finance takeovers that 
were considered to be a potential distortion to a fully competitive energy market. This 
was also reiterated in the recommendations for the second reading of the second energy 
market liberalisation package in April 2003 (amendment 18) (EP, 2003).  
 
In addition, the EP achieved the publication of both an interinstitutional statement and a 
Commission statement in the Official Journal to underline the importance of this issue.49 
The common statement of the three institutions underlined the need for these funds to 
be “actually available” for their purpose, and the need for them to be managed in a 
transparent way without interfering with fair competition in the energy market. In its 
                                                 
49 Statements made with regard to decommissioning and waste management activities, OJ L 176, 
15/07/2003, p. 56. 
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statement the Commission committed itself to publish an annual report on the use of 
decommissioning and waste management funds.  
5.3.2 Institutional venues and dominant issue definitions 
Against this background, policy entrepreneurs were looking for appropriate institutional 
venues with the aim of restricting and enabling actors’ access, and thus influencing 
dominant issue definitions in favour of their policy goals. Some Member States, 
supported by their national nuclear regulators, tried to avoid any competence shift from 
the national to the Community level, whereas the Commission, supported by an ECJ 
ruling, was building the case for new policy proposals. 
 
In response to the European Council’s Helsinki conclusions, in July 2000 COREPER 
mandated the WPAQ to provide an overview of the acquis in place and to elaborate a 
methodology for the assessment of nuclear safety in candidate countries (Council, 
2000b). For the assessment process the Council established an ad hoc Working Party on 
Nuclear Safety (WPNS) that consisted of experts from national regulators (Council, 
2000c). By the establishment of the Council-led WPNS the Council stressed that 
nuclear safety is a national competence since the “Euratom Treaty does not offer a 
specific legal basis for the establishment of safety standards for nuclear installations” 
(Council, 2000c: 9). The WPNS’ assessment process, however, revealed a major 
challenge: the absence of Community nuclear safety standards that could have been 
used to assess the nuclear safety situation in candidate countries. Instead, experience of 
national nuclear regulators and the IAEA standards had to be used as the basis for the 
evaluation of nuclear safety in candidate countries. The report was finalised in mid-
2001 (Council, 2001). 
 
The Commission used the lack of common nuclear safety standards as an important 
justification for legislative action in this field. In order to underline its competence 
claim, the Commission was not prepared to leave the assessment of nuclear safety in 
candidate countries to the Council-led WPNS. Instead, referring to the European 
Council’s Cologne conclusions from 1999, where the Commission was asked to include 
a statement on nuclear safety in its annual reports on the progress in candidate countries 
(European Council, 1999a: para. 60), the Commission established its own parallel 
assessment process. This was not, however, welcomed by national regulators. After it 
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became clear that the national regulators’ technical service organisations were not 
prepared to conduct this assessment on behalf of the Commission, the Commission had 
to contract a consortium of private organisations to carry out this assessment (Interview 
13).  
 
The struggle between some Member States and the Commission strongly underlined the 
tensions between the national and Community level on the issue of common nuclear 
safety standards. As will be seen later in the analysis, this conflict was incorporated in 
different institutional venues enabling and restricting actors’ access as well as 
influencing dominant problem definitions.  
 
The Council-led assessment process was strongly supported by the Western European 
Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA), representing national nuclear regulators 
within the EU plus Switzerland. WENRA had been created in 1999 with the following 
objectives (WENRA, 2000: 3): to develop a common approach to nuclear safety and 
regulation, in particular within the EU; to provide the EU with an independent 
capability to examine nuclear safety and regulation in candidate countries; and to 
evaluate and achieve a common approach to nuclear safety and regulatory issues. One 
of WENRA’s initial objectives was to contribute expert knowledge to the assessment 
process of nuclear safety in candidate countries. This was because the discussions at the 
time were perceived to be based on political rather than technical views (Interview 16).  
 
The ad hoc WPNS granted institutional access and allowed WENRA to establish itself 
as a leading player in the assessment process of candidate countries (Interview 9). 
WENRA’s chairman, André Lacoste from the French nuclear regulator, underlined the 
importance of this institutional access for WENRA’s future role in this policy process: it 
was “the beginning of an officialization” of WENRA (MacLachlan, 2000a: 13). There 
was clearly antagonism between WENRA and the Commission. WENRA contributed to 
the Council’s assessment process but not to the Commission’s parallel assessment 
process. Commission officials perceived WENRA as a means used by Member States to 
defend nuclear safety as a national competence, and to oppose new nuclear safety 
proposals at the Community level (Interview 3, 4, 5).  
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National nuclear regulators underlined their opposition to any competence shift from the 
national to the Community level in the field of nuclear safety. In 2000 DG ENV, the 
DG then responsible for nuclear safety, established a European Nuclear Installations 
Safety Group (ENISG) with the aim of developing nuclear safety indicators on the basis 
of an open process, including all relevant stakeholders such as national regulators and 
power companies. Regulators were, however, strongly opposed to the idea and clarified 
that they would “step up efforts to counter any attempt by the EC [the Commission] 
environment staff to monopolize the nuclear safety issue” (MacLachlan, 2000b).  
 
Early discussion of a Commission initiative in this field was interpreted as 
“sandwiching regulatory authorities between their national governments and the 
commission” (MacLachlan, 2000b). According to the Commission official responsible 
for ENISG, the “ultimate aim is to have a group that can promote harmonization of 
nuclear safety approaches EU-wide when central and eastern European countries start 
joining the Union” (MacLachlan, 2000c). ENSIG as an institutional venue was intended 
to help the Commission to make progress in nuclear safety at the Community level, 
whereas WENRA served exactly the opposite purpose, i.e. to prevent progress at the 
Community level that was against its own timetable. 
 
Discussions in the Council also highlighted different views among Member States. A 
group of countries led by Austria were strongly in favour of a common nuclear safety 
approach as reflected in the Laeken summit conclusions 2001 (European Council, 
2001). As a follow-up to the assessment process the European Council called for regular 
reports on nuclear safety. It was however underlined that these reports should be the 
responsibility of national experts and not of the Commission as intended by Austria. 
Austria, Ireland and Luxembourg proposed a declaration that aimed at establishing EU 
nuclear safety standards under the Commission’s responsibility. This was rejected by 
the UK, Finland and France, among others. In October 2000, Austria had already called 
for binding nuclear safety standards with the aim of harmonising them (Council, 
2000a). Community action in the field of nuclear safety was also supported by the EP’s 
Rübig report (EP, 2002b). 
 
These developments indicate a strong conflict of power and competences between the 
Commission, national regulators and some Member States. Despite the support for 
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Commission action in the field of nuclear safety by Member States such as Austria, 
Ireland and Luxembourg, the Council statements indicated that a few were keen to keep 
nuclear safety as a national competence. Nevertheless, the general objective of high 
nuclear safety standards in an (enlarged) EU was shared by all Member States as 
expressed in the Laeken conclusions. The Commission, however, was not prepared to 
accept the situation that it considered to be insufficient to guarantee a high level of 
nuclear safety within an enlarged EU. 
 
The Commission tried to use a ruling by the ECJ in December 2002 to substantiate its 
position legally. This ruling was the consequence of a struggle between the Commission 
and the Council on the Community competences in the field of nuclear safety that 
emerged in the context of the ratification of the IAEA’s CNS. In 1998 the Council 
approved the accession of the EAEC to the IAEA’s CNS only with a written declaration 
that the Community’s accession was limited to certain articles of the CNS. This was 
contested by the Commission who brought the issue to the ECJ in 1999 and asked for 
the partial annulment of the declaration because, from the Commission’s point of view, 
it constituted an unjustified limitation of the Community’s competences in this area.50  
 
In the subsequent ECJ process, both the Advocate General’s opinion and the ECJ ruling 
could be interpreted by the Commission as broadly confirming its position, i.e. that, 
under Title II, Chapter 3 “Health and Safety” of the Euratom Treaty, the Commission 
has jurisdiction in the field of nuclear safety and not only in a very restrictive area as 
argued by the Council. The ECJ’s Advocate General concluded in his opinion in 2001 
that: “According to the current understanding of the health and safety provisions of the 
Euratom Treaty there is a significant overlap between radiation protection and the safety 
                                                 
50 The Commission requested under Art. 146 of the Euratom Treaty the partial annulment of the 
unpublished Council Decision of 7/12/1998 approving the accession of the EAEC to the CNS. The 
Commission’s proposal submitted to the Council on 15/09/1994 had declared, first, that Articles 1 to 5, 7 
and 14 to 35 of the CNS apply to the Community and, second, that the Community possesses 
competences in the fields covered by Articles 1 to 5, 7 and 14 to 19 of the CNS. By contrast, the Council 
declared “that Articles 15 and 16(2) of the Convention apply to it [the Community]. Articles 1 to 5, 
Article 7(1), Article 14(ii) and Articles 20 to 35 also apply to it only in so far as the fields covered by 
Articles 15 and 16(2) are concerned.  The Community possesses competence, shared with the 
abovementioned Member States, in the fields covered by Articles 15 and 16(2) of the Convention as 
provided for by the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community in Article 2(b) and the 
relevant articles of Title II, Chapter 3 “Health and safety”. The ECJ ruled that it “1. Annuls the third 
[above quoted] paragraph of the declaration “in so far as Articles 7, 14, 16(1) and (3) and 17 to 19 of that 
convention are not referred to therein” (ECJ-C 29/99). As a result, a revised declaration was deposited 
with the IAEA in May 2004. 
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of nuclear installations” (ECJ, 2001b: para. 210). It was therefore argued that no clear 
distinction was possible between radiation protection, which is covered under Chapter 3 
“Health and Safety” under Euratom, and the safety of nuclear installations.  
 
The Advocate General’s opinion was largely confirmed by the ECJ ruling in December 
2002, which concluded that “it is not appropriate to draw an artificial distinction 
between the protection of the health of the general public and the safety of sources of 
ionising radiation” (ECJ, 2002). From the Commission’s viewpoint, this served as a 
strong jurisdictional basis to put forward a new legislative initiative in this policy field. 
The Advocate General’s opinion served as an important basis for the new directive on 
nuclear safety as reflected in the Commission’s communication in November 2002 
(CEC, 2002d) (Interview 3, 13). Although Member States opposed to the Commission 
policy could still question the jurisdictional basis of new legislative action in this policy 
field, this argument was weak and had to be backed up by other arguments (Interview 
15). As in other areas of EU policy making ECJ rulings were invoked by the 
Commission to assist its attempts to extend its competences (Tömmel, 2008b). 
5.3.3 Summary: filling the gap 
Issue initiation of the nuclear package process was a mixture of low and high politics 
dynamics. At the level of high politics, i.e. European Council summits, the issue of 
nuclear safety was brought to the agenda by the Austrian Presidency in the context of 
the enlargement process in 1998. This issue was subsequently picked up in the Cologne, 
Helsinki and Laeken summit conclusions. Nuclear safety was recognised as an integral 
part of the enlargement process. A split between Member States was however already 
apparent at the time: some Member States wanted the Commission to be responsible for 
the dossier whereas others were keen to emphasise that nuclear safety was not a 
Community but a national responsibility. 
 
The Council and the Commission incorporated their competence claims in institutional 
venues. By establishing the ad hoc WPNS, the assessment process was Council-led and 
national regulators informally organised within WENRA gained a central role in this 
process. To avoid being marginalised, the Commission initiated a parallel process with 
a consortium of private organisations and ensured a favourable issue framing around the 
absence of Community standards for nuclear safety that could be applied throughout an 
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enlarged EU. In addition the Commission’s DG ENV established another forum, 
ENSIG, to progress towards harmonised safety standards. This was, however, rejected 
by national regulators.  
 
The Commission’s position was considerably strengthened by the Advocate General’s 
opinion and the ECJ ruling. Member states could no longer refer only to the insufficient 
jurisdictional basis in this policy area to prevent new Community legislation. While the 
legal back-up by the ECJ served as an important trigger for the Commission, the 
enlargement process may have been used as a justification for the publication of the NP: 
“[…] the Commission has used the enlargement as a tool to make the directives more 
acceptable for the Member States. Nuclear safety and the enlargement have been 
harnessed to back up the Commission’s political purposes” (House of Lords, 2006b: 
59).  
 
Against this contextual background the Commission could develop different issue 
definitions to justify the nuclear package. With respect to EU enlargement it could be 
argued that the key problem was the lack of common safety standards. The IAEA CNS 
could be questioned as being an insufficiently robust legal instrument due to its 
incentive-based peer review character. Another problem dimension emerged from the 
Green Paper, i.e. the lack of public acceptance of nuclear power threatening the future 
of nuclear energy in the EU and thus – according to the Commission’s analysis – the 
long-term security of energy supply in the EU and the achievement of the EU’s climate 
targets. A further issue definition was put forward by the EP: potential market distorting 
effects of decommissioning funds in the internal energy market.  
 
While the first three problem definitions were broadly related to nuclear safety, the 
fourth was related to internal market issues. Each had different institutional 
implications: nuclear safety had to be based on the Euratom Treaty, whereas internal 
market issues and environmental concerns (e.g. climate change) were covered in the EC 
Treaty. Thus, despite an “asymmetrical distribution of influence through institutional 
structures” (Jann and Wegrich, 2007: 46) under the Euratom Treaty, the EP was able to 
put a nuclear energy-related issue on the political agenda via another institutional route. 
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5.4 Issue specification: the nuclear package proposal 2002/2003 
In January 2003 two directive proposals were transmitted to the Council as the nuclear 
package (CEC, 2003d):  
• Draft proposal for a Council Euratom Directive “Setting out the basic 
obligations and general principles for the safety of nuclear installations” (or 
briefly “Safety Directive Proposal”) including provisions for decommissioning 
funds; 
• Draft proposal for a Council Euratom Directive “The management of spent 
nuclear fuel and radioactive waste” (or briefly “Waste Directive Proposal”). 
 
The main points of the January 2003 version of the proposed “Safety Directive 
Proposal” can be summarised as follows: 
• Member States must ensure it has a safety authority, which is independent from 
bodies that promote or utilise nuclear energy. 
• The safety authority shall regulate and supervise safety of nuclear installations 
and grant the necessary licences. 
• Member States shall require the operator to run the facility in accordance with 
‘common safety standards’ and give priority to nuclear safety. 
• Member States to ensure that the regulator carries out nuclear safety inspections. 
• Member States shall take the appropriate steps to ensure adequate financial 
resources are available to support the safety of facilities. 
• Member States shall require the establishment of procedures by the safety 
authorities to deal with operating incidents and accidents. 
• The establishment of a verification system by the Commission to ensure that 
national safety authorities comply with the above principles. These verifications 
to be carried out by experts from another Member State approved by the 
Member State. The Member State concerned would be informed in advance of 
the verification. 
• Member States are required to submit annual reports to the Commission. 
• The Commission is required to submit a report to the Council and EP every two 
years. 
It was envisaged that the Commission would be responsible for a verification process on 
the basis of a peer-review process.  
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Another central element of the “Safety Directive Proposal” was the treatment of 
decommissioning funds. The proposal called for operators to build up sufficient 
decommissioning funds during the operating lifetime of the nuclear installation. In its 
annex the proposal included minimum criteria for decommissioning funds. A central 
criterion was the distinction between operators’ internal and external funds. 
Decommissioning should be managed separately, thus being ring-fenced to guarantee 
the availability of the funds when they were actually needed. The provisions included an 
opt-out for national particularities: “The present proposal leaves a great deal of the 
detail concerning the size of the funds, how they are to be collected and how they are to 
be managed to the individual Member States” (Taylor, 2003). The Commission 
defended its approach as reasonable given the variety of financing schemes that were in 
use throughout the EU. Harmonisation was therefore considered as only a long-term 
objective in response to the strong scepticism put forward by Member States (Interview 
4). 
 
The “Waste Directive Proposal” proposal required each Member State to define and 
implement a programme for all radioactive waste management under its jurisdiction. 
The provisions had to cover all stages of radioactive waste management, including its 
disposal. For each step in the process the programme should include a strict timetable 
following a pre-set timetable by the Commission. Authorisation for the development of 
disposal was to be given by 2008, for the operation of short-lived low and intermediate 
level radioactive waste disposal sites by 2013 and for the operation of disposal sites for 
high-level and long-lived radioactive waste by 2018. On the basis of this programme, 
Member States would have had to publish a report every three years and this would be 
assessed by the Commission and national experts, followed by the publication of a 
report by the Commission. Geological disposal was considered as the best practice 
among the disposal methods available.  
 
This brief summary of the key elements of the nuclear package underlines the ambition 
of the Commission proposals. They would have resulted in a clear expansion of 
Community competences in the field of nuclear safety and radioactive waste 
management. The clear indication during the assessment process of candidate countries 
that some Member States would be strictly opposed to any competence shift in the area 
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of nuclear safety raises the question as to what extent this scepticism was addressed 
during policy specification. It relates to key research questions summarised in Table 2: 
did the Commission try to build winning coalitions by building consensus and selling 
proposals (Wendon, 1998; Nugent, 2006; Pallis, 2006)? Were existing advisory groups 
used to gather independent information and to build legitimacy (Marks and Hooghe, 
1996) (see  3.3)?  
 
This section argues that the Commission did not seek to sell its policy proposal to 
Member States, but followed a confrontational approach to issue specification. The 
empirical analysis shows that, instead of pre-testing policy ideas and issue definitions, 
the Commission opted for the exclusion of almost all relevant actors during issue 
specification. Unclear issue definition resulted in rather vague policy proposals. 
Existing institutional venues that could have provided input to the formulation process, 
and thereby legitimacy, were ignored and eventually discontinued. This procedural 
weakness was complemented by, and resulted in, an incoherent policy proposal as 
regards its content and jurisdictional basis. 
5.4.1 Policy entrepreneurs: the Commission as formal agenda-setter 
During issue specification the Commission was the central policy entrepreneur. 
Commission officials’ motivation to propose the NP can be explained on the basis of 
Kingdon’s concept of expected material and purposive benefits (Kingdon, 1995 [1984]) 
(see  3.2.3). The nuclear package would have resulted in a competence gain for the 
Commission (material benefit). Moreover new legislation on the basis of Euratom 
would have underlined its significance more than 50 years after its adoption. This was 
of importance as the validity of the Euratom Treaty was questioned in the framework of 
the European Convention (The European Convention, 2003). In addition key players in 
DG TREN, including Commissioner de Palacio and Director-General Lamoureux, were 
convinced that nuclear energy was an important energy source for ensuring a secure and 
competitive low carbon energy supply in the EU (purposive benefits) (Interview 3, 4, 
13). In 2000 de Palacio argued that the EU could “never respect the environmental 
undertakings of Kyoto without nuclear energy” (Agence Europe, 2000). Finally, the 
nuclear package was considered by the Commission as a means of increasing public 
acceptance of nuclear energy (Waeterloos, 2003).  
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Commission officials drafted the nuclear package in a very short time period, and it was 
not discussed officially with stakeholders during the drafting process (Interview 4, 13). 
Participants in the process agreed that Member States were taken by surprise when the 
Commission published the nuclear package. Due to the absence of any pre-consultation, 
the Commission’s approach was perceived as “very brutal […] There was mistrust and 
this could not be changed” (House of Lords, 2006a: 29). Independent of their position 
on the nuclear package (supportive or opposed) many participants strongly emphasised 
the fact that the Commission did not consult sufficiently with Member States before the 
publication of the nuclear package (Interview 8, 9, 11, 14, 18, 19, 23, 24, 25). This 
fundamentally influenced the subsequent policy discussions (Interview 23, 24).  
 
The Commission scarcely made any attempt to discuss its ideas with Member States – 
with the exception of France – either at the political or technical level (Interview 3, 13, 
18). Industry was – with the exception of the French nuclear industry – also mostly 
excluded from the drafting process (Interview 8, 10). It seemed as if support from the 
nuclear industry was assumed (Interview 10). The non-involvement of regulators and 
industry that had to deal with outcomes weakened the nuclear package and also justified 
its rejection (Interview 23).  
 
Besides the nuclear industry, national nuclear regulators with a strong influence on their 
national governments (see below) were not consulted during the drafting process. 
Instead early drafts of the proposal prompted mistrust against national regulators 
(Interview 18) and the idea of a European nuclear regulatory body – although never 
written down – created resistance among national authorities (Interview 19). Early 
drafts of the nuclear package were leaked to national regulators, most of whom lobbied 
their national governments to oppose the nuclear safety proposal before governments 
had seen the proposal themselves. The exclusion of national nuclear authorities with 
their technical expertise in this field raised questions about the technical knowledge 
underpinning the proposals. WENRA decided not to respond to the nuclear package 
because it was considered to be of poor quality written by lawyers without any expertise 
in the topic (Interview 16).  
 
Doubts and mistrust in the Commission’s nuclear package among some Member States 
were reinforced by unclear propositions in the final stages of issue specification. After 
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strong opposition to the initial proposal was expressed by some Member States and their 
nuclear regulators, the Commission weakened its proposal before submitting it officially 
to the Council. Nonetheless, the underlying long-term intentions by the Commission 
had been spelled out, i.e. a legally binding Community regime in the field of nuclear 
safety. The version of the “Safety Directive Proposal” published in November 2002 
(CEC, 2002d) was drafted as a framework directive, and clearly indicated that the 
Commission only saw this initiative as a first step to be followed up by legally binding 
operational standards: 
 
“Initially, the Community system will be based on a corpus of minimum standards. 
However, it will establish a legal framework comprising a mechanism allowing the 
standards to evolve. One of the first tasks of the Article 31 Committee will therefore be 
to work out a corpus of legally binding operational standards, on the basis of the 
abovementioned studies, which can serve as a common reference point.” (CEC, 2002d: 
15) 
 
By contrast, the January 2003 version of the “Safety Directive Proposal” omitted any 
reference to “a corpus of legally binding operational standards” and was rather vague in 
its final purpose:  
 
“The Community system will be based on basic obligations and general principles. 
It will establish a legal framework comprising a mechanism allowing an 
evolution.” (CEC, 2003d: 5) 
 
It was argued that, “a Community approach to the safety of nuclear installations does 
not necessarily entail laying down detailed technical safety standards” (Council, 2003f: 
3).  
 
Instead of defusing concerns about the Commission’s long-term intentions, they were 
reinforced by Commission officials: when the nuclear industry expressed doubts about 
the nuclear package to the Commission, Commission officials replied that this would 
only be the first step and the technical details would follow on the basis of the IAEA 
guidelines (Interview 8). An official from a Member State opposed to the nuclear 
package expressed the view that this would have meant supporting something without a 
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clear idea of where the process would end (Interview 24). It would have empowered the 
Commission for further action without knowing what follow-up measures would be 
proposed and subsequently potentially implemented; it would have ultimately entailed 
transferring the interpretation of EU nuclear safety standards to the ECJ (Interview 24). 
 
Most importantly, the “Safety Directive Proposal” did not address key issues with 
respect to its implementation. While the January 2003 version aimed for Community 
safety principles rather than standards, it still envisaged the establishment of a 
Community framework without detailing how this would be achieved. It reflected the 
initial approach of a framework directive without explaining a potential follow-up 
process. It was generally acknowledged that it would be very difficult to develop 
common standards or principles given the variety of operating nuclear reactor designs in 
Member States (Interview 3). Moreover, the “Safety Directive Proposal” was drafted on 
the basis of the IAEA safety conventions that were not considered to be suitable to serve 
as the basis for Community legislation (Interview 3). With the “Waste Directive 
Proposal” the major objections related to pre-set timetables for national waste 
management programmes and the preference for geological disposal. Finally, the 
Commission’s decision to set the enlargement date, 1 May 2004, as the deadline for the 
adoption of the nuclear package was perceived as creating unnecessary time pressure. 
 
To sum up, the Commission did not seek to sell its ideas to Member States and other 
stakeholders in order to build ‘winning coalitions’. This created mistrust that was 
reinforced by the exclusion of nuclear regulators and the nuclear industry from the 
drafting process. Unclear propositions were also reflected in the issue definitions 
brought forward by the Commission. 
5.4.2 Issue definition: limiting actors’ access 
The Commission tried to justify the nuclear package as a response to various problems 
that were pertinent at the time. Instead of pre-testing the variety of problem definitions 
and identifying the most convincing one(s) among relevant stakeholders in order to 
build winning coalitions, the Commission launched the nuclear package on the basis of 
a mixture of problem definitions that responded to institutional and contextual factors. 
The justification for the nuclear package related mainly to the policy context at the time 
(see  5.3.1): different levels of nuclear safety within an enlarged EU (enlargement), long-
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term EU energy security (Green Paper 2000), public acceptance of nuclear energy 
(Eurobarometer), and market distortion (energy market liberalisation).  
 
This was reflected in the Commission’s presentation of the NP to the Council’s WPAQ 
in January 2003. Three policy priorities were highlighted (Council, 2003a): first, 
improving the security of energy supply by contributing to maintaining nuclear energy 
as one of the possible generation options, and thus implicitly referring to the need to 
increase public acceptance; secondly, ensuring the safety of installations in an enlarged 
Union through binding Community standards; finally, contributing to a genuine 
European energy market, including nuclear fuels, and providing a level playing field for 
its actors.  
 
The importance of framing during issue specification of the nuclear package is well 
illustrated by the issue of decommissioning funds. The Commission initially drafted 
three separate directives on nuclear safety, radioactive waste management and 
decommissioning funds (de Esteban, 2002: 6), but these were virtually not discussed 
outside TREN. Before the launch of the Commission’s inter-service consultation, it was 
decided by DG TREN’s hierarchy to integrate the provisions of decommissioning funds 
into the “Safety Directive Proposal” (Interview 3, 13). This was strongly criticised by 
MEPs since it marginalised the EP in the decision-making process (Interview 3).  
 
As a result of the merger of the safety and decommissioning draft directives, 
decommissioning funds provisions were not based on the EC Treaty’s internal market 
provisions (and thus subject to co-decision procedure as intended by the EP) but on the 
Euratom Treaty. This ensured that the traditionally anti-nuclear EP was put in a 
consultative role. As the Euratom Treaty did not provide any relevant provisions on 
financing, the provisions on decommissioning funds had to be framed as a matter of 
nuclear safety. This was strongly contested by opponents to the nuclear package (e.g. 
Hohlefelder, 2003). From the very beginning it was felt by participants that this problem 
definition was difficult to sustain (Interview 4, 8, 13). This scepticism was confirmed by 
the Council’s legal service who questioned whether decommissioning funds provisions 
could be based on the Euratom Treaty (Council, 2006f: 17). 
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5.4.3 Institutional venues: neglected advisory groups and internal reorganisation 
Institutional venues can enable and restrict actors’ access to the decision-making 
process (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). The integration of decommissioning funds in 
the nuclear “Safety Directive Proposal” on the basis of the Euratom Treaty marginalised 
the EP in the decision-making process. In addition to this strategic institutional venue 
choice, two factors related to institutional venues influenced issue specification: first, 
the non-involvement of the Commission’s nuclear related advisory groups and thus the 
exclusion of existing institutional venues; second, institutional changes within the 
Commission that reinforced DG TREN’s role as key institutional venue responsible for 
the nuclear package within the Commission. 
 
Since the early 1970s the Commission had established several nuclear related advisory 
groups consisting of national experts on nuclear safety and radioactive waste 
management: the NRWG, ACPM and (more recently) ENSIG (see  5.2.2). These groups 
consisted of representatives from national nuclear regulators and the nuclear industry. 
The Commission, however, made no explicit use of this established network of advisory 
groups. Bringing together national experts on radioactive waste management, the 
ACPM had been discontinued in 2001 shortly before the drafting process started 
(Interview 13). The long-standing NRWG on nuclear safety was virtually not involved 
in the drafting process (Interview 13, 18) and was also later abolished. Participants 
suggested that one reason for their abolition was that they did not support the 
Commission’s objectives of radical policy change (Interview 18, 25), preferring 
incremental policy change which built on ongoing processes that did not necessarily 
lead to legislation in the short-term (Interview 13). Moreover, by abolishing existing 
groups the Commission wanted to avoid parallel processes (Interview 20) that would 
divert attention from its own policy agenda.  
 
Neglecting these groups of experts had several impacts on the subsequent policy 
process. This exclusion of expertise weakened the authority and legitimacy of the 
nuclear package. In addition, these institutional venues could have served to pre-test 
ideas for new legislation and to develop a more convincing policy strategy. This was 
because the experts were very well aware of national positions and thus national 
perceptiveness to any new legislative proposals in this area. Experts from national 
nuclear regulators were very influential in determining national positions to any new 
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proposals as will be shown below. Not integrating them in the drafting process resulted 
in a confrontational constellation between the Commission and nuclear regulators 
because they felt excluded from the drafting processes of a major piece of EU 
legislation that would fundamentally impinge upon their work. A senior Commission 
official expressed the view that these advisory groups could have been a source of 
strength for the Commission by taking advantage of their technical expertise, the 
Commission could have used them to generate support for the nuclear package 
(Interview 13) and thus contribute to the legitimacy of the proposals.  
 
The policy initiation approach by the Commission can partially be explained by the 
policy style of the leading figures within DG TREN. Energy Commissioner de Palacio, 
Vice-President of the Commission and in charge of the relations with the European 
Parliament, and her Director-General Lamoureux, were considered as very powerful 
players within the Prodi Commission and could push their proposals through (Interview 
4). Lamoureux was, in general, strongly in favour of legislative approaches instead of 
consultations or voluntary working programmes (Interview 11, 13). Their willingness 
and ability to propose legislative measures in the fields of nuclear safety and radioactive 
waste management was supported by a Commission internal reorganisation in 2000.  
 
Until 2000 DG ENV and DG TREN shared responsibilities on nuclear related issues 
within the Commission and had quite contrasting positions on nuclear energy. While 
DG ENV was rather sceptical of nuclear energy, DG TREN was supportive of nuclear 
energy as reflected in the above quoted policy statements by the Commission since the 
early 1970s (see  5.2.2). The role of nuclear energy was, for example, contested between 
both DGs until the very last minute before the adoption of the 2000 Green Paper on 
security of supply (European Report, 2000) (see also  5.3.1). Shared nuclear 
competences between DG TREN and DG ENV, with their different positions on nuclear 
energy, required more intensive Commission internal discussions and might have 
contributed to a more balanced approach to nuclear issues by the Commission 
(Interview 8). However, in 2000 the Commission restructured the responsibilities for 
nuclear energy. As a result of this reorganisation virtually all nuclear competences were 
put under the responsibility of DG TREN “in order to provide for an appropriate 
concentration of staff and expertise” (CEC, 2000a: 16f). Consequently DG TREN, with 
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sole responsibility for nuclear related policy proposals, could take bolder positions on 
nuclear energy (Interview 11). This was reflected in the nuclear package. 
5.4.4 Summary: formal strength turned into informal weakness 
Member states and stakeholders were generally not consulted but taken by surprise 
when the nuclear package was published in November 2002 and officially transmitted 
to the Council in January 2003. Existing long-standing Commission advisory groups 
with national experts were not integrated in the policy process either. Mistrust regarding 
this process and the Commission’s objective of radical policy change affecting national 
competences were reinforced by a lack of clarity in the final proposals. This 
confrontational issue specification was also due to key personalities involved in this 
process, mainly energy Commissioner de Palacio and Director-General Lamoureux, and 
a formally strengthened DG TREN after nuclear responsibilities had been concentrated 
in DG TREN. The nuclear package was put on the agenda in a confrontational rather 
than entrepreneurial way. The Commission was very confident of its approach on the 
basis of its interpretation of the ECJ ruling. There was also the ‘obvious’ need for 
Community safety standards and radioactive waste management programmes to keep 
the nuclear option open in order to meet energy security and climate policy objectives. 
But the absence of policy entrepreneurship within the Commission paved the way for 
opposing Member States to engage in issue re-definition and agenda re-structuring 
during issue expansion. 
5.5 Issue expansion: issue re-definition and agenda re-structuring 2003-2008 
Initial reactions to the nuclear package among Member States were mixed. Ireland and 
Austria were in favour of the nuclear package due to nuclear safety concerns in 
neighbouring countries (the reprocessing plant in Sellafield, UK, and the NPP in 
Temelin, Czech Republic, respectively). France was in support of the NP because it was 
interested in increasing public acceptance of nuclear energy. It also wanted to underline 
its support for high nuclear safety standards that might, in the long-term, be beneficial 
for the French nuclear industry if it led to streamlined licensing procedures within the 
EU. The UK was against competence shift to the Community level in the field of 
nuclear safety and feared that the radioactive waste proposal would cut across an 
ongoing national process on radioactive waste management (Interview 14). Germany 
did not want to jeopardise its nuclear phase-out plan by putting additional economic 
burdens on nuclear operators. Sweden and Finland shared fears about a weakening of 
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nuclear safety standards to a lowest common denominator; they also feared that they 
would be forced to import radioactive waste from other EU countries. Finland could not 
accept the “Waste Directive Proposal” as long as it was not guaranteed that it would not 
be forced to import radioactive waste from other countries (Interview 21). 
Independently of why Member States supported or opposed the NP, the key question 
here is how they managed to restructure the policy agenda. 
 
While “a few” Member States were “broadly sympathetic” to the Commission’s 
approach, others raised questions about “the general assessment of the situation, 
appropriateness of measures proposed in the light of subsidiarity, adequacy of the legal 
basis, added value, compatibility with international and the institutional framework as 
well as technological soundness” (Council, 2003a: 2). In June 2003 the Council 
Secretariat noted that Member States were, in general, supportive of the nuclear 
package’s objectives and that certain Member States agreed to proceed to the 
examination of the draft proposals. However, some Member States asked for more 
information from the Commission on broader issues before entering the examination 
stage of the proposals. These more general concerns were divided into five areas: first, 
legal and principles issues; second, analysis of the nuclear safety situation; third, added 
value and effectiveness; fourth, scope, nature and practicalities of the proposed 
measures; finally, interplay with international framework (Council, 2003e). The “added 
value” of the nuclear package in the context of existing international regulatory 
frameworks is highlighted as a central issue. This was also due to the fact that, after the 
ECJ ruling, legal issues could no longer be deployed by opposing Member States 
(Interview 11), except for questioning the use of the Euratom Treaty as the basis for 
binding provisions related to decommissioning funds. 
 
The European nuclear industry did not have a strong unified stance on the nuclear 
package (Interview 8). The industry was quite supportive of the “Waste Directive 
Proposal” except for the strict timetable, but had major difficulties in finding a united 
position on the “Safety Directive Proposal” and in particular on decommissioning funds 
(Interview 8). Foratom, representing the European nuclear industry in Brussels, 
cautiously welcomed the directive on waste management, but was sceptical about safety 
standards and decommissioning funds (Power in Europe, 2002). On the nuclear safety 
proposal Foratom considered the “excellent results” delivered by the regulations in 
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place, but acknowledged the “views of others” supporting common standards (Foratom, 
2002a). It emphasised the ongoing exchange of best practice at the utility level, and 
stated that “the industry sees its actions as part of its long-term strategy towards 
supporting nuclear as a sustainable energy source” (Foratom, 2002a). Foratom 
supported the harmonisation of nuclear safety standards at the global level instead of 
common standards at the Community level, and called on the Commission to support 
IAEA’s work in this area to ensure “that the evolution of the applicable safety standards 
will remain governed only by sound technical considerations”. Moreover it emphasised 
the role of national regulatory authorities who would remain solely responsible for the 
inspection of nuclear installation. Foratom underlined the role of the IAEA, national 
regulatory authorities and the operators as having the prime responsibility for nuclear 
safety.  
 
In relation to the package’s provisions on decommissioning funds, Foratom emphasised 
the need to allow Member States to consider the national context, although it shared the 
overall objective of ensuring availability of funds when needed for decommissioning 
purposes (Foratom, 2002b). As for the proposal on radioactive waste management, 
Foratom acknowledged the importance of gaining public support, but called for more 
flexibility for Member States and questioned the strict deadlines in the proposal 
(Foratom, 2002c). 
 
Utilities were mainly opposed to the nuclear package due to the provisions on 
decommissioning funds, and the envisaged extra level of control over national 
regulators that might have reduced their powers due to established links with national 
regulators. However, the Commission’s objective to contribute to better public 
acceptance of nuclear energy was supported (Interview 10). In general the nuclear 
industry and utilities were not very visible at the EU level throughout the process, apart 
from their activities against decommissioning funds where they lobbied strongly at 
national and EU level (Interview 3, 4). This low visibility was also due to the fact that 
there was no clear and strong common position among the members of the respective 
EU lobbying organisations (Foratom and Eurelectric). It was mainly left to national 
energy companies to lobby their national governments. 
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Environmental NGOs saw the Commission’s nuclear package mainly as a “green wash” 
of nuclear energy to prepare for the relaunch of nuclear energy in the EU (Interview 11). 
They were strongly opposed to the nuclear package, but did not play an important role 
in the policy process. Over time environmental NGOs lost interest in the nuclear 
package and became more involved in the Constitutional Treaty discussions and the role 
of Euratom in the future Constitutional Treaty. One representative argued that it was 
hard to maintain interest in the nuclear package throughout the NGO network because 
nothing was moving compared with the Treaty discussions.  
 
After the Commission had tabled the nuclear package, the Council gradually established 
itself as the leading player in the policy process. Whilst the EU decision-making 
procedure results in a substantial transfer of responsibility from the Commission as 
“formal agenda-setter” to the Council after a proposal is published (see  3.3), this section 
shows why and how the Commission was marginalised during issue expansion. The 
Council itself was split on the nuclear package and could not therefore reach the 
required unanimity to change the Commission proposal. In a first reaction Member 
States agreed on the general objective to achieve a high level of nuclear safety, and on 
the need to find a solution to radioactive waste. However, they disagreed on how to 
achieve this objective. Building on the Commission’s issue specification, Member 
States opposed to the nuclear package could redefine the issues and restructure the 
agenda by proposing alternative policies and processes. Since the policy process was 
based on Art. 31 of the Euratom Treaty, the decision-making procedure was formally 
qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council with the EP in a consultative role 
though, as in most Council procedures Member States sought to obtain a consensus. 
National nuclear regulators with their expertise in this policy field played a key role in 
this process.  
5.5.1 Policy entrepreneurs: agenda-structuring 
In the Council the formation of an opposing group of Member States, including 
Sweden, Finland and the UK, in an ad hoc response to the Commission’s proposals 
(Interview 14) strongly influenced the subsequent policy process. As soon as a blocking 
minority together with Germany was formed and alternative proposals tabled, the 
discussion within the WPAQ did not advance any further (Interview 14). Moreover non-
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papers tabled by Sweden, Finland and the UK in September 2003 were important to 
build and sustain an opposing group of Member States (Interview 18). 
 
The influence of the blocking minority was strengthened by the united stance between 
the respective national governments and their national nuclear regulators (Interview, 8, 
15, 16, 18, 23). National regulators were mainly opposed to the proposal on nuclear 
safety because they feared the loss of their independence. In July 2003, a statement by 
WENRA underlined the regulators’ opposition to the Commission’s proposal on nuclear 
safety. WENRA’s key arguments against the nuclear package with respect to nuclear 
safety was the “significance of the national responsibility for nuclear safety” (WENRA, 
2003), and the importance of in-depth knowledge for an effective regulatory control that 
can only be provided by national regulators. According to WENRA national expertise 
was of particular importance given the different reactor designs and institutional 
frameworks in place.  
 
Despite the opposition in the Council, Commission officials showed no sign of moving 
in order to reach a compromise but tried as hard as they could to push the dossier 
through the Council (Interview 14, 24). Even when it became clear during Council 
discussions that the nuclear package would not be adopted, the Commission refused to 
split the package. A split might have helped to eliminate controversial issues from the 
agenda and thus facilitate political agreement (Hennessy, 2007a). The Commission only 
agreed to split the package in May 2004 when it was too late. For one participant it 
seemed as if the Commission was working against the adoption of its own proposal 
(Interview 23).  
 
The frustration of some national delegations was reflected in an official letter by British 
Prime Minister Blair and German Chancellor Schröder to Commission-President Prodi 
expressing their concerns about the nuclear package (Interview 25). Officials from the 
UK and Germany, which were both opposed to the nuclear package, had the impression 
that their concerns and arguments were not taken seriously by Commission officials. As 
a consequence they convinced their heads of government to intervene directly at the 
Commission’s top level. 
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In addition, two non-papers51 tabled by Finland, Sweden and the UK were put forward 
as non-legally binding alternatives for the “Safety Directive Proposal” (Council, 2003b) 
and “Waste Directive Proposal” (Council, 2003c). These non-papers, supported by 
Germany (Interview 25), were tabled as an alternative to the Commission’s nuclear 
package. The aim of these non-papers was to highlight that there was a non-legally 
binding alternative to the Commission proposals and to point to serious matters of 
concern among opposing Member States. Thus Member States were able to demonstrate 
that they were not opposed to nuclear safety objectives as such (Interview 23, 24), but 
point to the way this should be achieved. These non-papers substantially restructured 
the policy process. 
 
The Council Presidency used its agenda-shaping power (Tallberg, 2003) by accepting 
these alternative proposals as the basis for future discussions in the Council’s WPAQ 
(Council, 2003d). It structured the agenda differently and shifted the agenda away from 
the Commission’s initial proposals. The revised safety proposal omitted, for instance, 
reference to Art. 187 of the Euratom Treaty; this allows the Commission, within certain 
limits, to “collect any information and carry out any checks required for the 
performance of the tasks entrusted to it”. It also called for the creation of a Regulatory 
Authorities Committee that would strongly increase the influence of national regulators 
on the verification process, while the Commission would play more of a coordinating 
role. 
 
In January 2004 this alternative route was further pursued when Finland, Germany, 
Sweden and the UK formally tabled a proposal for a Council Resolution on nuclear 
safety, arguing that “a non-legally binding, incentive driven and well defined 
harmonisation process, respecting the national responsibility for nuclear safety and 
taking into account already existing international co-operation, has the best possibility 
to achieve positive results from the safety point of view” (Council, 2004c: para. 13).  
 
Subsequently no major progress could be reached on the revised proposals (Council, 
2004d), although the nuclear package was a priority under the Irish Presidency. Five 
Member States (DE, UK, SW, FI and BE) opposed the two nuclear directive proposals 
                                                 
51 Non-papers constitute unofficial and informal documents tabled as input to ongoing policy discussions 
as opposed to official alternatives for legal adoption. 
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on waste and safety and wanted them to be downgraded into non-binding instruments. 
The Irish Presidency noted that “regarding the proposal on Safety, a very small number 
of delegations are still seeking clarifications on the scope of the proposed directive, the 
level of detail for the provisions on financial resources, or as regards provisions on the 
consultation of population” (Council, 2004a). At the same it noted that “a number of 
delegations” still preferred non-binding instruments to reach the common objective of a 
high level of safety standards. 
 
The opponents’ position was supported by the EP’s reports on the nuclear package 
published in early 2004. The majority of suggested amendments to the safety proposal 
strongly supported the Council’s amendments (EP, 2004b). The EP expressed 
scepticism towards the Commission’s proposal, and supported the opposing Member 
States’ position (Interview 2, 7). The EP underlined Member States’ prime 
responsibility on nuclear safety and called for clear provisions on decommissioning 
funds in new legislation under the EC Treaty (Amendment 30). The resolution on the 
“Waste Directive Proposal” was generally more supportive of the Commission’s 
approach, the major difference being that the ambitious deadlines for national waste 
management programmes were omitted (EP, 2004a). The EP’s reports therefore did not 
strongly (waste) or not all (safety) ‘interlock’ (Jones and Clark, 1999) with the 
Commission’s agenda. 
 
In June 2004, Council conclusions broadly rejected the proposals discussed. They 
referred to the international safety rules in place and strongly emphasised national 
competences in this policy field. The conclusions formalised an alternative discussion 
process within a new institutional venue led by the Council, putting national regulators 
in a central position. The Council conclusions acknowledged the work by other fora, 
such as the IAEA, NRWG, and WENRA, and decided “to return to this matter in a 
timely manner” (Council, 2004b: para. 9). It urged Member States, together with the 
Commission, to engage in “a wide ranging consultation process facilitating the choice 
of instrument(s), in the framework of the Euratom Treaty, that can contribute more 
effectively to achieving nuclear safety and the safe management of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste, without excluding any instrument and in line with the principles of 
Better law making” (Council, 2004b: 4).  
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The Council’s WPAQ and WPNS were invited to review this process and the 
Commission was invited to report on, and assess, the outcomes of this process together 
with Member States. Austria, Italy and Luxembourg expressed their discontent on the 
agreed consultation process with rather vague objectives in an Annex, and instead 
invited the Commission to renew its initiative on binding common nuclear safety 
standards. The WPNS was asked to report back to the WPAQ by the end of 2006 
(Council, 2005). The agreed consultation process was launched in the second half of 
2004 and is analysed below (see  5.5.2). 
 
In September 2004, the Commission proposed a revised nuclear package (CEC, 2004a), 
but these amended proposals were never discussed in the Council. Due to the strong 
resistance by some Member States, the Commission rejected the EP’s amendment of an 
inclusion of new provisions to guarantee the availability of financial resources and their 
assignment to decommissioning. The issue of DF was ‘organised out’ of the nuclear 
package process. Shortly after the publication of the amended proposals the 
Commission published a first report on Member States’ decommissioning funds in 
October 2004 (CEC, 2004b). With the publication of this report the Commission 
responded to the announcement made in the Commission statement that was published 
in parallel with the interinstitutional agreement when the second energy market 
liberalisation directive was adopted (see  5.3.1). 
5.5.2 Institutional venue shopping (I): bottom-up meets top-down 
By establishing the ad hoc WPNS, new issue definitions and new access structures were 
institutionalised. The Council-led consultation process was implemented under the 
auspices of the reactivated WPNS, originally established for the assessment of nuclear 
safety in candidate countries. It consisted mainly of representatives from national 
regulators and therefore had a technical focus. The idea behind WPNS was to start a 
consultation process that was as objective as possible, and credible among all Member 
States, by shifting the debate from the political to the technical level of experts 
(Interview 6). WPNS was however supervised by the WPAQ to ensure that the experts 
went in the right direction (Interview 24). Policy entrepreneurs resorted therefore to 
institutional venues of expertise; this move was also intended to depoliticise the 
discussion (Timmermans and Scholten, 2006). 
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WPNS treated the same elements as proposed by the Commission in the nuclear 
package and kept the issues on the Council agenda (Interview 1, 21, 23). However the 
issues were organised differently (Interview 23), and, as WPNS discussed according to 
its own terms of references, the WPNS consultation process was regarded by several 
interviewees as completely separate from the nuclear package process (Interview 14, 18, 
23). The main focus was on the added value of Community legislation, and the WPNS 
consultation process would not necessarily develop a legislative proposal (Interview 14) 
– the key difference to the nuclear package. The main aim of the WPNS consultation 
process was to get an inventory of existing regulations at national, EU and international 
level, on the basis of which the need for additional EU rules could be identified 
(Interview 24, 25). This was a process that had been expected to be accomplished by the 
Commission before the publication of the nuclear package (Interview 6, 17, 25). The 
final WPNS report was adopted by the WPAQ in December 2006, and broadly 
confirmed some Member States’ scepticism towards new Community legislation as well 
as towards existing international standards (Council, 2006g). 
 
As a result of the WPNS consultation, the Commission was organised out of the policy 
process (Interview 17) and WENRA was placed into a key position, although officially 
WENRA could not play too important a role since non-nuclear Member States would 
have felt excluded from the process (Interview 25). Nevertheless WENRA’s success as 
policy entrepreneur was supported and to a certain extent formalised by the WPNS 
consultation process (Interview 14). There was a strong overlap between WENRA and 
WPNS membership (Interview 9, 10, 13, 18). As a result of the Council-led WPNS 
consultation process, WENRA’s harmonisation agenda and the discussion initiated by 
the nuclear package were increasingly synchronised with respect to timing and content 
(Sauter, 2009). 
 
A crucial factor in WENRA’s success was that it had initiated a parallel harmonisation 
process of nuclear safety standards and that it kept this process ongoing despite the 
Commission’s nuclear package. In 1999 WENRA launched a harmonisation process of 
national safety standards (or “Reference Levels” in WENRA’s term). This process 
referred to existing NPPs only, and focused on regulators’ requirements of licensees and 
not on regulatory regimes. It covered five main safety areas: safety management, 
design, operation, safety verification, and emergency preparedness. A first report on the 
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results of this process was published in 2005 for comments, followed by a revised final 
report in January 2007 to serve as the basis for national action plans for harmonisation 
by 2010. On this basis WENRA members committed themselves to improve and 
harmonise their national regulatory regimes by 2010 (Woodhouse, 2007). 
 
This harmonisation process was in parallel to the Commission’s proposals (Interview 8, 
16, 18, 20). When the Commission announced in 2001 to WENRA that it would aim for 
legislation in the field of nuclear safety, WENRA rejected a role for the Commission in 
shaping the agenda of its ongoing harmonisation process (Interview 18). WENRA’s 
process was continued as a parallel process after the nuclear package had been 
published to show that the Commission’s proposals could not be taken seriously due to 
their poor quality (Interview 16). By following this route WENRA showed that a 
bottom-up approach that involved national regulators in formulating common safety 
standards could work. It therefore offered a clear alternative to the Commission’s 
approach (Interview 23). 
 
WENRA’s intention was to provide a broadly acceptable ‘content’ for any new 
Community legislation. In 2007, WENRA chairman Dabrova argued that “one of the 
major tasks for Wenra will be to provide the results of the bottom-up approach when it’s 
time to go top-down” (MacLachlan, 2007b). WENRA initially opposed the legislation 
but changed its position over time and accepted legislation (Interview 8). 
 
Besides the broad support by national regulators, the gradual involvement by the 
nuclear industry in the WENRA harmonisation process helped the process to become 
increasingly accepted. In 2005, the nuclear industry completed the WENRA process by 
establishing the European Nuclear Installations Safety Standards Initiative (ENISS). 
ENISS fed the nuclear industry’s view into the process and welcomed WENRA’s 
harmonisation process (Foratom, 2006). The industry’s involvement was considered as 
very important to ensure that the agreed safety standards (RLs) were operational 
(Interview 8). This was followed by the Commission with great interest as a potential 
basis for future legislation (Interview 2, 20).  
 
The WPNS consultation process was considered by many Member States’ 
representatives as a useful learning process, whereas the Commission saw it mainly as a 
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delaying tactic bearing in mind that the Prodi Commission’s mandate ran out in autumn 
2004. Although the Commission could still table proposals, it was clear that for the 
following 2-3 years no new legally binding proposals would succeed (Interview 6). One 
Commission official who became involved in this process at a later stage considered the 
WPNS consultation process to be very useful. This was because it allowed for an 
exchange of views on the basis of a rather technical discussion, and showed why the 
nuclear package was necessary (Interview 20). 
 
To summarise, the WPNS consultation process ensured that the issues put forward by 
the nuclear package were kept on the Council’s agenda, although the debate was 
structured differently. The Commission was marginalised, whereas nuclear regulators 
gained an important position in this consultation process, and ensured that the WPNS 
consultation process and the WENRA harmonisation process were increasingly 
synchronised in terms of their timing and content. The struggle in influencing the 
agenda was continued in the follow-up consultation process. Despite regular meetings 
between WENRA and non-nuclear Member States, non-nuclear Member States always 
made it clear that there must be a new consultation process with full involvement of 
non-nuclear Member States if common standards were to be adopted (Interview 9). 
5.5.3 Institutional venue shopping (II): technical and political venues 
As requested in the Council conclusions 2004, and in order to broaden the consultation 
beyond WENRA, a follow-up consultation process was initiated in early 2007 (Council, 
2006c; b). In a WPAQ meeting in January of that year, the Commission underlined that 
it was still keen to adopt concrete measures and instruments under Euratom, whereas 
Member States emphasised the need to establish the added value of any new measures 
(Council, 2007d). Both parties tried to push their policy objectives through by the 
establishment of institutional venues supportive to their objectives. 
 
Between 2004, when the Council launched a new series of consultations as the follow-
up to the nuclear package, and 2007, when a new stage of this consultation process was 
launched, the general context and the image of nuclear energy changed quite 
significantly at the national and EU level. In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the 
prospects for nuclear energy in the EU were not very promising after the German red-
green coalition government had agreed a nuclear phase-out law (in consensus with the 
  
104
German electricity industry) by around 202552. This was an important symbolic 
decision by a major industrialised country and was followed by other EU Member 
States, such as Belgium which announced in mid-2004 that it would phase out nuclear 
power by 2030.  
 
In 2003 the UK government concluded that it would not propose new nuclear build and 
considered it as an “unattractive option” (DTI, 2003: 61) under current economics of 
nuclear power. However, a couple of years later, and in response to changes in the 
external energy environment, the then prime minister Blair announced that nuclear 
power was “back on the agenda with a vengeance” (MacKerron, 2009). In 2004 Finland 
notified the Commission of its plans to build a new NPP at Olkiluoto as required under 
Art. 41 of the Euratom Treaty (CEC, 2006c). Olkiluoto was the first new NPP to be 
built in the EU for more than a decade. This was followed by an announcement by 
France to build a new NPP in Flamanville which was officially approved by the French 
Prime Minister in 200753.  
 
While the actual significance of these decisions with respect to a ‘nuclear renaissance’ 
can be questioned (Mez and Schneider, 2008), these announcements in favour of 
nuclear energy influenced the policy debate at the EU level. In the final version of the 
fifth PINC published in October 2007, the Commission referred to the decisions in 
Finland and France to construct new reactors and to the reopened debate on the 
extension of the operating lifetime, the replacement of existing plants, or the 
construction of new installations in a number of new Member States (CEC, 2007f: 4). 
The Commission argued that “nuclear energy generation has a role to play” (CEC, 
2007f: 5) to meet the main energy policy priorities outlined in the 2006 Green Paper on 
security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability. Following the 1990 and early 
2000s – when the prospects for nuclear energy in the EU had appeared unpromising – 
these developments were used to indicate the need to address issues such as nuclear 
safety, decommissioning and radioactive waste management. 
 
                                                 
52 Gesetz zur geordneten Beendigung der Kernenergienutzung zur gewerblichen Erzeugung von 
Elektrizität of 22 April 2002, Bundesgesetzblatt, 2002, Part I, No. 26, 26/04/2002. 
53 Décret n°2007-534 du 10 avril 2007 autorisant la création de l'installation nucléaire de base dénommée 
Flamanville 3, comportant un réacteur nucléaire de type EPR, sur le site de Flamanville (Manche) 
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A swing in the political mood towards nuclear energy at the EU level could also be 
noticed in the EP’s position on nuclear energy following the 2004 enlargement. 
Traditionally the EP “has been less sympathetic to nuclear power than the Member State 
governments” (Cameron, 2007b: 76). In recent years several initiatives by MEPs called 
for more action in the field of nuclear energy. There is now a cross-party majority in 
support of nuclear energy – with the exception of the Greens (Interview 19) and some 
MEPs from other political groups. The general pro nuclear stance was underlined by the 
EP’s resolution “Assessing Euratom” (EP, 2007a). The resolution regretted the absence 
of harmonised standards as proposed in the nuclear package (para. 31), and encouraged 
“the Commission to draw up at regular intervals […] really forward-looking PINCs for 
nuclear production and investment targets”. It also “notes in this connection that the use 
of all other energy sources is also a matter for national competence but that targets 
(sometimes even binding targets) are nevertheless set at Community level, as is the case 
with renewable” (para. 50). The EP called also for a revision of decision-making 
procedures related to nuclear energy issues with full involvement of the EP. 
 
This changing political context made the Commission more willing to put the nuclear 
dossier back on the agenda after it had been marginalised by the Council-led 
consultation processes. Based on the technical consensus reached within the scope of 
the WENRA process, and building on the discussion process that started with the 
nuclear package, the Commission called for a restart of the legislative debate. 
 
In its PINC published in January 200754 the Commission suggested a way forward in 
order to finalise and improve the nuclear package, including (CEC, 2007f: 22): 
• recognition of common nuclear safety reference levels for implementation in the 
EU, building on the extensive expertise of national nuclear safety authorities; 
• setting up “a High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and Security with the 
mandate of progressively developing common understanding and, eventually, 
additional European rules on nuclear security and safety”; 
• national plans for radioactive waste management; 
                                                 
54 As required under Art. 40 of the Euratom Treaty the Commission had to obtain the opinion of the 
European Economic and Social Committee before its publication in October 2007, see 
COM(2007)565final. 
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• simplification and harmonisation of licensing procedures, “based on closer 
coordination between national regulatory authorities, aiming at maintaining the 
highest safety standards”. 
 
The PINC concluded that “the Commission considers it a priority that the Community 
adopt a legal framework on nuclear safety” (CEC, 2007f: 23). The Commission used the 
results of two Special Eurobarometers to support its case for legislative action (CEC, 
2005b; 2007d). Before the 2007 spring summit a special survey on nuclear safety 
concluded that “there is widespread support for the EU as a mediator of information 
exchange between European nuclear safety experts and as a guardian of harmonised 
nuclear safety legislation” (CEC, 2007d: 58), although most respondents asserted that 
Member States should be able to adopt their own legislation. From the Commission’s 
viewpoint common safety principles, whose implementation would be independently 
verified by the Commission alongside national radioactive waste management 
programmes, remained important steps to increase public acceptance of nuclear energy 
within the EU.  
 
The German Council Presidency in 2007 supported the establishment of the High Level 
Group (HLG). Yet the expected outcomes were still different from those of the 
Commission. Member States such as Germany, who were opposed to a competence 
shift to the Community level in the area of nuclear safety, wanted to ensure that the 
follow-up process was not necessarily about new legislation (Interview 15).  
 
In addition to the HLG a second institutional venue was established in 2007 in response 
to the conclusions of the spring summit 2007: the European Nuclear Energy Forum 
(ENEF). The European Council called for a broad discussion “among all relevant 
stakeholders on the opportunities and risks of nuclear energy” (Council, 2007a: 23). 
This initiative was mainly supported by new Member States (Interview 20). The idea 
was taken forward by the Prime Ministers from the Czech Republic and the Republic of 
Slovakia who agreed to jointly host ENEF. The aim was to provide recommendations 
and specialist advice to the European Commission and the national governments. The 
Commission actively pushed for the establishment of the ENEF and it met for the first 
time in November 2007. The significance allocated to ENEF was underlined by 
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Commission President Barroso’s welcome address to the first ENEF meeting (Barroso, 
2007). 
 
Thus, supported by the previously noted changed context and image of nuclear energy, 
the Commission tried to use process legislation to establish a more favourable 
institutional framework for its policy objectives in the field of nuclear energy. Initially 
the Commission investigated various ideas about the institutional framework of the 
follow-up consultation process. In January 2007 the Commission played with the idea 
that the HLG would not only include representatives from national nuclear safety 
authorities, but also “various actors from both public and private sectors, as well as 
from non-nuclear member countries” (MacLachlan, 2007a). By contrast, others saw the 
HLG as “a mirror group” that would be the institutional counterpart of WENRA 
(MacLachlan, 2007a). It was finally decided to create two different groups: on the one 
hand, the HLG on nuclear safety and radioactive waste management, composed of 
senior expert representatives from Member States, and, on the other, ENEF that would 
represent all relevant stakeholders for a broad discussion of nuclear energy including 
political, social and economic aspects. 
 
The agreement on the establishment of both advisory groups was, however, followed by 
a struggle about the scope and task of these groups that exemplified the influential role 
that institutional venues can take in EU energy policy-making. All policy (or political) 
entrepreneurs tried to design and use HLG and ENEF for their policy objectives. The 
Commission’s objective was to use the HLG as a forum to formulate new Community 
legislation building on the nuclear package. This objective was clearly stated in the 
2007 PINC, and the Commission decision establishing the HLG (CEC, 2007a). By 
contrast, the Council saw the HLG as a Council-led group that was established by the 
Commission only on invitation by the Council (Interview 18). From the Council 
perspective it was simply a practical solution in terms of logistics to have it operated 
and established by the Commission (Interview 6). The Council considered the HLG 
process as a continuation of the WPNS consultation process that would not necessarily 
lead to new Community legislation (Council, 2007b). The Commission wanted to 
ensure that the chairperson was sympathetic to the Commission’s approach, while some 
Member States wanted a person closer to their own position (Stellfox, 2007b). Both 
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perspectives were reflected in the Council conclusions and Commission decision 
respectively (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3: HLG as an example of “venue shopping” 
 Council conclusions 
(8784/07) 
EC decision 
(2007/530/Euratom) 
HLG Rules of Procedure 
(HLG_p(2008-
02)_8.Final) 
Task / 
Purpose 
“furthering a common 
approach” a list of possible 
actions suggested by the 
Council (“by means of 
coordination”, “building on 
the WENRA process”) 
“shall advise and assist the 
Commission in 
progressively developing 
common understanding and 
eventually additional 
European rules” (Art. 2) 
“shall work to develop a 
common understanding 
and, if appropriate, 
suggest common 
approaches” and “shall 
facilitate consultation, 
coordination and 
cooperation of national 
regulatory authorities in 
the EU” (Art. 1) 
Composition Senior representatives 
from safety authorities, 
regulatory or 
administrative bodies and 
EC representatives 
National representatives 
with competence in the 
relevant fields and high level 
EC representative (Art. 3) 
Each MS shall designate 
two senior representatives 
competent in the relevant 
areas and high level EC 
representatives 
Reporting To the Council and EP the 
latest of two years of its 
establishment, then 
progress report every three 
years 
To the EC at least two years 
after entry into force of EC 
Decision and thereafter 
every two years. EC to 
transmit reports to EP and 
Council, “where appropriate 
with comments” (Art. 6) 
To the Council and EP; 
first report by 17 July 
2009. 
Work 
programme 
To be established by the 
end of 2007 on the basis of 
list of actions structured in 
three areas: 
• Safety of nuclear 
installations; 
• Safety of the 
management of spent fuel 
and radioactive waste; 
• Financing of the 
decommissioning of 
nuclear installations and 
safe management of spent 
fuel and radioactive waste 
• Safety of nuclear 
installations 
• Safety of the management 
of spent fuel and radioactive 
waste 
Work programme (May 
2008) – three working 
groups: 
• Improving Nuclear 
Safety arrangements 
(CNS, national 
arrangements for 
regulating nuclear safety, 
the pros and cons of EC 
Directives or other 
instruments covering 
Nuclear Safety) 
• Improving Radioactive 
Waste Management, 
Spent Fuel and 
Decommissioning 
arrangements 
• Improving Transparency 
arrangements 
Follow-up Council should review 
HLG’s achievements and 
decide on further action as 
appropriate 
  
Source: Own elaboration 
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At the first meeting of the HLG in October 2007, Member States such as DE, SE and 
UK questioned Art. 2 of the Commission decision on HLG, which stated that the HLG 
“at its own initiative or at the request of the Commission, shall advise and assist the 
Commission in progressively developing common understanding and eventually 
additional European rules (…)”. They argued that the HLG should base its work 
programme more on the Council conclusions of May 2007, i.e. to select and address 
actions, listed in these conclusions, which would be of added value in identifying 
common approaches, without duplicating the work already being carried out on national 
and international level. Germany’s insistence on the Council conclusions as a basis for 
the HLG’s work was further underlined by a note to the HLG (HLG, 2007). Within the 
HLG many members shared a certain level of mistrust against the Commission, and 
wanted to ensure that any Commission action would not be against the interest of 
Member States (Interview 17). Given the lack of expertise within the Commission, 
some HLG members preferred that the HLG would draft any new proposal on 
harmonisation to ensure it went in the right direction (Interview 16). 
 
The Rules of Procedures adopted by the HLG showed that its own understanding was 
more in line with the Council than the Commission (HLG, 2008c; a). This was also 
reflected in a comment by Massimo Garriba, head of the Commission’s Euratom 
Coordination & International Relations unit, who acknowledged that “the EC [the 
Commission] was no longer trying to lead the drive for common EU nuclear safety 
rules, but would follow what the council-appointed HLG does” (Stellfox, 2007a: 11).  
 
HLG’s role was also contested within the HLG. There was strong disagreement on the 
French representative’s suggestion that the HLG should come up with an agreement on 
a new nuclear “Safety Directive Proposal”. Drabova, the Czech WENRA chair, argued 
that the Commission might underestimate regulators’ concern about the status of their 
nuclear programmes, and that new Member States would not accept any interference in 
national regulators’ authority. By contrast, Jukka Laaksonen, DG of the Finish regulator 
STUK, argued that HLG should work on a directive on common design criteria for new 
nuclear power plants in Europe. However, it was feared that nuclear opponents would 
call for these standards to be also applied to existing power plants.  
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The interest in new nuclear power plants was a central agenda change as compared to 
the initial nuclear package that only dealt with existing nuclear plants. Minutes of the 
third HLG meeting in April 2008 indicate that a majority – with the exception of the 
UK and Germany – was in favour of working towards a legal Community framework 
for nuclear safety (HLG, 2008b). As for the timetable of the HLG’s work the work 
programme published in May 2008 envisaged that a first report for the Council and the 
EP should be finished by spring 2009 (HLG, 2008d). 
 
Compared with the HLG that was supposed to be a technical group of experts despite its 
political dimension, ENEF’s objective was to create a stakeholder forum similar to other 
fora for various energy sources established by DG TREN55. As indicated above, the 
Commission played with various ideas on how to establish a broad stakeholder forum to 
discuss the future of nuclear energy in the EU, although this idea was never included in 
any of the Commission’s official publications at the time. Both the PINC (CEC, 2007f) 
and the Commission’s communication “An Energy Policy for Europe” (CEC, 2007b) 
referred only to the establishment of the HLG.  
 
Three Working Groups were established at the first ENEF meeting: 1) Opportunities of 
nuclear energy; 2) Risks of nuclear energy; and 3) Information and transparency. The 
second working group was most relevant to the follow-up process of the nuclear 
package; this was because among its main priorities was the support of a greater 
harmonisation of safety requirements at the EU level for nuclear installations in the EU, 
particularly through the HLG (ENEF, 2007).  
 
ENEF was interpreted as resulting from the Commission’s frustration with the NP 
process – not only for the rejection of the nuclear package, but also because it was not 
possible to openly discuss the role of nuclear energy in the Council because of the 
strong opinions on nuclear energy among some Member States such as Austria and 
Ireland. ENEF was therefore seen as an instrument by the Commission to push the 
Council forward on this issue (Interview 24). The idea was to build up sufficient support 
by relevant stakeholders to legitimise a new legislative proposal that would make it 
                                                 
55 The Florence Forum deals with the internal electricity market, the Madrid Forum with the internal gas 
market, the Amsterdam Forum with sustainable energy with a particular focus on renewable energy and 
energy efficiency. While the Florence and Madrid Fora are mainly concerned with market regulation, 
ENEF has a broader scope dealing with the pros and cons of nuclear energy. 
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difficult for the Council to reject such a proposal (Interview 20). Observers suggested 
that ENEF was not an open process, but strongly controlled by the Commission 
(Interview 9, 23). Although broad stakeholder support could constitute a supporting 
coalition that the Commission did not have in the past, Commission representatives 
were well aware that this could backfire if it was seen as a promotional tool for nuclear 
energy (Interview 5). 
 
ENEF’s outputs showed strong support for the Commission’s policy objectives. The 
conclusions of the second ENEF-meeting were strongly supportive of the adoption of 
EU legislation on nuclear safety and waste management, based on common fundamental 
safety principles for nuclear installations. With such a legal framework, it was argued, 
Europe could become “a real model also for possible nuclear newcomers” (ENEF, 
2008). In view of future EU initiatives on safety of nuclear installations, ENEF 
emphasised the need to harmonise EU national licensing requirements. Thus new build 
attracted increasing attention in the debate. Based on a SWOT analysis, the working 
group considered an “EU Directive on common Fundamental Safety Principles for 
Nuclear Installations” as an appropriate regulatory instrument. With respect to 
WENRA’s Reference Levels, further discussions were considered necessary to assess if 
a Directive or a Recommendation would be the most appropriate instrument (ENEF 
Subgroup Harmonisation, 2008). 
 
The instrumental relationship between the nuclear industry, WENRA and HLG, and the 
role of ENEF in pushing the HLG to consider regulatory issues not only related to 
existing NPPs but to include new build, is reflected in the following quote (ENEF 
Subgroup Harmonisation, 2008): 
 
“In the field of nuclear safety the existing WENRA Reactor Safety Reference 
Levels are already a sound basis for the new build of nuclear power plants. But for 
the design of Generation III NPPs there are requirements not covered by the 
current design safety issues. Therefore those Reactor Safety Reference Levels 
considering typical design features have to be further developed. ENEF 
encourages WENRA via the HLG to work in that direction based on what has 
already been done in this area. WENRA should apply a similar process to what 
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has been done for existing reactors and building a good interaction with the 
industry.” 
 
This process resulted in the publication of a new proposal by the Commission in 
November 2008; setting up a Community framework on Nuclear Safety that aimed at 
restarting the process, establishing an EU framework on nuclear safety proposed as part 
of the nuclear package. In the second paragraph of the explanatory memorandum to the 
new proposal, the Commission argues (CEC, 2008c: 2): 
 
“The renewed interest in nuclear power expressed by a number of Member States, 
with the perspective of numerous life extensions and construction of new plants, 
makes the timing of this revised proposal particularly appropriate.”  
 
In a sign of policy learning among Commission officials, the Commission recognised 
the role of established policy entrepreneurs. The Commission’s legislative proposal 
built on WENRA’s technical work, recognised the principle of strong and independent 
regulators, and envisaged the enshrining of main international instruments in 
Community legislation. The IAEA’s CNS was supplemented by additional safety 
requirements for new NPPs “on the basis of the safety levels developed by WENRA 
and in close collaboration with the […] HLG”.  
 
Energy supply security and limitation of CO2 emissions were identified as key reasons 
for the “revival phase” (CEC, 2008c: 3) of nuclear energy in the EU and globally. The 
Commission’s perspective was still that a Community framework for nuclear safety 
would add value to the national approaches, and ultimately result in “improved public 
confidence in the EU decision-making process on nuclear safety matters and bring legal 
certainty” (ibid.). 
 
The explanatory memorandum to the legislative proposal referred explicitly to the ECJ 
ruling, C-29/99, to underline the proposal’s consistency with Community policies and 
objectives. Both institutional venues created during issue expansion were relevant in the 
new proposal and illustrated the significance of process legislation. The proposal 
referred to ENEF’s conclusions and their strong support for the adoption of EU 
legislation on nuclear safety. Moreover, a key role is assigned to the HLG in 
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“supporting the definition of instruments to maintain and further improve nuclear safety 
throughout the Community” (ibid.: 7); the HLG “will become the focal point for 
cooperation between the regulatory bodies charged with the safety of nuclear 
installations in the Member States and will contribute to the development of the EU 
nuclear safety framework” (ibid.: 2). 
 
The new proposal dealt with nuclear safety only and replaced the directive on nuclear 
safety proposed in 2004, although in 2004 agreement on the radioactive waste 
management directive seemed more likely. Key provisions of the new proposal 
included: 
• prime responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations, throughout their 
lifetime, rests with the holder of the license under the control of the regulatory 
body (Art. 3); 
• Member States to establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework 
for nuclear safety (Art. 3); 
• effective independence of the regulatory body provided with adequate authority, 
competence and financial and human resources to fulfil its responsibilities and 
duties (Art. 4); 
• regulatory infrastructure, the regulatory body and the national regulatory 
structure will be subject to periodic international peer reviews (Art. 4); 
• Member States are obliged to respect the IAEA safety fundamentals including 
the CNS (Art. 6); 
• Member States are encouraged to develop additional safety requirements for 
new NPPs in line with WENRA’s work and in close collaboration with the HLG 
(Art. 6); 
• the regulatory body shall carry out nuclear safety assessments (Art. 8); 
• Member States shall report to the Commission on the implementation of the 
directive three years after the entry into force of the Directive and then every 
three years (Art. 11). 
 
 
Besides new provisions on the simplification and harmonisation of licensing procedures 
for new NPPs, the 2008 proposal was much more restrictive with respect to any shift of 
competences to the Community level, and respected national responsibilities for nuclear 
safety when compared to the January 2003 version of the “Safety Directive Proposal” 
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(see  5.4). The 2008 proposal did not refer to common safety standards or principles, but 
referred to the national legislative and regulatory framework and to the IAEA safety 
fundamentals. Moreover it did not envisage the establishment of a verification system 
by the Commission, ensuring that national safety authorities comply with the agreed 
nuclear safety principles where the verification would have carried out by experts from 
another Member State. By contrast, the 2003 proposal envisaged that the Commission 
would be responsible for a verification process on the basis of a peer-review process.  
 
The publication of the new Commission proposal cut across the HLG’s work 
programme that had foreseen an HLG report to the Council and the EP by spring 2009, 
which should have served as the basis for any new Commission initiative. Instead the 
new Commission proposal aimed at clarifying the HLG’s task and scope. 
5.5.4 Summary: the role of alternatives 
During issue expansion the Council used its powers of agenda-shaping (Tallberg, 2003) 
to restructure the agenda. The creation of new institutional venues granted formal access 
to new actors. The WPNS consultation as an alternative route marginalised the 
Commission’s influence in the process, and put national regulators into a key position 
building on WENRA’s parallel harmonisation approach. This bottom-up process 
offered an alternative to the Commission’s top-down approach. Both process were 
increasingly synchronised in terms of their objectives and timeline.  
 
Over time the Commission seemed to acknowledge the role of institutional venues and 
stakeholder involvement in the policy process. The Commission’s support for the 
establishment of an advisory group for the development of new legislative proposals in 
the field of nuclear safety (HLG), and a broader stakeholder forum to discuss the future 
of nuclear energy in the EU (ENEF), constituted a significant change in the 
Commission’s approach compared to the policy initiation stage, when existing advisory 
groups had been abolished or excluded from the drafting process. Instead of excluding 
and marginalising outside actors, it signalled a more transparent and open (re-)drafting 
process. This might have been the result of a learning process within the Commission 
that was also facilitated by the fluctuation of key personnel within DG TREN.  
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Both the Commission and the Member States tried to use process legislation in relation 
to HLG and ENEF to achieve their respective policy objectives (binding legislation vs. 
voluntary approaches/coordination). At the same time there was an important change in 
the nuclear safety agenda due to a changing policy context: it was no longer focused on 
existing power plants, as in the nuclear package, but included provisions on new nuclear 
power plants and licensing issues. In parallel, after the spring summit 2007, there was a 
general expansion of the nuclear dossier from the more technical level (‘low politics’) to 
a political level (‘high politics’); this was reflected in the participation of Commission 
President Barroso and Prime Ministers from several Member States at the inauguration 
of ENEF. The new Commission proposal from November 2008 cut across HLG’s 
agenda and timetable, and aimed at realigning HLG’s work with the Commission’s 
policy objectives, while integrating WENRA’s bottom-up processes. 
5.6 Chapter conclusions 
Why did the Commission not succeed in introducing important changes in the field of 
EU nuclear energy policy as intended by its nuclear package published in 2002/2003 
and revised in 2004? Drawing upon the agenda-setting framework elaborated in Chapter 
3, it was argued that the Commission did not act sufficiently as a policy and political 
entrepreneur during policy initiation and issue specification, both with respect to 
content (issue definition) and procedure (institutional venues). These ‘shortcomings’ 
could be exploited by other policy entrepreneurs opposed to the nuclear package and 
thus prevented political agreement in the Council. From an agenda-setting perspective 
the chapter distinguished between three steps in this process: policy initiation, issue 
specification and issue expansion. 
 
Policy initiation of the nuclear package was a mixture of low and high politics 
processes. At the level of high politics, e.g. European Council summits, the issue of 
nuclear safety was brought on the agenda in the context of the enlargement process. 
Nuclear safety was recognised as an integral part of the enlargement process. A split 
between Member States was, however, already apparent at the time: some Member 
States wanted the Commission to be responsible for the dossier, whereas others were 
keen to emphasise that nuclear safety was not a Community but a national 
responsibility. As a consequence there was no political momentum visible at the level of 
high politics that could have helped the Commission as formal agenda-setter.  
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From the Commission’s viewpoint the EU enlargement process, supported by the ECJ 
ruling, constituted a window of opportunity to propose the nuclear package. A 
Community framework on nuclear safety, decommissioning funds and radioactive 
waste management was considered as fundamental to increase public acceptance of 
nuclear energy and thus to keep the nuclear option open in the EU. Against this 
background the Commission chose several problem definitions to justify the nuclear 
package. This raised doubts about the actual objective of the proposals and how the 
proposal would specifically address the identified problems. While the inclusion of 
provisions for decommissioning funds, as required by the EP, helped to prevent a 
separate co-decision procedure under the EC Treaty with full involvement of the EP, it 
increased opposition to the safety proposal within the Council and industry. Although 
the broad problem definition helped to put the issue on the agenda, it did not help in the 
adoption of the intended policy (Dery, 2000). 
 
In addition (and linked to the lack of clarity concerning the content of the nuclear 
package), the Commission did not seek to build coalitions with key stakeholders during 
policy initiation and issue specification. Such coalitions could have helped to develop 
problem definitions and policy proposals backed by strong majorities. Instead the 
Commission excluded existing institutional venues such as the advisory groups NRWG 
and ACPM, which were eventually discontinued. Thus the Commission did not use 
relevant expertise from national regulators that could have strengthened its policy 
proposals, and could have contributed to higher acceptability among stakeholders.  
 
Although this would have entailed substantial changes to the proposals put forward by 
the Commission, it might have helped to reach agreement on a first legislative step in 
this area. Moreover, at the political level there were scarcely any attempts to organise a 
supporting majority. Member States were taken by surprise when the nuclear package 
was published which affected issue expansion in a negative way. This confrontational 
issue specification was due to key Commission officials and a formally powerful DG 
TREN after nuclear responsibilities had been concentrated in DG TREN. Policy 
initiation by the Commission was therefore not built on “multi-directed consensus-
building” (Pallis, 2006).  
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Against this background, opponents of the nuclear package could shift the agenda’s 
priorities in the Council. Supported by some Member States (e.g. through non-papers), 
Council Presidencies’ used their power of agenda-shaping (Tallberg, 2003) to structure 
the agenda by establishing a new institutional venue and thus granting access to new 
actors. The ad hoc WPNS consultation process did not investigate legally binding 
Community nuclear safety standards, but reviewed existing frameworks in order to 
assess if there was a need for a Community framework. It marginalised the 
Commission’s influence in the process, and put national regulators into a key position 
as reflected in Council reports and the insistence of non-nuclear Member States to 
launch a second consultation process that should not be dominated by WENRA.  
 
The Council-led consultation process therefore built on national regulators’ recognised 
expertise as incorporated in WENRA’s parallel harmonisation process. This bottom-up 
process showed nuclear regulators’ ability to make progress on harmonised safety 
standards on the basis of a voluntary approach that offered an alternative to the 
Commission’s top-down process. As a result of the Council’s agenda structuring, the 
process was delayed by several years if compared to the Commission’s initial timeline; 
the follow-up process to the nuclear package, and the WENRA process were 
increasingly synchronised in terms of its objectives (or ‘issue definitions’) and timeline.  
 
The significance of institutional venues was also emphasised by the establishment of the 
HLG and ENEF. After the Council-led consultation process the Commission continued 
to pursue its objective of a legally binding Community framework. For this purpose it 
sought to use HLG as a new institutional venue to include national regulators in a new 
legislative drafting process. This was, however, prevented by the Council. At the same 
time the Commission tried to pursue its policy objective within the framework of 
ENEF, a stakeholder forum. This indicates policy learning within the Commission in 
the way it sought to engage with key stakeholders. ENEF sought to achieve a consensus 
among key actors to legitimise a new proposal that would then no longer be opposed by 
Member States. The procedural dimension was further underlined by the Commission’s 
2008 nuclear safety proposal that commits the HLG to elaborate a legally binding 
framework. Process legislation served therefore informational and legitimacy aims 
(Cram, 1993).  
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Contextual factors had an important influence at the policy initiation (EU enlargement) 
stage and during issue expansion. Decisions to build new nuclear reactors, and political 
discussions on the lifetime extension of existing nuclear reactors and nuclear new build 
in some Member States, helped to replace the image of the declining nuclear industry by 
the image of a nuclear renaissance. A policy image can be the “driving force in both 
stability and instability” (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). This was visible in the 2008 
proposal on nuclear safety: it was not limited to existing power plants as in the 2003-
version, but included provision on new nuclear power plants and licensing issues. The 
new Commission proposal used the changed context and integrated existing institutional 
venues like WENRA and HLG while respecting national responsibilities. 
 
The case study suggests that the Commission does not only need to act as policy 
entrepreneur in legally weak positions such as EU social policy (Wendon, 1998), but 
also in legally strong areas including Euratom proposals. Issue initiation, and in 
particular legislative initiation, took place predominantly at the level of low politics. 
The multiplicity of EU venues allowed several issue specifications, and offered 
opportunities for actors to steer proposals into institutional venues favourable to their 
policy objectives as predicted by earlier studies (Princen and Rhinard, 2006). 
 
The agreement on the new nuclear safety proposal reached in the Environment Council 
on 25 June 2009 (Council, 2009a) could not be included in this analysis. It suggests, 
however, new agenda dynamics in this second agenda-setting cycle that started with the 
creation of ENEF and HLG. 
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6 Case study II: The EU RES Directive  
6.1 Introduction 
In December 2008 the Commission, the Council and the EP reached political agreement 
on a new directive for the promotion of renewable energy sources (RES) in the EU 
(Council, 2008b). A key achievement of the new EU RES directive was the introduction 
of an overall 20% EU RES target, broken down into binding national RES targets for 
2020. The Commission’s proposal for a new RES directive – part of the Commission’s 
climate and energy package56 – was published in January 2008, and agreement with the 
Council and EP was achieved, within less than 12 months, in December 2008. The 
political agreement was preceded by an EU agenda-setting process where low politics 
met high politics. Although the low politics process was an important preparatory stage 
of this agenda-setting process, it was high politics that enabled agreement to mandatory 
national RES targets after an unusually quick EU policy-making process.  
 
This chapter provides an analysis of this policy process. Previous research on EU RES 
policy was predominantly interested in the best support systems and policy framework 
for RES, mostly from a comparative perspective (Reiche and Bechberger, 2004; Blok, 
2006; Harmelink, Voogt et al., 2006). The following analysis is interested in the EU 
level decision-making process on RES policy. Previous studies that have addressed this 
policy process – or parts of it – provide interesting empirical insights that proved useful 
for this analysis, but they are limited to a certain period of this process (Nilsson, Nilsson 
et al., 2008; Toke, 2008), or focus on legal and economic aspects of the RES directive 
(Fouquet and Johansson, 2008; Johnston, Neuhoff et al., 2008). The analytical interest 
here is not in assessing the directive with respect to its potential in achieving an increase 
in RES investments in the EU, and thus to achieve the RES targets by 2020. The 
analysis aims to explain policy outputs of this policy process from an agenda-setting 
perspective. 
 
The following analysis applies the agenda-setting framework elaborated in Section  3.3, 
and follows the key phases of the agenda-setting process as in the previous chapter. 
                                                 
56 The Commission’s “Climate action and renewable energy package” included, besides the RES directive 
proposal, a directive proposal revising EU ETS (COM(2008)16 final), a decision proposal on an effort-
sharing agreement on GHG emission reductions from sources not covered under EU ETS (COM(2008)17 
final), and a directive proposal on carbon capture and storage (COM(2008)18 final). 
  
120
Policy initiation of the new RES directive started at the beginning of 2004 when a 
conference, organised by the Commission and the RES industry in cooperation with the 
German government, launched a political debate about EU RES targets beyond 2010. 
This initial phase culminated in March 2007 in the European Council’s political 
agreement on a binding overall 20% EU RES target by 2020 as proposed by the 
Commission in an RES Road Map in January 2007 (Sauter and Grashof, 2007). The 
second phase – issue specification – started immediately after the spring summit 2007 
with the drafting process of the new RES directive that was published in January 2008. 
The subsequent issue expansion under first reading procedure was characterised by 
political urgency to reach political agreement by December 2008. This objective was 
achieved under the French Council Presidency.57 For a timeline of this policy process 
see Appendix B. 
 
Due to the complexity of the RES policy process, the subsequent analysis focuses on 
two key issues to capture the dynamics of the agenda-setting process: RES target-setting 
and the attempt to introduce an EU-wide trading mechanism. Both issues were central 
to the policy debate since the discussions on the first RES directive in the late 1990s. 
From an agenda-setting perspective, it is of interest to analyse how these long-term 
discussions in a low politics context were influenced by increasing interest at the level 
of high politics, and thus may have affected issue entrance (Princen and Rhinard, 2006).  
 
Other elements that were also important during the discussion of this directive, but 
could not be integrated into the analysis, included sustainability criteria for bioenergy, 
direct penalty mechanisms in the case of Member States’ failure to meet interim RES 
targets, and priority grid access for RES. Sustainability criteria for bioenergy were 
organised out from the mainstream policy discussions in the Council into an ad hoc 
working group, and were perceived as disconnected from the RES directive discussion 
(Interview 35, 39).58 Penalty mechanisms and priority grid access were not subject to 
long-term agenda dynamics. 
                                                 
57 The stages of an issue career could have been applied differently, e.g. by considering the drafting of the 
RES Road Map as issue specification and the follow-up process as issue expansion. This was, however, 
ruled out as the RES Road Map did not constitute a legislative proposal but was a preparatory step 
towards a legislative proposal. The actual legislative proposal was elaborated after the spring summit 
2007. 
58 Similarly the parallel policy process on the revision of environmental state aid led by DG COMP could 
not be discussed in this chapter. The Spring Council 2007 called “for an early review of the Community 
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The chapter is structured as follows. The following section provides a brief overview of 
Community policy towards RES prior to 2004 in so far as it is relevant for the 
subsequent analysis of the post-2004 RES policy process. The analysis is structured 
according to the stages of an issue career: policy initiation, issue specification, and issue 
expansion. 
6.2 The role of renewable energy in Community energy policy 
Renewable energy emerged on the EU energy policy agenda in the 1980s (see also  2.2). 
The increasing interest in RES was initially prompted by the desire to reduce the 
Community’s reliance on imported fossil fuels, and later by the search for low carbon 
energy sources in the context of climate policy objectives. The emergence of 
transnational issues such as climate change, as well as the expansion of Community 
jurisdiction in the field of environmental policy and changes in institutional structures, 
contributed to new legislative initiatives in the late 1990s in EU RES policy (Matláry, 
1997).  
6.2.1 Institutional basis 
The SEA in 1986 ended the informal status of Community environmental policy. The 
new Art. 100a EEC introduced an explicit Community competence to regulate 
environmental matters in the context of internal market developments and Art. 130 r-t 
EEC provided an explicit basis for European environmental policy (Lenschow, 2005). 
While under the SEA QMV and the then newly introduced cooperation procedure with 
the EP was restricted to internal market issues, the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 
established QMV and the co-decision procedure for most environmental policies and 
granted more influence to the EP in this policy field. This was an important procedural 
change and stimulus for European energy policy in general (Matláry, 1997), and for EU 
RES policy in particular. However, before Arts. 100a and 130 r-t were used to introduce 
                                                                                                                                               
guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and other relevant Community instruments which 
can provide incentives, with the aim of making them more supportive of the Community's energy and 
climate change objectives” after the guidelines in place were to expire by the end of 2007. This was an 
important parallel policy process after FiT support schemes were regularly attacked as illegal 
environmental state aid by opponents of this policy instrument (e.g. Lauber 2004). DG COMP had 
already launched a consultation process on the revision of the guidelines in 2005. Revised “Community 
guidelines on State aid for environmental protection” were published in April 2008: OJ C 82, 1.4.2008, 
pp. 1-33. 
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EU RES legislation in the late 1990s, EU RD&D programmes such as ALTENER 
reflected the increased political attention paid to RES at the EU level.   
6.2.2 ALTENER and the 1997 White Paper 
The 1990 energy policy objectives adopted in 1980 by the European Council included, 
for the first time, an unspecified objective to increase the share of renewable energy 
sources in the EU’s energy mix (Council, 1980), mainly in response to energy security 
concerns in the 1970s. This general commitment to increase the share of RES in the EU 
energy supply mix was reiterated in a Council resolution in 1986 setting out 1995 
energy policy objectives (Council, 1986). It was, however, only in the early 1990s when 
more concrete steps towards an EU RES policy were taken and EU R&D support 
programmes for RES were adopted. ALTENER I (Council, 1993), the EU renewables 
action programme for the promotion of renewable energy sources, supported the 
development of RES with a strong focus on R&D support, and constituted the first 
specific EU financial instrument for renewables promotion and was followed in 1998 by 
ALTENER II (CEC, 1998a).59  
 
Specified indicative RES targets were proposed for the first time in 1993 as part of the 
ALTENER programme: 
• increase the share of RES of total energy demand from around 4% in 1991 to 
8% in 2005; 
• a threefold increase of renewable electricity (RES-E) generation (excluding 
large hydro); 
• 5% market share of biofuels of total fuel consumption by motor vehicles by 
2005. 
 
As EU energy policy was institutionally very limited in the early 1990s, R&D 
programmes constituted one of the few tangible elements in the development of an EU 
energy policy. At the EU level R&D policies can therefore be regarded as an ‘incubator’ 
for EU RES policy. More significant steps forward towards an EU RES policy were the 
Commission’s 1995 Energy White Paper (see  2.2) and the Green Paper on renewable 
energy in 1996 (CEC, 1996). The Green Paper suggested an RES target of 15% of the 
EU’s primary energy mix by 2010. The EP called in its resolution on the Green Paper 
                                                 
59 On the role of climate change policy objectives for ALTENER see (Collier, 1996). 
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for a 2010 target of at least 15% being broken down in sectoral and national targets for 
each member state (EP, 1997), and underlined its position as a strong supporter of an 
ambitious EU RES policy. 
 
In November 1997, as a follow-up to the Green Paper, the Commission published a 
White Paper on renewables proposing a 12% EU RES target for 2010 (CEC, 1997b). It 
argued that:  
 
“an indicative [RES] target is a good policy tool, giving a clear political signal and 
impetus to action. The strategy and action plan in this White Paper therefore, are 
directed towards the goal of achieving a 12% penetration of renewables in the 
Union by 2010 - an ambitious but realistic objective” (CEC, 1997b: 9-10).  
 
Member States were expected to put forward individual objectives with details on how 
these could be achieved. The Community Strategy and Action Plan proposed in the 
White Paper included a variety of measures to be adopted at Community and national 
level across different policy sectors. New directive proposals were envisaged on “Fair 
Access for RES to the Electricity Market” and the “Promotion of Biofuels in the 
transport sector”.  
 
The Energy Council welcomed the 2010-target as a “useful guideline”, and invited the 
Commission to consider proposals in order to remove barriers for the wider deployment 
of RES and in order to facilitate trade of green electricity (Council, 1998). By contrast, 
the EP reaffirmed a minimum 15% RES target with binding national undertakings on 
national overall goals and targets for each type of energy (EP, 1998). This policy 
process eventually resulted in two EU directives on RES-E and biofuels. These are 
briefly reviewed in the next sub-section. It focuses on the RES-E directive and the 
discussions on target-setting and support schemes as they constitute key issues in the 
agenda-setting process leading to the 2008 RES directive. 
6.2.3 EC directives on the promotion of RES-E and biofuels 
A proposal for an RES-E directive was published in May 2000 with indicative national 
targets and an overall EU-target for the share of RES in EU electricity gross 
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consumption of 22.1 % by 2010 (CEC, 2000c).60 Environmental groups questioned the 
proposal’s effectiveness in the absence of legally binding targets (Cordes, 2000). 
Similarly the EP called for mandatory national objectives (EP, 2000). Such calls were 
however opposed by most Member States in the Council (Council, 2000f). During the 
directive negotiations the Council sought to omit any references to mandatory targets – 
even in the case of failure to achieve the indicative targets and possible follow-up 
proposals by the Commission. Several Member States questioned even the indicative 
targets listed in the annex to the directive proposal (Council, 2000e).  
 
In its final version as published in October 2001, the RES-E directive included national 
indicative targets, and a total 22% indicative EU15-target for the contribution of 
electricity produced from renewable energy sources to gross electricity consumption by 
2010. A majority of Member States in the Council ensured that only indicative RES-E 
targets were set, and household waste for incineration was partly recognised as biomass 
(Lauber, 2005). However, supporters – mainly the Commission and Denmark – of a 
mandatory target succeeded in keeping a reference to mandatory targets in the final 
version of the directive. According to Art. 3(4) of the RES-E directive, mandatory 
targets can be brought forward by the Commission if the national indicative targets and 
the 12% overall target are not met.61 The Commission was therefore “extremely 
important as [an] agenda-setter on the issue of targets” (Rowlands, 2005: 970) in the 
preparation of the 2001 RES-E directive and succeeded in pushing national targets 
through despite them being more ambitious than what Member States initially 
supported. 
 
With respect to the 2008 RES policy process, it is worth noting that in the RES-E 
directive 2001/77/EC guarantees of origin (GO) had already been introduced. The use 
of GO became a key issue in the discussion on the 2008 RES directive. In 2001 GO 
were introduced for disclosure purposes only in order to “enable producers of electricity 
from renewable energy sources to demonstrate that the electricity they sell is produced 
                                                 
60 The proposal was based on Art. 95 (formerly Art. 100), a choice that was questioned by the Council’s 
Legal Service. It argued that Art. 175 (formerly Art. 130) would be the appropriate legal basis for the 
directive because it would contribute predominantly to environmental objectives and not to market 
harmonisation (Council, 2000d). Collier (2002) also argues that GHG emission reductions, and thus 
environmental objectives, were the major rationale for the RES-E directive. 
61 The Commission and Denmark insisted on setting individual and mandatory national targets if 
considered as necessary in the Commission’s regular assessments of the directive (Council, 2000g). 
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from renewable energy sources within the meaning of this Directive” (Art. 5(3)). It was 
explicitly distinguished from tradable green certificates as noted in recital 11 of 
directive 2001/77/EC: “It is important to distinguish guarantees of origin clearly from 
exchangeable green certificates”. GOs should therefore not be misinterpreted as being 
originally intended as the basis for an EU-wide market-based certificate system. This 
distinction was challenged by Commission officials in the 2008 RES directive, but met 
fierce resistance among the RES industry and some Member States. 
 
At the time it was considered as “too early to decide on a Community-wide framework 
regarding support schemes” due to limited experience with existing national support 
schemes. In April 1999 the Commission had already published a working paper that 
explored different options for RES support, argued in favour of market-based support 
mechanisms and considered an eventual transition from a Feed-in Tariff (FiT) to trading 
mechanisms as “inevitable” (CEC, 1999b: 17). The possibility of a Community 
framework was strongly related to an internal market frame as underlined in recital 16 
of the directive: “It is, however necessary to adapt, after a sufficient transitional period, 
support schemes to the developing internal electricity market. […] That proposal should 
contribute to the achievement of the national indicative targets, be compatible with the 
principles of the internal electricity market […]” (ibid.). The internal market frame, and 
thus the evaluation on the basis of economic criteria, was however strongly contested by 
the EP which insisted on environmental criteria for such an assessment (Rowlands, 
2005: 972). 
 
Within the Commission DG COMP argued strongly in favour of market-based 
instruments that would conform to Community state aid rules. The initial Commission 
proposal published in May 2000 contained a provision that would have subjected 
support mechanisms for RES to state aid regulation and thus to DG COMP (Lauber, 
2007). The ECJ ruling in the PreussenElektra vs. Schleswag case in March 2001 (ECJ, 
2001a) was crucial in that it rejected the Commission’s argument that the German FiT 
(see also  6.2.4) constituted state aid and a quantitative restriction on electricity imports, 
and therefore a barrier for intra-Community trade (Oschmann, 2002). This ruling 
weakened the Commission’s position at a crucial state in the legislative process to the 
2001/77/EC directive, and at the same time strengthened the EP’s position. In this 
context Lauber (2007) points to the importance of the ECJ ruling with respect to Art. 4 
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of the RES-E directive, which stated that state aid rules apply to RES support schemes. 
This would have made it possible for the Commission to intervene and cut national FiTs 
if it considered them as being in breach of Community state aid rules. The ECJ ruling 
prevented such an interpretation. 
 
Targets and a Community framework for the support of RES-E were kept on the agenda 
by the reporting requirements of the RES-E 2001-directive. A first report required an 
assessment of the national progress towards the indicative targets by October 2004, with 
the possibility of proposing new mandatory targets if considered necessary on the basis 
of the Commission assessment (Art. 3(4)). The second report should “assess the 
success, including cost-effectiveness, of […] [national] support systems […] [and] if 
necessary, be accompanied by a proposal for a Community framework with regard to 
support schemes for electricity produced from renewable energy sources” (Art. 4(2)) 
(CEC, 2001b). A harmonisation proposal by the Commission, however, could not be 
tabled before 2005, and a transition time of seven years was foreseen before such a 
harmonisation would take effect. Although it was expected that any harmonisation 
proposal would build on market-based mechanisms, the reference to the cost-
effectiveness of support schemes was an important amendment to the Commission’s 
initial draft (Lauber, 2007). Comparative studies of FiT and quota/certificate support 
schemes showed that the latter are not necessarily more cost-effective (see  6.2.4).  
 
In addition to the promotion of RES-E, in November 2001 the Commission published 
two proposals on the promotion of biofuels as transport fuel: one directive set EU-wide 
binding biofuels targets of 2% by 2005 and 5.75% by 2010, another directive on excise 
duties allowed Member States to cut excise duties on biofuels (CEC, 2001a).  
 
The biofuels directive proposal with binding targets was opposed by 12 out of 15 
Member States emphasising its negative overall environmental performance. The 
adopted biofuels directive as published in May 2003 (CEC, 2003a) leaves it to Member 
States to set national indicative targets with two reference values: 2% by the end of 
2005 and 5.75% by the end of 2010 (Art. 3(1)). However, as in the RES-E directive, 
supporters of a mandatory target achieved the inclusion of a provision, according to 
which the Commission could propose mandatory targets if the Commission’s 
assessment report shows that these targets are not met for unjustified reasons (Art. 4(2)). 
  
127
 
In contrast to RES-E and biofuels no legislative proposal was published to cover 
renewable heating and cooling. Although the 1997 White Paper identified the strategic 
importance of renewable heating in order to achieve the 2010-target no specific policy 
proposals were envisaged. The first European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) 
report62, published in June 2001, indicated the need for an initiative on the promotion of 
heat production from RES (RES-H). The necessity for additional RES-H initiatives was 
reaffirmed in the second ECCP in November 2003 and resulted in Commission 
sponsored study on the promotion of RES-H (VHK, 2002). Despite this apparent 
commitment, no legislative proposal was put forward by the Commission.  
 
This brief overview of the early EU RES policy process underlines the fact that the 
Commission cannot be considered as a single policy entrepreneur. The Commission’s 
DGs “did not follow identical administrative traditions and paradigms” (Lauber, 2005: 
42), but each DG with an interest in this policy process pushed for its own objectives. 
DG COMP mainly took a state aid-perspective and was keen to limit national subsidies 
for RES, while DG ENV was strongly supportive of financial support for RES. Within 
DG TREN the change from Commissioner Papoutsis to de Palacio in the second half of 
1999 affected the general RES-E policy direction. While Papoutsis was clearly in favour 
of tradable certificates and market-based instruments, de Palacio left it to Member 
States to choose their preferred support system for RES-E (Lauber, 2005). In his 
analysis of the policy process on the 2001/77/EC directive Lauber concludes that the 
Commission and the Council were the key players in this process whereas the EP and 
the ECJ “played a somewhat lesser role” (Lauber, 2005: 42). 
6.2.4 Support schemes for RES-E 
The question of the ‘right’ support scheme for RES has sparked intensive political and 
academic discussions since the early days of the EU RES policy process (see  6.2.3). 
Apart from indirect policy instruments to support RES investments, including RD&D, 
tax incentives and building regulations, FiT and green certificates are, in the EU, the 
most commonly used direct policy instruments to stimulate RES-E growth (CEC, 
2005c). As of 2005, the majority of Member States used FiT whereas the UK, the 
                                                 
62 European Climate Change Programme, Report June 2001, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climate/pdf/eccp_longreport_0105.pdf 
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Flemish region in Belgium, Poland, Sweden and Romania opted for a certificate system. 
While FiT is a price-based instrument, green certificates constitute a quantity-based 
approach (Menanteau, Finon et al., 2003). Under an FiT scheme, network operators 
and/or utilities are obliged to purchase green electricity fed into the public grid at a 
fixed price, which is guaranteed for a longer period of time. Under a green certificate 
scheme utilities are obliged to provide a fixed quantity of their electricity from RES. 
RES producers receive a green certificate for each MWh RES-E produced and can sell 
this certificate on a market for green certificates; this generates an income-stream in 
addition to the selling price for each unit of green electricity produced.  
 
The pros and cons of each of these instruments have been intensively discussed 
(Menanteau, Finon et al., 2003; Haas, Eichhammer et al., 2004; Lauber, 2004; Reiche 
and Bechberger, 2004; Harmelink, Voogt et al., 2006; Szarka, 2007; Fouquet and 
Johansson, 2008). The merits of FiT are that they provide long-term stability to 
investors and allow differentiation according to the maturity of the technology and can 
thus incentivise technological diversity. On the other hand, they are criticised for being 
too rigid, that they do not stimulate enough competition, and are not compatible with a 
liberalised EU electricity market and EU environmental state aid regulation. Quantity-
based support schemes are praised for steering investments to the most efficient 
technology and thus reducing costs, while neglecting less mature technologies. 
Certificate-based systems were also criticised for leading to geographical concentration 
of RES investments in areas most endowed with RES potential, which might increase 
local opposition to new developments. 
6.2.5 Summary 
New Community competences in the field of environmental policy, introduced by the 
SEA and Maastricht Treaty, served as a jurisdictional basis for RES legislation in 2001 
and 2003. While directives with indicative targets for 2010 were adopted covering two 
RES sectors, electricity and transport, the third sector, heating and cooling, was not 
subject to EU legislation. This legislative output predetermined the central elements of 
the subsequent policy debate: targets beyond 2010, a Community framework for the 
support of RES and additional legislative measures for RES-H/C. 
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6.3 Policy initiation: low politics meets high politics 
The policy process that eventually resulted in the agreement on the 2008 RES directive 
built on the policy processes described in the previous section ( 6.2). Two key events in 
2004 can be considered as the starting point for the initiation of the more recent policy 
process. The Commission and the RES industry, supported by the German environment 
ministry, organised a conference on RES policy in January 2004 that launched the 
political debate on a 20% EU RES target for 2020. Moreover, as required under 
directive 2001/77/EC, in May 2004 the Commission published a communication 
assessing the progress in reaching the indicative RES-E targets for 2010.63 In addition, 
an EP own-initiative report and the RES industry were pushing strongly for an RES-
H/C directive. These bottom-up processes were complemented by top-down initiatives 
by the European Council that enabled Commission officials to put an ambitious set of 
actions, including a binding overall 20% EU RES target by 2020, on the agenda. Out of 
the two central issues of the 2001/77/EC policy process – target-setting and 
harmonisation of support schemes – it was only target-setting that determined the 
agenda during policy initiation. This phase, which culminated in the European 
Council’s political agreement on a binding 20% EU RES target in spring 2007, was 
strongly influenced by contextual factors. 
 
In January 2004 the Commission and the European Renewable Energy council (EREC) 
organised a European Conference for Renewable Energy supported by the German 
environment ministry.64 This conference can be considered as the key event initiating a 
policy discussion on 20% RES targets for 2020 (Interview 27, 45). The conference 
conclusions considered an EU-wide RES target of at least 20% of gross inland energy 
consumption by 2020 for the EU as achievable, and urged the EU institutions to start a 
political process for setting ambitious RES targets.65 These conclusions were picked up 
in an EP resolution calling “upon the Commission and the Council to make the 
                                                 
63 Directive 2001/77/EC required a report by October 2004, but the Commission decided to publish the 
report earlier, in May 2004, ahead of the “renewables 2004” conference held in Bonn, Germany, in June 
2004. 
64 The “European Conference for Renewable Energy - Intelligent Policy Options” was held on 19-21 
January 2004 in Berlin. It convened more than 650 participants from 45 countries and discussed the 
situation of RES in Europe, including experiences with Community legislation and place and future 
perspectives. The Conference was held under the high patronage of Loyola de Palacio, Vice-President of 
the European Commission, Commissioner for Energy and Transport, Jürgen Trittin, German Federal 
Minister for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. 
65 European Conference for Renewable Energy ‘Intelligent Policy Options’, Berlin, 19-21 January 2004, 
Chair Closing Conclusions 21 January 2004, Conference Conclusions and Recommendations to the 
International Conference for Renewable Energies ‘renewables2004’, Bonn, June 2004. 
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necessary efforts to reach a target of 20% for the contribution by renewable energy to 
total domestic energy consumption in the EU by 2020” (EP, 2004c). The debate was 
further substantiated by the RES industry in the form of feasibility studies, 
demonstrating that a 20% RES target was achievable by 2020 (EREC, 2004).66 These 
numbers were broadly in line with the results of the Commission-sponsored FORRES 
2020 study that concluded in April 2005 that “a RES share of about 34 % in the 
electricity sector and of about 20 % in primary energy terms is feasible in 2020 for the 
EU-25” (Ragwitz, Schleich et al., 2005: 87).  
 
However, forces within the Commission were more hesitant to fix a new RES target that 
would extend beyond 2010. In May 2004 the Commission was still sceptical towards a 
new 2020 RES target and argued that:  
 
“acknowledging the outcome of the currently available feasibility studies […] the 
Commission considers it necessary to more thoroughly assess the impacts of RES 
resources, notably with regard to their global economic effects before deciding on 
adopting targets beyond 2010 and before taking a position on the abovementioned 
20% target for the share of renewable energy in 2020. […] This review will be 
carried out for the first time not later than the end of October 2005 with a view to 
opening a debate in order to set in 2007 a target for the period after 2010” (CEC, 
2004c: 42).  
 
The Commission’s view, as expressed in this communication, was that it was too early 
to fix new RES targets beyond 2010 when it was not yet clear whether the existing 
2010-targets would be met. During the inter service consultation for the 2004 
communication DGs ECFIN, COMP and ENTR blocked an ambitious 2020-target, 
although DG TREN claimed that the communication was never intended to set new 
targets, but was rather seen as a naming and shaming exercise (European Voice, 2004). 
In its communication from December 2005 the discussion on target-setting beyond 2020 
was further delayed. With reference to the “on-going assessment related to 2020 
targets” (CEC, 2005c: 18) a report was to be published no later than December 2007.  
                                                 
66 While the quoted 2004-study covered EU15 only, an updated potential study for the EU25 was 
published in 2007, and argued that a 21% RES share was achievable by 2020 if ambitious energy 
efficiency measures were implemented to stabilise energy consumption between 2010 and 2020 (EREC, 
2007). 
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The core objective of this 2005-communciation was to comply with Art. 4 of directive 
2001/77/EC, which called for an assessment of national RES support schemes which 
“may be accompanied by a proposal for a Community framework with regard to support 
schemes”. Despite the eagerness of some Commission officials in the 2000-2001 RES-E 
policy process to harmonise RES support in the EU (see  6.2.3), the 2005-
communication concluded that “the Commission does not regard it appropriate to 
present at this stage a harmonised European system” (CEC, 2005c: 16). As opposed to 
target-setting, the harmonisation of RES support schemes was therefore not further 
discussed at this stage of the agenda-setting process, although it was to become a key 
issue during issue specification and issue expansion. 
 
In addition to ambitious long-term RES targets, the RES industry and the EP strongly 
lobbied for an additional directive for RES-H/C in order to stimulate a sector which, 
unlike RES-E and biofuels, had until then not benefited from specific EU legislation. In 
a joint declaration the renewable energy industry and environmental lobbying groups 
called for an RES-H/C target of at least 25% by 2020 with binding national targets for 
each Member State.67 The RES industry lobby argued that an EU directive on RES-H/C 
was necessary to close the gap between RES H/C, on the one hand, and RES-E and 
biofuels, on the other (Schäfer, 2005). After the joint declaration it was hoped that “a 
point of no return towards a European directive for the promotion of renewable heating 
and cooling” (Schäfer, 2005: 48) would be achieved.  
 
The Commission was, however, sceptical of an additional target for RES-H/C arguing 
in 2004 that “targets for renewable energy sources’ heating would be difficult to 
establish because there is no single ‘heating supply industry’ to whom they could be 
addressed”. It announced that:  
 
“the Commission will bring forward further initiatives – if necessary, legislative 
proposals – to accelerate the fulfilment of the potential of three key technologies – 
                                                 
67 “Joint declaration for a European directive to promote renewable heating and cooling” by European 
Renewable Energy Council, European Biomass Association, European Geothermal Energy Council, 
European Photovoltaic Industry Association, European Small Hydropower Association, European Solar 
Thermal Industry Federation, European Biomass Industry Association, European Renewable Energy 
Centres Agency and European Wind Energy Association (published in 2005, publication without date), 
http://www.erec.org/fileadmin/erec_docs/Documents/Publications/EREC_RES-H.pdf. 
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modern biomass heating, solar heating and geothermal heat. These initiatives 
could include targets for specific technologies, or requirements for suppliers of 
heating oil and gas to supply e.g. wood pellets and biogas” (CEC, 2004c: 37).  
 
In addition, the Commission’s Biomass Action Plan published in December 2005 
announced that new specific legislation on RES-H would be considered in 2006 (CEC, 
2005a). In its conclusions to the Biomass Action Plan the Council invited the 
Commission to table proposals for the promotion of RES-H/C. 
 
The Commission’s defensive position on future RES policy proposals changed rather 
abruptly when they announced an RES Road Map in its energy Green Paper from 
March 2006 that would consider  
 
“which targets or objectives beyond 2010 are necessary, and the nature of such 
targets, in order to provide long term certainty for industry and investors […]. Any 
such targets could be complemented by extended operational targets on electricity, 
fuels and possibly heating” (CEC, 2006b: 12).  
 
The Commission’s previously announced timetable, to propose a new RES target only 
at the end of 2007, was therefore already obsolete a couple of months later. This 
announcement was welcomed by the Spring Council 2006 which considered increasing 
the RES share in the EU to 15% by 2015 (Council, 2006a: 15). The European Council 
invited the Commission to propose a set of actions which should serve as basis for a 
prioritised Action Plan to be adopted by the European Council at the spring summit 
2007.  
 
In January 2007 the Commission’s RES Road Map, published as part of the 
Commission’s climate and energy package, proposed the establishment of a mandatory 
overall 20% EU RES share of energy consumption in the EU by 2020 (CEC, 2006d). 
The Commission’s proposal was therefore more ambitious than supported by Member 
States (20% instead of 15%, mandatory instead of indicative. 2020 instead of 2015), and 
more demanding than earlier Commission statements. Moreover, it gave up the sectoral 
approach as called for by the EP and the RES industry – two key Commission allies for 
an ambitious EU RES policy process.  
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This radical shift in the Commission’s policy agenda was supported by the European 
Council at the spring summit 2007. How can this radical shift in the EU’s RES policy 
agenda during policy initiation be explained? This section attempts to answer this 
question by analysing the role of the key variables elaborated earlier (see  3.3): 
contextual factors, policy entrepreneurs, issue definition and institutional venues. 
6.3.1 Contextual factors: a policy window? 
The large majority of interviewees underlined the crucial role of contextual factors 
during policy initiation. Changes in the policy environment affected the significance 
and consequences of the reports required under directive 2001/77/EC. Commission 
officials expressed the view that the Barroso-Commission’s unexpected priority on 
energy and climate was mainly due to contextual factors (Interview 29), which created a 
political momentum that pre-empted major opposition against this policy initiative 
(Interview 33). This political dynamic was related to several contextual factors in the 
final stages of policy initiation in 2006 and 2007, which were of particular importance 
in autumn 2006 when the RES Road Map and the climate and energy package were 
finalised (Interview 45). Key contextual factors included: the Stern report, Al Gore’s 
film “An Inconvenient Truth”, the fourth IPCC assessment report, as well as the Russia-
Ukraine gas crisis which complemented the focus on climate change by increased 
interest in energy security.  
 
The Stern report was published in October 2006 and pointed to the overall economic 
costs of global climate change if no action was taken against rising GHG emissions. It 
put forward the widely reported estimate that business as usual would cause overall 
costs and risks of climate change equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP 
annually, depending on the assumptions this figure could even rise to 20% of GDP; by 
contrast the costs of action could be as low as 1% of global GDP (Stern, 2007). This 
emphasis on economic benefits, as opposed to costs of climate change policies, 
constituted a major shift within the climate change debate. When Gordon Brown, then 
UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, commissioned the Stern review in July 2005, one of 
his objectives was indeed to “put climate change on the agenda of economic policy 
makers” (HM Treasury, 2007). Moreover the Stern review helped to put climate change 
on the EU energy policy agenda. The publication of the report signalled the UK’s 
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support for an ambitious EU climate policy. The informal European Council at 
Hampton Court, organised in November 2005 by the UK Council Presidency, had 
already called for an energy policy for Europe and underlined the UK’s concerns in 
relation to climate change and energy security (Interview 36).68 The UK’s clear support 
for an ambitious climate policy – besides Germany’s ambitions in this policy area (see 
below) – made it worthwhile for the Commission to pursue energy and climate further 
(Interview 32), and thus go beyond mere reporting requirements on the achievement of 
the 2010 RES targets. It was also an important signal from a large Member State, which 
was until then reluctant to support an EU energy policy. This was timely support for the 
Commission who had announced the publication of a new “Green Paper on a secure, 
competitive and sustainable energy policy for Europe” in its Work Programme 2006 
published in October 2005 (CEC, 2005d). 
 
In addition to the Stern report, which launched an extensive debate about the 
consequences of and necessary measures against global climate change, Al Gore’s 
documentary film “An Inconvenient Truth” on global climate change was released in 
autumn 2006 in European cinemas, and stimulated huge public interest in climate 
change.69 The effect on public opinion was put forward by several Commission officials 
as an important factor during policy initiation within the Commission (Interview 29, 33, 
45).  
 
A third contextual factor was the publication of the fourth IPCC assessment report in 
the first half of 2007. While the Stern report underlined the economic argument to take 
measures against global climate change, and Al Gore’s film brought the issue more 
widely onto the public agenda, the fourth IPCC assessment report underlined the 
urgency to act by publishing the most recent scientific evidence.70 The report published 
                                                 
68 The UK’s ambition to move forward with a more ambitious international climate policy agenda was 
also reflected in the UK’s G8 Presidency and the G8 summit that was held at Gleneagles (6-8/07/2005); 
the final summit communiqué was entitled “Climate Change, Energy and Sustainable Development”. 
69 The fact that the Nobel Peace Prize for 2007 was shared, in two equal parts, between the IPCC and Al 
Gore “for their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, 
and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such change” (The Norwegian 
Nobel Committee, 2007) can serve as an indication of the impact of Al Gore’s film. 
70 The fourth IPCC assessment report was published in four steps: On 02/02/2007 the WG1 “The Physical 
Science Basis” report was launched in Paris, on 06/04/2007 the WG2 “Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability” report was launched in Brussels, on 04/05/2007 the WG3 “Mitigation of Climate Change” 
report was launched in Bangkok and on 17/11/2007 the synthesis report was launched in Valencia. For 
more information see: www.ipcc.ch. 
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in February 2007, and therefore just before the EU spring summit of 2007, concluded 
that global warming was “unequivocal” (IPCC, 2007: 5) and thus highlighted the urgent 
need for action (e.g. Harvey, 2007). Ongoing post-Kyoto negotiations71 added an 
additional element to the discussions at the EU level. The EU wanted to maintain its 
leadership position72 in international climate change policy in the run-up to the Poznan 
and Copenhagen summits (Interview 26, 27).  
 
Although less prominent at this stage of the policy process, energy security had already 
been put on the EU’s energy policy agenda by the UK Presidency at the informal 
Hampton Court summit. This was mainly due to the UK’s strong concerns about energy 
security after having become a net importer of gas (Scrase and Ockwell, 2009). Interest 
on energy security was reinforced at the turn of the year 2005/06, when a gas dispute 
between Russia and Ukraine resulted in reductions in Russian gas supplies to European 
countries, including Italy and France. In reaction to this disruption the incoming 
Austrian Presidency announced that energy security would be one of its priorities 
(Arnold, Benoit et al., 2005; Adams, Anderson et al., 2006). A regularly quoted figure 
was the forecast in the 2006 Green Paper that the EU’s energy import dependency 
would rise from 50% in 2006 to 70% over the next 20 to 30 years under business as 
usual scenarios. High oil prices also played an important role in favour of RES 
(Interview 29) in that they reduced the cost differential between fossil fuels and RES. 
The energy Green Paper 2006 noted that oil and gas prices had nearly doubled in the EU 
since 2004 (CEC, 2006b: 3) and continued increases in oil and gas prices until mid-
2008 emphasised this problem further. 
 
While there was large agreement among interviewees that the climate change debate 
strongly affected the RES policy process, there was no consensus on the role of energy 
security. One interviewee expressed the view that the energy security debate did not 
play a major role for the RES policy process at this stage since the link between energy 
                                                 
71 The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement that sets binding GHG emission targets for 37 
industrialised countries and the European Community for the current commitment period until 2012. 
Post-Kyoto negotiations refer to the process on a follow-up agreement for the period after the first 
commitment period and the EU hope that such an agreement would be concluded at the Copenhagen 
summit in December 2009 – the Poznan summit in December 2007 was a preparatory meeting in this 
process. 
72 The EU’s perception of being in a leadership position in global climate change negotiation is mainly 
based on the introduction of the world’s first emissions trading system (EU ETS) (see also Skjærseth and 
Wettestad, 2008). 
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security and RES was not widely acknowledged (Interview 28). Other observers argued 
that it was not only about climate change but also security of supply (Interview 31, 43), 
and both were considered as perfectly aligned reasons to push for an RES target 
(Interview 31). 
 
Against this background Commission officials argued that the time was right to move 
forward towards a common energy policy (Interview 36), and that there was a policy 
window for a binding RES target (Interview 46). These contextual factors can be 
considered as opening up a policy window due to significant changes in the problems- 
and politics-streams (Kingdon, 1995 [1984]). A focusing event (the Russia-Ukraine gas 
crisis), and new data on climate change (IPCC report), were reinforced by significant 
public support that climate change should be a policy priority. This raises the question 
to what extent policy entrepreneurs could seize this opportunity to initiate a new policy 
initiative. 
6.3.2 Policy entrepreneurs: the Commission in responsive mode 
Key policy entrepreneurs at this stage of the policy process were MEPs, Commission 
officials, the German Council Presidency, and the RES industry. Their motivations as 
policy entrepreneurs were quite diverse. MEPs and Commission officials sought the 
expansion of Community jurisdiction in the field of RES policy and partially followed 
their values and beliefs. In Kingdon’s (1995 [1984]) terms MEPs and Commission 
officials thus invested resources for anticipated future bureaucratic (expansion of 
jurisdiction) and purposive (values and beliefs) gains. The German Council Presidency 
pursued economic interests of its RES industry and Chancellor Merkel wanted to 
benefit from the positive policy image of RES policy73. The RES industry aimed for a 
long-term regulatory framework. While previous RES policy processes provided the 
basis for policy entrepreneurs’ action, changes in the policy environment were of 
particular importance for a shift in the Barroso-Commission’s policy priorities. Key 
issues during policy initiation were whether the RES target would be binding or 
indicative and whether it would be an overall or a sectoral target. 
 
                                                 
73 After the political agreement on the 20-20-20 targets at the EU spring summit 2007, the German 
Chancellor Merkel was hailed as “Klimakanzlerin” in the German press e.g. (Dehmer, 2007) 
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The change in the Commission’s political agenda to energy and climate change 
constituted a radical change in policy priorities. In 2004 the incoming Commission 
President Barroso stressed the revival of the Lisbon Strategy as his key priority (CEC, 
2005e). Presenting this strategy to the EP Barroso made clear that the economic pillar 
needed to prevail over social and environmental issues (Agence Europe, 2005). The 
revival of the Lisbon Strategy, however, proved to be difficult74 and in 2005 
Commission President Barroso realised that his Commission had no clear headline topic 
(Interview 33). The Commission started to look for alternative themes and eventually 
adopted climate change as a key theme.  
 
The Commission picked up the 15% RES target put forward by the European Council in 
March 2006 to build an ambitious climate and energy package (Interview 33). After 
Hampton Court it was hoped that this shift in the Commission’s political agenda 
towards energy and climate issues would raise the Commission’s profile (Interview 26, 
27, 28, 32, 33). The EP, the RES industry, and Member States that had been successful 
with respect to the 2001 RES-E directive, supported this shift in the Commission’s 
political agenda (Interview 28). The strong push by the EP, and the increasing evidence 
that the existing indicative targets would not be met, gave the Commission the 
confidence to propose an ambitious RES target. This was strongly supported by the 
incoming German Council Presidency (Interview 36, 47).  
 
The agenda-shaping power of the Council Presidency (Tallberg, 2003) significantly 
affected policy initiation. Firstly, the UK Presidency’s informal Hampton Court summit, 
and then the German Presidency’s clear support for ambitious climate and RES targets, 
influenced the Commission’s agenda-setting and thus the EU’s energy policy agenda. 
Hampton Court was important since heads of state gave a clear mandate to the 
Commission to develop a European energy policy (Interview 45). It was an essential 
starting point for the climate and energy package and thus for the new RES directive. 
This ambition was backed later that year by clear signals from the incoming German 
Presidency. The Commission knew that Germany would support ambitious binding 
GHG reduction and RES targets as was expressed during preparatory meetings between 
the Commission and the incoming German Presidency (Interview 47); Germany 
                                                 
74 The renewed Lisbon Strategy published at the end of 2007 included energy and climate as one of four 
priority areas (CEC, 2007g). 
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indicated early in the process that it would support a climate and energy package with 
ambitious targets (Interview 27, 30)75. The German Presidency’s ambitions in this area 
were seen as a window of opportunity within the Commission (Interview 40).  
 
A Council official expressed the view that there was a perfect alignment between the 
Commission’s Road Map and the German Presidency’s agenda, and many Member 
States’ interests (Interview 31). What was important was not only the number of 
Member States supporting new ambitious climate and energy proposals, but also the 
fact that large Member States, such as the UK, Germany, and France, explicitly 
supported the initiative. France had published a memorandum on a revival of European 
energy policy in January 2006 shortly after the Hampton Court summit (MINEFI, 
2006). The agreement on the need for action among these three Member States was 
even more significant for EU agenda dynamics, since all three Member States were 
acting or about to act as Council Presidency with leverage on the agenda: the UK in the 
second half of 2005, Germany in the first half of 2007 and France in the second half of 
2008. 
 
The EP was another important agenda-setter. In continuation of the previous RES policy 
processes, in February 2006 Mechtild Rothe MEP (PES-DE) put forward an own-
initiative report on the basis of the EP’s most powerful formal instrument to influence 
the EU policy agenda. The report, adopted by a majority of the EP on the basis of Art. 
19276 EC Treaty, requested that the Commission seek “to submit to Parliament by 31 
July 2006, on the basis of Article 175(1) of the EC Treaty, a legislative proposal on 
increasing the share of renewable energy for heating and cooling” (EP, 2006a). In an 
Annex it called for a realistic and ambitious EU target for RES-H/C with the aim of at 
least doubling their share of energy supply, and for effective national targets to 
contribute to this EU target. The EP’s objective was further underlined in its resolution 
to the 2006 Green Paper where it called “on the Commission to present a proposal for a 
directive on heating and cooling from renewable energy sources as soon as possible” 
                                                 
75 At the third meeting of the Amsterdam Forum (see 6.4.3), 21-22/11/2006, Germany supported an 
overall binding 20% EU-RES target by 2020, 
http://www.senternovem.nl/amsterdamforum/amsterdam_forum_iii/proceedings/road_map_on_renewable
_energy_sources.asp. 
76 By adopting an own-initiative report under Art. 192 EC Treaty, the EP can “request the Commission to 
submit any appropriate proposal on matters on which it considers that a Community act is required for the 
purpose of implementing this Treaty” (see also  3.3.3). 
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(EP, 2006b). The EP’s resolution on the Green Paper 2006 supported the Commission’s 
approach – the elaboration of an RES Road Map as mentioned above – but asked the 
Commission to “set binding sectoral targets for renewables in order to achieve 25% of 
renewables in primary energy by 2020” (EP, 2006b).  
 
Thus the EP was an important ally for the Commission with respect to an ambitious 
RES target, but was insisting on a sectoral approach. Also the RES industry and 
environmental NGOs continued to push for sector specific RES policy objectives. In 
2006 the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) argued that “it makes no sense 
providing a headline figure of 20% without providing the main energy using sectors of 
electricity, heat and transport, with their own individual targets” (Massy, 2006). At the 
start of 2007, ERES/EWEA renewed its calls for sectoral targets as a crucial policy 
element (Massy, 2007). Drafts of the RES Road Map with an overall 20% mandatory 
RES target, instead of sector specific targets, were strongly criticised for being 
ineffective. The RES industry was keen on sectoral targets building upon the existing 
sectoral approaches for RES-E and biofuels, in order to prevent any major changes to 
the existing 2001 RES-E directive that had proved to be a successful policy instrument 
(Interview 27).  
 
In response to the EP’s request energy Commissioner Piebalgs promised the EP that the 
Commission would come up with an RES-H/C proposal (Interview 30). In summer 
2006, Commission officials started drafting an RES-H/C proposal (Interview 32). Even 
in October 2006 Piebalgs announced that “the new target would include separate 
sectoral targets […], but the EC [the Commission] was still discussing how these would 
work, for example if they would be differentiated between Member States” (Power in 
Europe, 2006: 14). This was, however, abandoned soon after and replaced by an overall 
binding target, leaving it to the Member States to determine how to spread an overall 
target over the three RES sectors.  
 
The shift from sectoral targets, as proposed by the EP and the RES industry, to an 
overall RES target was predominantly a strategic decision by Commission officials. 
Against past experience with indicative targets, the Commission’s DG TREN was keen 
to have binding targets, but the Commission recognised that it could not achieve both 
sectoral and binding targets. DG TREN officials’ major priority was to have a binding 
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target, and it was happy to leave it to Member States how to achieve the national 
binding target (Interview 45); flexibility for Member States was the price to pay to 
achieve mandatory national targets (Interview 33). Most Member States and industry 
representatives would have perceived binding sectoral targets instead of a binding 
overall target as too rigid, whereas a binding overall target allowed for sufficient 
flexibility and thus increased acceptance of the proposal (Interview 29). Furthermore the 
complexity of the task to break down sectoral targets into national targets prevented a 
sectoral approach (Interview 45). A binding target in one directive covering all three 
RES-sectors was also preferred on the grounds of good governance and cutting red tape 
under the Commission’s drive for “Better Regulation”77 (Interview 32).  
 
The agreed overall RES target-level of 20% was mainly based on the impact assessment 
(CEC, 2007e: 22-23). Cost-benefit analysis showed that going beyond 20% would be 
much more expensive (Interview 32). Besides this analytical aspect, it was considered 
as helpful to have the clear political message ‘20-20-20 by 2020’78 (Interview 32). The 
20% RES target was seen as a logical step in a long-term process that started back in 
1997 with the White Paper’s 12% RES target (Interview 28, 30, 34). The binding target 
could be seen as a response to the failure of existing indicative EU targets (Interview 27, 
31, 32). Yet, despite paying the political price of flexibility by giving national control 
over the setting of sectoral targets, the acceptance among Member States of the overall 
binding 20% RES target was far from guaranteed prior to the 2007 Spring Summit. The 
Commission had to prove its skills as policy entrepreneur by building winning 
coalitions and selling its proposals (Pallis, 2006) to Member States. 
 
At an informal meeting in December 2006, 25 out of 27 Member States voiced 
opposition to a binding RES target (Interview 32). Only two Member States – Denmark 
and Germany – supported binding targets at the time, but the Commission considered 
proposing a binding renewable target in the RES Road Map as a response to the slow 
RES progress so far (Agence Europe, 2006). The Commission’s decision to go ahead 
                                                 
77 The “Better Regulation” programme was launched in 2002 ”to simplify and generally improve the 
regulatory environment. It is designed to cut red tape, improve the quality of regulation and design better 
laws for consumers and business alike” (CEC, 2006a). The relevance of “Better Regulation” in 
developing new energy proposals was also underlined in the Commission’s work programme for 2006, 
see COM(2005)531. 
78 20% RES share, 20% GHG emissions reduction as compared to 1990 levels, 20% increase in energy 
efficiency. 
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with the proposal for a binding target was taken by key people within the Commission 
(for example, Piebalgs, Christopher Jones (deputy head of Piebalgs’ cabinet) and 
Catherine Day (Director-General of SG)), because they saw a chance of success 
(Interview 32). This was backed by the fact that the incoming German Presidency 
clearly signalled its support for a binding RES target (Interview 29, 30, 47).  
 
The Commission tried to sell the package to Member States in order to ensure political 
backing at the Spring Council 2007. Between January and March 2007 top level people, 
including Barroso himself, Commissioners and members of the cabinets, were travelling 
to national capitals to do a “selling job” of the binding target (Interview 32, 45). This 
was a coordinated effort between DG TREN, DG ENV and DG ENTR (Interview 32). 
Although this did not prevent the Energy and Environment Councils from opposing the 
binding nature of the target, these preparatory discussions could have helped to achieve 
agreement at the Spring Council. Shortly before the Spring Council the Commission 
published results of a Eurobarometer survey pointing at the overwhelming support of 
EU citizens for the climate and energy package (CEC, 2007c).79 
 
After the publication of the RES Road Map in January 2007, the German Presidency 
suggested that energy ministers endorsed a binding 20% RES target in overall EU 
energy consumption by 2020, and called for a new framework directive for RES 
including specific national targets on the basis of National Action Plans (Council, 
2007c). Member States, however, did not agree on the nature of the target (binding or 
indicative) and the level of the target for biofuels (12.5% or 10%). A revised version of 
the draft conclusions therefore emphasised effort sharing among Member States, and the 
need to take into account “national circumstances, potentials and starting points” 
(Council, 2007c). Energy ministers agreed on the 20% target, differentiated national 
overall targets, and to leave it to Member States to decide on national sectoral targets. A 
binding 20% target met resistance from France and the UK, but was supported by DE, 
DK, ES, and IT (Power in Europe, 2007). It was left to the European Council to decide 
on the nature of the target. 
 
                                                 
79 One interviewee expressed the view that Barroso used and stimulated public mobilisation before the 
Spring Council 2007, by giving interviews in several European media to ensure that the heads of state 
would be measured against concrete agreements on climate change, i.e. the binding targets proposed by 
the Commission (Interview 27). 
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At the Spring Council 2007, the European Council agreed on the binding 20% RES 
target in overall EU energy consumption by 2020 “taking account of different national 
starting points and potentials, including the existing level of renewable energies and 
energy mix”, and “leaving it to Member States to decide on national targets for each 
specific sector of renewable energies (electricity, heating and cooling, biofuels)” 
(Council, 2007a). This agreement was subject to internal European Council dynamics.80 
It was widely agreed that the German Chancellor Merkel played a key role in getting the 
binding overall 20% target accepted. One explanation put forward was that Merkel 
succeeded in convincing other Member States that enough flexibility would be given to 
Member States to achieve their target (Interview 26). There were early signals that the 
‘effort sharing’ of the RES target would be decided flexibly, and not only on the basis 
of the national RES potential but also considering GDP and other factors (Interview 
28).81  
 
Agreement was also made possible by a complete U-turn of UK policy from its 
traditional policy, a decision taken at the top level (Interview 36). The UK’s position 
was initially less in favour of an RES target but supportive of a low carbon target; this 
explains why the UK initially rejected an RES target82. For the UK it was about tackling 
climate change and not about picking certain technologies. The UK preferred that 
Member States decide how to implement a low carbon target according to national 
circumstances. Before the spring summit the UK changed its position and supported a 
binding RES target. 
 
An observer considered the RES Road Map as much a Commission initiative as it was 
an initiative from Member States (Interview 37). The UK, for example, continued after 
its Presidency to build up international leadership in climate change and pushed for EU 
level initiatives in this area. Similarly, Germany and Spain clearly signalled their 
support for ambitious 2020 RES targets.  
                                                 
80 The specific dynamics of the spring summit 2007 are underlined by the fact that, for example, Poland 
had internally agreed before the summit to oppose a binding target, but at the spring summit the Polish 
president agreed to the binding target in exchange for other things (Interview 39). 
81 Support by France and other pro nuclear countries has reportedly been achieved by introducing a cross-
reference to the contribution of nuclear energy to CO2 emission reduction (para 11) in the spring summit 
conclusions.  
82 This view was expressed by the UK at the third meeting of the Amsterdam Forum, 21-22/11/2006, 
http://www.senternovem.nl/amsterdamforum/amsterdam_forum_iii/proceedings/road_map_on_renewable
_energy_sources.asp. 
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6.3.3 Issue definition: climate change, energy security and internal market 
Climate change was the key issue frame during policy initiation. The shift from an 
additional sectoral target for RES-H/C to an ambitious binding overall 20% EU RES 
target, was clearly favoured by the Commission’s package approach to energy and 
climate as its new key policy priority. As for the RES-E directive in 2000/2001 (Collier, 
2002), a major rationale for the RES Road Map was the reduction of GHG emissions. 
At the same time after the conflict on gas transit between Russia and Ukraine in 
2005/2006, energy security became an increasingly important justification for new RES 
legislation.  
 
In its resolution for an RES-H/C directive in February 2006, the EP’s first objective was 
to contribute to the EU’s energy security followed by creating jobs and improving the 
environment (EP, 2006a). The Commission’s Road Map referred first to climate change 
and second to the increased dependence on oil and other fossil fuels as well as growing 
imports (CEC, 2006d). Moreover, the Road Map points at the €20 billion turnover of 
the EU RES industry and the 300,000 people employed in this sector.  
 
As in the run-up to the 2001 RES-E directive, internal discussions in the Commission 
reflected the DGs’ different paradigms (Lauber, 2005). DG ENTR was very critical and 
DG ECFIN was quite critical of the proposal, and both were either opposed to a target 
or argued that 20% would be too ambitious (Interview 45). The high interest in the 
dossier by the Commission President helped the process in that objections brought 
forward by DG ENTR and DG ECFIN were overruled by Barroso’s cabinet (Interview 
33). DG ENV’s main objective was to have a GHG-target included as an objective of a 
European energy policy (Interview 40). DG ENV initially questioned the RES directive 
and the separate RES target since it claimed that modelling results showed that carbon 
trading was sufficient to achieve GHG reductions and to promote RES investments. 
However, since the RES-E directive from 2001 was considered as the probably most 
successful EU instrument to reduce carbon emissions, TREN argued strongly for a 
separate RES target (Interview 32).  
6.3.4 Institutional venues: legitimisation by the European Council 
Following the above definition, according to which institutional venues constitute 
“institutional locations where authoritative decisions are made concerning a given 
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issue” (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 32), policy entrepreneurs acted predominantly 
within the existing institutional venues to initiate a new RES policy process. Relevant 
institutional venues that affected policy output at this stage of the policy process were 
Commission internal working groups and the European Council. 
 
Within the Commission the high political salience of the issue, and thus the intervention 
by high-level Commission officials, helped to reach cross-departmental agreement on 
the overall binding 20% EU RES target. At the more technical level this agreement was 
supported by many inter-service groups and processes that were established within the 
Commission in order to get consensus across the different DGs and their particular 
frames and interests (Interview 45). Although inter-service groups involving relevant 
DGs are common practice within the Commission during the preparation of a new 
legislative proposal and its impact assessment, the preparation of a joint impact 
assessment (CEC, 2008b) for all legislative proposals of the climate and energy 
package, point to a high intensity of inter-service discussions that went beyond the usual 
Commission-internal inter-service-consultation (Interview 45). This enabled and 
required compromises between the different DGs in order to put forward the legislative 
package called for by the European Council. 
 
The key institutional venue during policy initiation was the European Council. It was 
first the informal summit at Hampton Court in November 2005, then the Spring Council 
2006 where the Green Paper was presented, and then the Spring Council 2007 that 
illustrated the European Council’s leverage on the EU agenda by serving as a venue to 
sanction and legitimise policy ideas and new proposals (Nugent, 2006; Rasmussen, 
2007). At Hampton Court the heads of state agreed to support a common energy policy 
and provided the Commission with a strong mandate to develop the climate and energy 
package. This was reiterated at the European Council meetings in December 2005 and 
March 2006. Discussions and processes in preparation for the Spring Council 2007 
strongly illustrate high-level agenda-setting dynamics.  
 
After ministers could not agree on the nature of the 20% EU RES target in the 
preparation phase of the Spring Council 2007, the final decision was left to heads of 
state who agreed on the binding target and thus followed the Commission’s suggestion. 
The Spring Council 2007 showed the significance of this institutional venue. Even 
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officials who were directly involved in the preparations of the summit were surprised 
that the binding nature of the 20% RES target was agreed. Besides the efforts of policy 
entrepreneurs like the German Chancellor Merkel, this success was also put down to the 
negotiation process of the European Council (Interview 47). It might also have helped 
that, at the high political level, there was insufficient understanding of the technical 
details; heads of state signed a blank cheque and details had to be clarified afterwards 
(Interview 26, 33). 
6.3.5 Summary 
This high-level attention within and outside the Commission ensured that the long-term 
bottom-up policy processes sustained by Commission officials, MEPs and the RES 
industry resulted in the proposal of binding long-term RES targets. Low-level politics 
was complemented by high-level politics. Policy developments since the late 1990s, and 
insufficient progress on agreed targets, helped Commission officials to push for more 
ambitious targets, supported by the RES industry and MEPs. Targets beyond 2010 were 
already put on the agenda by the 2001 RES directive and its reporting requirements. The 
discussion during policy initiation focused mainly on the level and nature of the RES 
target.  
 
A policy window was opening up due to contextual factors and was seized by the 
Barroso Commission to gain profile. This was also enabled by the incoming German 
Presidency that signalled support for ambitious RES and climate targets. The 
Commission acted as policy entrepreneur by ‘selling’ its objectives to Member States. 
The binding overall 20% RES target was a strategic choice to give Member States 
sufficient flexibility to allocate their national resources according to their preferences. 
The European Council had provided the Commission with strong legitimacy to put 
forward ambitious proposals and – under strong public pressure – used its authority to 
agree to a binding EU RES target.  
 
Independent of the reason why the Spring Council 2007 reached agreement on the 
binding target, the key assumption of the analysis here is that the high politics 
agreement by the heads of state had important implications for the subsequent policy 
process. The Spring Council conclusions underlined that all Member States agreed at 
the highest level on the urgency of this initiative and that all players were moving in the 
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same direction (Interview 37). The RES target could no longer be questioned by anyone 
(Interview 34); it made Member States conscious that this was a serious issue and high-
level meetings continued throughout the preparation of the package (Interview 32). The 
remainder of this chapter analyses if, and to what extent, this high politics involvement 
affected the subsequent policy processes. 
6.4 Issue specification: GO trading 
After the political agreement on an overall 20% EU RES target by the heads of state, the 
Commission had the task of translating the political compromise into a legislative 
proposal. The Commission was faced with two main challenges: to allocate national 
contributions to the overall target in a fair way, and to ensure efficient use of the 
available renewable energy resources across Europe (Johnston, Neuhoff et al., 2008). 
The Commission’s proposal, published in January 2008, addressed these challenges in 
two ways. First, national targets were calculated on the basis of a flat rate of 5.5% for 
each member state, plus a contribution based on GDP per capita and the inclusion of 
early actions in RES investments. Second, two trading approaches were suggested to 
enable an efficient use of renewable resources across national borders: national 
governments could trade their surplus or deficit RES generation, and market 
participants were allowed to trade guarantees of origin (GO) across Member States 
independently of physical trade. 
 
Key elements of the proposed RES directive as published by the Commission in January 
2008 (CEC, 2008d) included: 
• Binding overall national RES targets and indicative trajectory (Art. 3/Annex I); 
• Member states shall develop national action plans (NAPs) outlining the shares of 
RES-T, RES-E and RES-H/C in 2020 and measures to be developed to achieve 
these targets including national policies to develop existing and new biomass 
resources in fulfilling the requirements in Art. 12 to 17 (Art. 4); 
• Member States need to recognise GOs from another MS, otherwise the 
Commission can adopt a Decision and can require the refusing MS to recognise 
it (Art. 6); 
• GOs can be used to claim benefits from the national support system (Art. 8); 
• If the RES share in a Member State equals or exceeds the indicative trajectory, 
GOs can be transferred between persons in different Member States after 
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Member States’ prior authorisation. By 31/12/2014 the Commission shall assess 
the costs and benefits of GO transfer between Member States (Art. 9); 
• Priority grid access for RES-E as long as electricity system security is 
guaranteed (Art. 14); 
• Sustainability criteria for biofuels and bioliquids (Art. 15-18). 
 
The Commission’s translation of the overall binding target into mandatory national 
targets followed the Spring Council’s conclusions by “taking account of different 
national starting points and potentials, including the existing level of renewable energies 
and energy mix” (Council, 2007a: 21). The key issue was the methodology used to 
calculate national targets in order to have fair distribution among Member States 
(Interview 45). The Commission was keen to find a consensus on targets not only 
during the drafting process but also in the negotiation stage (Interview 37). Discussions 
were kept open and there were very intensive efforts by the Commission to liaise with 
Member States (Interview 37). As for the methodology for calculating national RES 
targets, it was soon realised that a strictly RES potential-based target setting would not 
be feasible since the wealth discrepancies within the enlarged EU were considered as 
too great (Interview 32). Agreement on a methodology combining a flat rate of 5.5%, 
and GDP per capita distribution, helped to avoid difficult discussions on national 
potentials (Interview 32). 
 
This methodological solution to the problem was convincingly sold to Member States to 
ensure their support. After the Spring Council the binding 20% RES target had the 
absolute highest political priority, and the Commission worked as hard as it could to 
develop a proposal (Interview 31). High-level meetings were organised between the 
Commission and Member States in summer 2007 (Interview 45). Before the 
Commission adopted the climate and energy package, their top officials 
(Commissioners and members of their cabinets) went to national capitals to explain the 
targets, the underlying economic analysis, as well as the costs and benefits (Interview 
32). Thus Commission officials continued their entrepreneurial approach to target-
setting that was already visible during policy initiation. In promoting the targets to 
national governments, it helped the Commission that no Member State was taken by 
surprise, and that there was no strong opposition from the very beginning (Interview 37, 
40), although a few Member States considered their targets as too ambitious.  
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The methodology for national target-setting contributed to a fair distribution of the 
overall EU RES target among Member States. However, it was not considered as 
sufficient for an efficient use of RES across the EU (Johnston, Neuhoff et al., 2008) 
given the ambitiousness of the RES targets and quite large discrepancies of RES 
potential among Member States. Figure 5 shows the proposed national targets and 
illustrates the considerable differences among Member States regarding their RES share 
in 2005 and the expected increase by 2020. 
 
Figure 5: National share of RES in % of gross final consumption in 2005 and 2020 
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Discussions on target-setting were linked to the question of support mechanisms 
because, depending on the national target, trading was considered as an important 
measure to reduce costs in reaching the targets (Interview 32, 45). As a consequence, 
similar to the 2000/2001-RES policy process, the question of the right support 
mechanism became a key issue. However, while discussions during the drafting of the 
2001 RES-E Directive were mainly based on theoretical advantages and disadvantages 
of each instrument due to the lack of sufficient experience with them, by 2007 several 
assessments of the experience with national support schemes had been published (e.g. 
Haas, Eichhammer et al., 2004; CEC, 2005c; Mitchell, Bauknecht et al., 2006). One key 
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message of these studies was that, against the expected theoretical benefits of certificate 
trading schemes (see  6.2.4), FiT proved to be more effective and cost-efficient.83  
 
In 2005 the Commission had argued in its assessment report as required under directive 
2001/77/EC, that it was too early to harmonise national support schemes: 
 
“While gaining significant experience in the EU with renewable support schemes, 
competing national schemes could be seen as healthy at least over a transitional 
period. Competition among schemes should lead to a greater variety of solutions 
and also to benefits: for example, a green certificate system gains from the 
existence of a feed-in tariff scheme, as the costs of less efficient technologies fall 
due to the technological learning process, which in turn leads to lower transfer 
costs for consumers. Moreover, it is too early to compare the advantages and 
disadvantages of well-established support mechanisms with systems with a rather 
short history. Therefore, and considering all the analyses in this Communication, 
the Commission does not regard it appropriate to present at this stage a 
harmonised European system.” (CEC, 2005c: 16). 
 
The conclusion, that it was premature to propose a harmonised Community framework 
for the support of RES-E in the EU, was reiterated in the Commission Staff Working 
Document published alongside the RES directive in January 2008 (CEC, 2008a). The 
Commission still argued that, “harmonisation of support schemes remain a long term 
goal on economic efficiency, single market and state aid grounds, but that 
harmonisation in the short term is not appropriate” (CEC, 2008a).  
 
Nonetheless in the 2008 RES directive the Commission proposed a trading mechanism 
on the basis of guarantees of origin (GO) that would have established an EU-wide 
certificate scheme in the long-term (see also discussion below). This leads to the 
following question: how can the emergence of this provision in the RES directive 
proposal during issue specification be explained, and how did this affect the policy 
process? The following section illustrates the leverage of Commission officials on EU 
                                                 
83 This is not to argue that feed-in tariffs are under any circumstances ‘better’ than green certificates, but 
as implemented in EU Member States until then, feed-in tariffs were superior to green certificate schemes 
in terms of effectiveness and cost efficiency. It is however important to underline that each policy 
instrument’s performance depends on its actual design and socio-institutional context. 
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agenda-setting during issue specification and how outside players influenced this 
process. 
6.4.1 Policy entrepreneurs: Commission officials’ leverage on the agenda 
High-ranking Commission officials were the key drivers behind the trading mechanism 
proposal. They were keen to put their “pet proposal” (Kingdon, 1995 [1984]) on the 
decision agenda. This attempt to set the agenda during issue specification was strongly 
influenced by Member States and interest groups.  
 
Christopher Jones, deputy head of Piebalgs’ cabinet, used the drafting process to push 
for an EU-wide market-based support system that would be both compatible with the 
internal market and more cost effective, while providing flexibility to Member States. 
For the purpose of introducing a trading mechanism in the new RES directive, 
Christopher Jones recruited Peter Vis to Piebalgs’ cabinet in May 2007. He was given 
the task of overseeing the RES directive drafting process and assessing whether or not 
an EU-wide green certificate scheme could be introduced in the RES directive 
(Interview 41). Peter Vis was chosen because he was one of the key Commission 
officials who had developed the EU ETS, and therefore had detailed knowledge about 
trading systems and the process of introducing them at EU level.84 However, whereas 
the Commission had been ahead of national authorities in the introduction of ETS, in 
the RES case it could only proceed incrementally as it was faced with more than 27 
existing national RES support schemes (Interview 41). 
 
Piebalgs’ cabinet strongly pushed for an EU-wide green certificate system on the basis 
of GO certificates. Drafts of the RES directive written by DG TREN’s unit D1, 
responsible for the RES directive, were regularly redrafted by the cabinet on the issue of 
certificate trading mechanisms (Interview 41). Not all people within D1 were convinced 
that a Community-wide system of tradable green certificates would be the most 
effective and cost-efficient solution to support RES in the EU (Interview 29, 45), as 
reflected in their assessments of RES support mechanisms in the EU (CEC, 2005c; 
2008a). Commission officials, sceptical of an EU-wide GO trading system, could build 
on the experience with RES policies in the EU since the late 1990s (Interview 29, 33, 
                                                 
84 On the key role of Peter Vis in relation to the initiation of EU ETS see Skjærseth and Wettestad (2008: 
74-87). 
  
151
45) and point to the policy experience gained so far. By contrast, DG ECFIN and DG 
ENV (Interview 41, 42) supported the trading idea. Both DGs were keen to combine the 
RES directive with ETS after models showed that a harmonised certificate system 
would be less expensive compared with the continuation of national support schemes 
(Interview 40, 45). Both groups within the Commission relied on outside allies to push 
for their position. 
 
A key ally for Commission officials in favour of a Community-wide trading mechanism 
was the UK who had a strong influence at this stage of the policy process (Interview 37, 
39). The national target proposed by the Commission for the UK entailed a radical shift 
to UK policy compared with existing domestic policies and its RES share in 2005 (see 
Figure 5). The UK’s progress towards achieving the 2010 RES-E target underlined this: 
in 2006 the UK had only reached an RES-E share of 4.63% starting from 2.12% in 
1997; this is compared to its 2010 RES-E target of 10% (CEC, 2009d: 11). This 
explains the UK’s keen interest in flexibility to meet the target in the most cost effective 
way; a Community-wide trading mechanism was seen by the UK as a means to achieve 
flexibility and thus reduce costs (Interview 36). A study commissioned by the UK 
government concluded that the annual cost to the UK in 2020 of meeting its RES target 
would be €1.7 billion higher without a trading mechanism (Pöyry, 2008).  
 
A briefing note85 from UK officials showed that UK officials had met with 
Commissioners, cabinet members and officials since April 2007 to stress the importance 
of an integrated approach to the implementation of the climate and energy package. It 
noted that: “On the particulars of the solutions, discussion with Dep head of Piebalgs 
cabinet, Chris Jones, shows he is thinking along similar lines to the UK in terms of the 
need to use flexible approaches such as EU wide trading to meet a renewable target 
[…]”. The note argued that “from a UK point of view, given the concern on not 
undermining the EU ETS, and the difficulties of making large increases in renewable 
investment domestically, we would tend to favour options with maximum flexibility 
over what and where investments can be made to minimise costs […].” It recognised the 
challenge to maintain this position within the Commission cabinets and services and 
                                                 
85 Internal briefing paper for UK ministers prepared by officials from the UK Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform “Draft options paper on renewables target” (no date), 
http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2007/08/13/RenewablesTargetDocument.pdf. 
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with other Member States and pointed to the need to influence key Member States’ 
views, namely France, Germany, Italy and Poland. The briefing concludes that:  
 
“UKREP’s [the UK’s permanent representation to the EU] advice is that we 
should concentrate our influencing primarily at senior level within the 
Commission where the decisions over approach will be made. Meetings are 
planned before the summer with the Cabinets and the two relevant Directors 
General. […] Alongside this, we will continue to engage and lobby Member States 
towards the emerging UK position.” 
 
This seemed to be a successful strategy. In September 2007 Dörte Fouquet, 
representative of EREF and forceful opponent of an EU-wide trading mechanism, noted 
in an open letter that “a group of anti feed-in hardliners has convinced Commissioner 
Piebalgs […] to introduce a EU wide system […] which favours trade and green 
certificates for Renewable Energies” (Fouquet, 2007). Fouquet named Catherine Day, 
Director General of the Commission’s Secretariat General, Jos Delbeke, deputy Director 
General of DG ENV, Christopher Jones, and Peter Vis as key advocates of trading 
within the Commission. 
 
Besides the UK, Eurelectric, the European power industry association representing all 
major European electricity companies, were keen to introduce a trading element in the 
new RES directive (Interview 44). In a joint press release in November 2007, 
Eurelectric, together with the European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET) and 
Renewable Energy Certificate System Association (RECS), underlined the need for a 
harmonised trading mechanism, arguing that it should be prevented that one third of the 
electricity market is closed off “through the creation or continuation of non-market-
based incentive mechanisms” (Eurelectric, RECS et al., 2007). This argument was 
based on the assumption that the 20% RES target would lead to roughly an RES-E share 
of one third in the EU electricity market by 2020. BusinessEurope President Seillière 
wrote to Barroso in November 2007 expressing his concerns about the costs of the 20% 
RES target. He called for “utmost flexibility” for achieving the target and for the 
introduction of a harmonised support system for RES (Europolitics, 2007).  
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Commission officials opposed to the trading mechanism effectively used conflict 
expansion to include new actors (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Leaked drafts of the 
directive proposal that included trading provisions took Member States like Germany by 
surprise (Interview 47), and led to fierce opposition by some Member States. Germany, 
Denmark and Spain lobbied against the introduction of a trading mechanism by pointing 
to the benefits of renewables in terms of new industry and employment (Interview 27).  
 
In January 2008, Germany and Spain, backed by Latvia and Slovenia, wrote to 
Commissioner Piebalgs arguing that the proposal threatened FiT support systems and 
implying that this “is not acceptable to our governments” (Toke, 2008: 3003). The 
German Ministry for the Environment argued that a mandatory EU-wide GO trading 
scheme in parallel with existing national support systems would wipe out FiT systems. 
Moreover, it was argued that it would lead to additional costs of €4 billion per year in 
Germany by 2020, and of €100 billion per year by 2020 for the EU as a whole (Schöpe, 
2007). Conflict expansion through the pronounced opposition by some Member States 
and the RES industry, contributed to last minute changes of the draft proposal’s 
provisions on certificate trading (Interview 27, 41, 42, 43). 
 
Although the scheme included in the Commission’s draft proposal did not aim explicitly 
for a harmonised EU-wide certificate trading scheme, a number of Member States 
considered FiTs as being threatened. Since the GO trading scheme could have regarded 
GO certificates as “goods” in the internal market according to Art. 28 of the EC Treaty, 
national support systems could have eventually been regarded as a distortion of the 
internal market. As a consequence, national RES support systems could “fall from the 
current scheme of being independent legally sustainable national mechanisms into the 
legal category of unsustainable obstacles to trade” (Johnston, Neuhoff et al., 2008: 
130).86  
 
This view was also shared by the Commission’s Legal Service, which argued that it was 
not possible in the internal market that individual Member States could refuse GO 
trading as foreseen by the Commission, since GO certificates would be considered as a 
good whose trade cannot be restricted in the internal market (Interview 41). On the basis 
                                                 
86 For a detailed legal discussion of the Commission’s RES proposal’s implications for national support 
systems see Johnston, Neuhoff et al. (2008: 129ff) and Fouquet and Johansson (2008: 4086-4091). 
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of the Commission’s Legal Service’s opinion, it was realised among pro-trading 
officials that the intended scheme would have resulted in a run on the national support 
system with the highest support. This would have ultimately led to a race to the bottom 
of national support systems (Interview 41).  
 
Immediately after the agreement at the Spring Council 2007, MEPs tried to influence 
the drafting process (Interview 30), which was reflected in regular exchanges between 
key MEPs and Commission officials and MEPs (Interview 32). In its resolution to the 
RES Road Map from September 2007, the EP stated that it “believes that national 
support schemes would nevertheless be needed to maintain investor confidence” (EP, 
2007b), thereby supporting those Member States that opposed the Commission’s trading 
proposal.  
 
In addition, the RES industry and environmental NGOs were strongly opposed to an 
EU-wide GO trading scheme and put their position forward forcefully (Interview 25, 
26, 27, 38). Christian Kjaer, chief executive of EWEA, argued that an internal energy 
market was a precondition for an EU-wide trading mechanism and that trading could 
not be an objective in itself but that the key issue was how to achieve sufficient RES 
growth (EWEA, 2007; Kjaer, 2007). The RES industry’s position was strengthened by 
the success of the RES industry in the past (Interview 29), with high growth rates 
reflected in higher employment in this industry sector (see also  2.1). 
 
Although the published proposal for the RES directive still included trading 
mechanisms, opponents succeeded in introducing an opt-out clause that would limit the 
pressure on existing national support schemes. Art. 9(2) states that “Member States may 
provide a system of prior authorisation for the transfer of guarantees of origin […]” if 
such a system “is likely to undermine the achievement of the environmental objectives 
underlying their support scheme”, or to ensure that national targets are achieved.87 
6.4.2 Issue definition: ‘master frame’ and policy experience 
Proponents of an EU-wide harmonised certificate trading system argued that cost-
effectiveness should be the key objective when allowing Member States to trade GO. 
GO trading would allow Member States to achieve their RES target not only within 
                                                 
87 Yet, “the system of prior authorisation shall not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination”. 
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their territory but anywhere in the EU where RES investments can be achieved at lowest 
costs (Interview 41). Cost effectiveness was of particular importance for the UK. They 
feared that it had to bear the highest share of the additional RES investment by 2020 
due to the consideration of GDP per capita in calculating national targets, and as a result 
of the insufficient progress in national RES investment in the past (Interview 36).  
 
Arguments for a market-based system were in line with the Commission’s objective to 
further the internal energy market as already expressed in the 2001 RES-E directive in 
the context of a Community-wide framework for RES support systems (Rowlands, 
2005). It matched with the “master frame” (Nylander, 2001) of the single market that 
exerted a strong framing effect during the preparation of the RES directive (Nilsson, 
Nilsson et al., 2008: 24). This line of argument had already been put forward by DG 
TREN in 1999 during the preparation of the 2001 RES-E directive (CEC, 1999b). 
Fouquet and Johansson (2008: 4081) argue that the 1999 Commission working paper 
“introduced a negation of FiT mechanisms as viable competitive instruments for the 
promotion of RE[S] in Europe. FiT mechanisms were labelled as non-competitive and 
not to be considered further for a harmonised mechanism in Europe.” The theoretically 
based frame on the advantages of market- or quantity-based RES support mechanisms, 
and a harmonised EU-wide support mechanism, could, however, be successfully 
challenged in this policy process on the basis of empirical experience with these 
instruments. 
 
Opponents of the Commission’s proposed GO trading system insisted that the 
promotion of RES was not only about pursuing RES investments anywhere in the EU at 
lowest costs, but that it was also about local or national benefits in terms of employment 
and stimulating technological progress (Interview 47). It was argued that public support 
and acceptance of RES would drastically decrease if the benefits of public financial 
support for RES did not directly benefit the national economy (Interview 41, 47). In 
addition, a market-based support system that channelled RES investments to the 
cheapest investment option, would not stimulate technological progress in renewable 
energy technologies in the earlier stages of development. GO trading “would undermine 
the ability of Member States to implement technology and resource-differentiated 
support schemes, which are intended to support a technology portfolio and avoid 
high(er) consumer costs” (Johnston, Neuhoff et al., 2008: 128).  
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From a theoretical viewpoint, the empirical analysis implies that frames put forward by 
Commission officials as policy entrepreneurs were strongly institutionalised. Moreover, 
the different frames put forward by Commission officials confirmed that the 
Commission could not be treated as a monolithic policy entrepreneur but as being 
represented by various “frame entrepreneurs” (Nylander, 2001: 293). These 
entrepreneurs did not only reflect different paradigms among different DGs (Lauber, 
2005) but also within DGs.  
6.4.3 Institutional venues 
The Commission was the main institutional venue during issue specification where key 
decisions were taken. Commission internal frames were therefore central to this process. 
As would be expected, in the absence of a formal proposal during the drafting process 
between March 2007 and January 2008, there was no official discussion in the 
Council’s working party (Interview 31).  
 
Two informal institutional settings served as venues for the exchange of views among 
key participants in the policy formulation process: the Amsterdam Forum and the 
International Feed-in Cooperation.   
 
The Amsterdam Forum was organised jointly by DG TREN and the Dutch Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, with the objective of providing opinions on EU policy initiatives in 
the field of renewable energy and energy efficiency. Participation in the Forum is 
limited to representatives from EU Member States and representatives from NGOs, 
energy companies and other organisations in the field of renewable energy and energy 
efficiency. It met for the first time in October 2005 and complements fora such as the 
Madrid Forum (gas) and the Florence Forum (electricity).  
 
The Amsterdam Forum was used to exchange positions between the Commission, 
Member States and other stakeholders (Interview 38, 44). The Forum was considered as 
influential on the policy process since it illustrated Member States positions and enabled 
discussions on certificate trading, and thus made Member States aware of the 
underlying issues (Interview 28). The RES Road Map was discussed at the third 
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Amsterdam Forum in November 2006 and RES support mechanisms were discussed at 
the fifth Amsterdam Forum in October 2007.  
 
Another institutional venue that proved quite influential throughout the policy process 
was the International Feed-In Cooperation, which was established by the German and 
Spanish governments in 2004 to promote the diffusion of FiT and was joined by 
Slovenia in 200788. The “Feed-In Cooperation” was an important network of like-
minded Member States that enabled communication and common statements. This 
resulted, for example, in a January 2008 letter from the German and Spanish 
environment ministers to the Commission stating that FiT should not be called into 
question (Interview 47). Germany and Spain were very active through the “Feed-In 
Cooperation” (Interview 28). A workshop in October 2007 was used to reaffirm 
opposition against a mandatory EU-wide GO trading scheme, and to defend existing 
national support systems. Instead a voluntary coordinated or harmonised feed-in system 
was suggested (International Feed-In Cooperation, 2007).  
6.4.4 Summary 
The political agreement on the binding 20% RES target by the European Council 
provided a very strong mandate for the Commission’s drafting process of a legislative 
proposal. Since the package had the highest political priority, the drafting process was 
accordingly highly politicised as illustrated by regular high-level interventions within 
the Commission as well as from outside the Commission. While nobody could question 
the overall binding target agreed by the heads of state, there was no pre-set 
methodology on how to determine national binding RES targets. Major conflicts on 
national targets were prevented by an open and consensual drafting process between the 
Commission, Member States, MEPs and other stakeholders.  
 
While the Commission sought consensus on national targets, it did not do so on the 
proposed flexibility mechanism. Subsequently, the Commission had to dilute its original 
proposal due to the strong opposition from Member States like Germany and Spain 
seeking to defend their national support schemes. Those Member States were supported 
                                                 
88 A Joint Declaration of the International Feed-In Cooperation was signed on 6/12/2005 by German and 
Spanish representatives, and provided the formal basis for the Feed-In Cooperation that was initiated in 
2004 at the International Conference for Renewable Energies (renewables2004) in Bonn. 
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by the EP, the RES industry and environmental NGOs. The flexibility mechanism was 
also strongly contested within the Commission.  
6.5 Issue expansion: time pressure 
“It happens that one proposal is important but this [the climate and energy package] 
literally almost sucked up the whole machinery of the Council, COERPER, the EP and 
the Commission to get this through on time. For the rest it was completely normal 
negotiations.” (Interview 31) 
 
The issue expansion phase started with the publication of the RES proposal in January 
2008, and ended with the political agreement in December 2008. A key development at 
this policy stage was an alternative proposal for flexibility mechanisms put forward by 
Germany, the UK and Poland, which sought to overcome the main difficulty in the 
negotiation process: the Commission’s proposals on GO trading. Although it could be 
argued that issue expansion in the RES policy process started earlier, when Commission 
officials sought either consensus on their initial ideas or support from outside allies, the 
formal phase of issue expansion began with the publication of the proposal. 
 
Institutional considerations provided an important incentive for securing a rapid 
agreement under the French Council Presidency. The Czech Council Presidency, which 
followed the French Council Presidency, had clearly signalled that it would not push the 
climate and energy package any further under its Presidency (Interview 47). In addition, 
the end of the EP’s mandate in May 2009 would also complicate the negotiations if they 
became drawn out. The European Council conclusions from March 2008 acknowledged 
this time pressure by agreeing that deliberations on the package between the Council 
and the EP should lead to agreement by the end of 2008 “or at the latest early in 2009” 
(Council, 2008a: 12).89 
 
Political agreement on the RES directive was reached in December 2008 under first 
reading procedure. Table 4 provides a comparison of the initial Commission proposal, 
the EP amendments and the agreed directive. GO trading and flexibility mechanisms 
                                                 
89 In March 2008, the European Council also agreed that the Slovenian Presidency would aim to reach 
political agreement on the third internal market package by June 2008, that the French Presidency would 
try to reach political agreement on the climate and energy package, and that the Czech Presidency would 
deal again with the internal market package. 
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remained a key issue in the discussion. The political dynamics of achieving a 
compromise on this issue during the issue expansion stage is analysed in this section.  
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Table 4: Comparison of key elements of different versions of the RES directive 
Policy issue Commission directive proposal 
COM(2008)19 final (January 2008) 
EP report (A6-0369/2008, September 2008) Agreed directive (17086/08)  
(December 2008) 
Targets 
 
• Mandatory national overall RES targets  
(Annex I, Part A)  
• Indicative trajectory on how to achieve the 
2020-target (Annex I, Part B) 
• Inclusion of mandatory minimal interim 
targets in Part B of Annex I with the 
introduction of penalties if interim targets are 
not met. 
• Mandatory national overall RES targets  
(Annex I, Part A) 
• Indicative trajectory on how to achieve the 
2020-target (Annex I, Part B) 
Calculation of the 
share of energy from 
renewable sources 
• Biofuels and other bioliquids need to fulfil 
environmental sustainability criteria  
• Member States can apply that long lead-time 
projects that might not be operational by 2020 
count towards their 2020-target 
• RES-E from third countries can be taken 
into account if consumed in the Community 
• All biomass for energy need to comply with 
both environmental and social sustainability 
criteria 
• RES-E from third countries need to be 
physically imported and these third countries 
need to have binding targets for RES in place 
“comparable in ambition to the EU target” 
• Biofuels or other bioliquids need to fulfil 
sustainability criteria 
• RES-E from third countries need to be 
consumed in the Community and originate 
from a new RES-E installation that has not 
benefited from other support schemes than 
investment aid. 
Support schemes • GOs are linked to national support 
mechanisms 
• the aim is to introduce an EU-wide 
certificate system in the long-term 
• Each MS can decide to which extent RES 
produced in a different MS is supported. 
• Introduction of TACs 
• GOs for disclosure purposes only 
• Each MS can decide to which extent RES 
produced in a different MS is supported. 
Flexibility mechanisms 
 
• Transfer of guarantees of origin • TACS  
• Statistical transfers between Member States 
• Joint projects between Member States  
• Joint target compliance 
• Statistical transfers between Member States 
• Joint projects between Member States 
• Joint projects between Member States and 
third countries 
• Joint support schemes 
Grid access Priority grid access for renewable electricity 
insofar as the security of the electricity system 
permits 
Provisions on priority are substantially expanded 
and include the operation of distribution and 
transmission networks. 
Either priority access or guaranteed access to 
the grid-system of electricity produced from 
RES 
Sustainability criteria • Environmental sustainability criteria for 
biofuels and other bioliquids 
• GHG saving from the use of biofuels and 
other bioliquids: at least 35%. 
 
• Detailed environmental and social 
sustainability criteria for biomass for energy  
• Criteria shall apply to biomass cultivated 
within and outside the Community  
• GHG savings from the use of transport fuels 
from biomass shall be at least 45% and from 
1/01/2015 GHG savings shall be at least 60%. 
• Sustainability criteria for biofuels and other 
bioliquids cultivated within and outside the 
Community  
• GHG savings: 35%, from 2017: 50%, after 
2017: 60%  
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6.5.1 Contextual factors: the financial and economic crisis 
A major exogenous event in the second half of 2008 was the unfolding of a global 
financial and economic crisis, which it was feared would lead to the collapse of the 
industrialised economies (The Economist, 2008). This crisis prompted an extraordinary 
informal meeting of selected EU leaders in Paris on 4 October. The French president 
Sarkozy – at the time president of the European Council – invited the political leaders 
from Germany, Italy and the UK along with Commission president Barroso, ECB 
president Jean-Claude Trichet and Jean-Claude Juncker, head of the Eurogroupe90. 
Although the official objective was to sort out the EU position in view of the next G8 
summit, it was also considered as a preparation for an EU summit scheduled for mid-
October in Brussels. The seriousness of the financial and economic crisis raised 
questions about the political priorities and if the climate and energy package could and 
should remain the political top priority in the EU agenda.  
 
There was a risk that the economic crisis might negatively affect on-going EU policy 
discussions (Mazey, 1998; Wendon, 1998). National officials confirmed that there were 
discussions at the beginning of October about whether the climate and energy package 
should continue to be treated with the same political priority, or whether the focus 
should be put on the economic and financial crisis instead (Interview 46, 47). Although 
some Member States would have been comfortable with giving up the political 
momentum on the climate and energy package, key people in all Member States agreed 
that a decision on the climate and energy package should be reached by the end of 2008 
(Interview 46). Proponents of the climate and energy package argued that the financial 
and economic crisis even underlined the need for rapid agreement on the climate and 
energy package (Interview 47). The political process was considered as institutionally 
too advanced to be stopped and heads of state were clearly committed (Interview 47). 
The European Council in mid-October therefore reaffirmed its commitment taken at the 
spring summit 2008 to agree on the climate and energy package by the end of 2008 
(Council, 2008c).91  
                                                 
90 www.ue2008.fr: Sommet sur la crise financière internationale. 
91 It might have been more likely to find an agreement on the well-advanced climate and energy package 
than on measures of how to address the financial and economic crisis. 
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6.5.2 Policy entrepreneurs: alternative proposal 
The French Council Presidency became the principal policy entrepreneur in this phase 
of the negotiations. Officials from other Member States argued that the French 
Presidency played by far the most important role in securing political agreement on the 
climate and energy package by the end of 2008 (Interview 39, 47). France made the 
climate and energy package top priority during its Presidency, and put strong pressure 
on all participants to find an agreement (Interview 29). The French Presidency’s 
commitment to achieving a political agreement on the climate and energy package can 
be explained by at least two factors (Interview 46): the Council conclusions from March 
2008, which called for an agreement by the end of 2008 also in view of the Copenhagen 
process, and the national commitment to an ambitious energy and climate policy as 
agreed at the “Grenelle de l’environnement”92. In addition the French Presidency had 
the resources of a large Member State to push the negotiations forward (Interview 47), 
and could thus exploit dynamics introduced by the agreement of the European Council 
and the international climate negotiations. 
 
The Slovenian Presidency in the first half of 2008, by contrast, was in a moderating role 
that kept the process on track without major political decisions (Interview 38) and 
managed the process in cooperation with the Commission (Interview 39)93. While the 
French Presidency played a key role, its success was strongly supported by other policy 
entrepreneurs including Member States, MEPs and the Commission, as will be 
discussed in the remainder of this sub-section.  
 
Major themes of the negotiations during issue expansion were GO trading and 
sustainability criteria (Interview 30, 31, 32, 37, 38, 45, 46, 47). The intensive 
discussions on flexibility and sustainability criteria might have helped to avoid any 
major conflicts on targets (Interview 29, 41). Member States were also familiar with the 
national targets before their publication, which might have prevented major discussions 
on national targets in the Council (Interview 27). Despite the consensual agenda-setting 
                                                 
92 The “Grenelle de l’environnement” was a for national stakeholder process in France that was launched 
in July 2007 and presented its conclusions in October 2007. The conclusions call for an ambitious 
increase of renewable energy sources in France, which was broadly in line with the EU RES target for 
France. 
93 The co-called Trio Presidencies among three subsequent Council Presidencies that coordinated their 
work programme were Germany, Portugal and Slovenia (2007-2008) and France, Czech Republic and 
Sweden (2008-2009). 
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approach on targets and a general consensus on the targets, a few Member States 
including Poland considered their national target as “very ambitious” and “too 
ambitious” (Council, 2008d: 12), and wanted to open political discussion on those 
targets. While they could not question the overall target since it had been agreed by the 
heads of state, the national targets were considered as being open for political 
discussions because they were proposed by the Commission (Interview 39). 
 
However, the Slovenian and French Presidencies used their power of agenda-exclusion 
(Tallberg, 2003) and blocked any discussion of national targets in the Council 
(Interview 39). The large majority of Member States did not want to start a discussion 
on targets (Interview 31, 34), because everyone knew discussing individual targets 
would call into question the whole directive (Interview 36, 37). Since the overall RES 
target was fixed, negotiations on national targets would have constituted a zero sum 
game. Every participant in the negotiation knew that changes in one national target 
would affect those of others. Initial debates in the Council focused therefore on the 
same issue as in the final stage of the drafting process: flexibility mechanisms and 
national support schemes.94  
 
The first unofficial meeting of the Council’s energy working party in early February 
2008 showed that there was insufficient support for the Commission’s GO trading 
proposal – 10 to 15 Member States were not in favour of GO trading (Interview 39). 
Attempts to change the Commission’s GO trading proposal were ongoing in parallel in 
the Council and the EP. GO trading provisions were one of the first things to change 
after the publication of the proposal because both a majority in the Council and the EP 
were against these provisions (Interview 32). 
 
A turning point in the policy process was an alternative proposal95 to GO trading 
brought forward jointly by Germany, Poland and the UK at the June Energy Council. Its 
key points were: Member States could decide if and to what extent RES produced in 
other Member States would benefit from their national RES support schemes (Art. 
                                                 
94 In the final stages of the issue expansion phase the remaining controversial issues included the 
inclusion of the aviation sector in the method for calculating the 20% target, the appropriateness of a 
“large projects” clause, imports of RE from third countries, GO, statistical transfer, and rendez-vous 
clauses. 
95 “NON-PAPER: Joint proposal by Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom on an alternative 
renewable flexibility mechanism”, http://www.endseurope.com/docs/80627a.doc. 
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3(2a)), GOs were limited to disclosure purposes (Art. 6); possible statistical transfers 
between Member States (Art. 7); joint projects between Member States (Art. 8-9) and; 
joint target compliance (Art. 10). The alternative proposal by the UK, Germany and 
Poland was a turning point in the policy process because the proposal clearly identified 
a problem, outlined the reason for opposition and suggested an alternative (Interview 
31, 46). This alternative underlined that the key political conflict was not about the 
problem – the need to provide flexibility to Member States in fulfilling their RES 
targets – but about the best way to ensure the flexibility necessary in order to achieve 
the agreed targets.  
 
This alternative proposal, and thus its conflict definition, was acceptable and credible 
because it was put forward by three Member States that represented quite diverse 
positions in this policy process. They were very different in terms of their existing 
national support systems, their RES potential and already realised RES shares (e.g. 
Coenraads, Reece et al., 2008). The UK followed a market-/quantity-based approach 
system, whereas Germany used FiT for the support of RES (Mitchell, Bauknecht et al., 
2006). Having the UK as a supporter of market mechanisms and Poland as a new 
Member State behind the alternative proposal made it a strong compromise (Interview 
32, 41). The alternative proposal was also supported by France and Spain. France did 
not want to sign because it was the incoming Presidency, and Spain could not sign 
because of the national elections in March 2008 and the change of the Minister of 
Industry, Tourism and Trade, and afterwards the General Secretary for Energy 
(Interview 34). France agreed with Germany on the risks and potential detrimental 
consequences on national RES markets of the flexibility mechanism put forward by the 
Commission (Interview 46). 
 
The alternative was acceptable to everyone since it provided flexibility and trading 
between Member States as well as stability for national support systems. Member States 
opposed the idea of a common certificate trading scheme because it would have obliged 
them to change their national support systems. Most Member States, moreover, wanted 
to keep national control over their support mechanisms (Interview 36, 39, 44, 46). 
 
Early ideas for an alternative proposal sought to avoid a division between pro-trading 
and anti-trading positions by putting forward a different certificate system. By doing so, 
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Germany tried to win the support of Member States where certificate systems were 
already in place (Interview 47). Discussions between Germany, Poland, and Spain on an 
alternative proposal had already started in March 2008 (Interview 39). In April 2008 the 
“Feed-in Cooperation” organised a workshop on flexibility mechanisms, which all 
major Member States attended to exchange views on the flexibility mechanisms of the 
draft RES directive96; Germany and Spain emphasised that they would not support 
certificate trading as proposed by the Commission (Interview 26). The UK joined these 
countries in May 2008 (Interview 34) after it was clear that Germany would not accept 
the proposal tabled by the Commission. A UK official expressed the view that, since 
both France and Germany opposed to the Commission proposal, compromise was 
inevitable (Interview 36). 
 
The UK’s U-turn was a central factor in enabling major progress in this policy process 
and deserves closer examination. A UK official argued that the UK’s initial objective 
was not to create a harmonised EU trading system, but a flexibility mechanism that 
would permit investment in RES outside national territory that could be included in the 
national RES target (Interview 36). The UK’s U-turn was also due to the stance of 
influential actors such as Ofgem. It was opposed to an EU-wide certificate scheme, 
referring to high costs and a technology blind approach that would favour wind energy 
(Interview 28). British advocates of a trading system, moreover, were under strong 
pressure because the UK certificate-based system was considered as very expensive 
(Interview 43). The Commission’s 2005 assessment report, for example, showed that 
for onshore wind the UK ROC scheme was the most expensive one: “Support schemes 
for wind vary considerably throughout Europe with values ranging from €30/MWh in 
Slovakia to €110 per MWh in the UK” (CEC2005c: 26).  
 
In 2006, a report by the UK Carbon Trust pointed to the need for reform of the UK 
support scheme in order to attract more RES investments in the UK (The Carbon Trust, 
2006) 97. The UK was no longer convinced by green certificates given the poor 
performance of their national certificate scheme (Interview 41). 
                                                 
96 The workshop was held on 16/04/2008 in Brussels, for a full agenda see: http://www.feed-in-
cooperation.org/content/view/56/71/. 
97 The report argues: “the RO (by design) passes regulatory risk to the private sector, which the private 
sector accordingly prices at a premium. This leads to leakage of the subsidy away from developers, as 
suppliers take a margin to deal with this risk and funding from financiers is therefore available on less 
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Before the publication of the alternative proposal there were unofficial consultations 
between the Member States involved and representatives from the EP and the 
Commission (Interview 39); this included an informal gathering at the German 
Permanent Representation to the EU to inform all relevant actors about this proposal 
and explain its purpose (Interview 31). This inclusive approach, in addition to the 
factors described above, contributed to the substantial support the proposal received 
when it was presented to the Council’s Energy Working Party.  
 
As a consequence of the UK’s U-turn, pro-trading Commission officials lost their key 
outside ally. Commission officials ensured their influence during issue expansion by 
accepting the alternative proposal (Interview 31). The Commission’s key interest was a 
successful outcome of the negotiations (Interview 33, 47). By accepting the alternative 
proposal, and by not insisting on its flexibility mechanism, the Commission was in a 
position to act as “honest broker” (Interview 46) and important moderator between the 
Council and the EP (Interview 46, 47) during the formal trialogue in November and 
December 2008.  
 
In the EP, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) was dealing with 
the RES proposal, and Claude Turmes MEP (Greens/EFA-LU) was chosen as 
rapporteur. Turmes had a track record as a forceful supporter of EU RES policy. He had 
been rapporteur on the 2004 communication on the share of RES in the EU where he 
wanted to establish a 25% EU RES target as “feasible” by 2020 (EP, 2005). Many 
interviewees agreed on Turmes’ key role at this stage of the policy process. Early in the 
process Turmes expressed his opposition to an EU-wide certificate scheme as proposed 
by the Commission. His draft report in May 2008 limited GO to a disclosure role as in 
directive 2001/77/EC (EP, 2008b). Convergent positions between Turmes and Germany 
helped in securing an agreement on flexibility mechanisms.98 The initial draft of an 
alternative proposal put forward by Germany included a system similar to that proposed 
by the EP (Interview 47). Turmes succeeded in obtaining a large majority within the 
                                                                                                                                               
favourable terms than it would otherwise be. There is wide and growing consensus that the RO needs to 
be adapted or changed […]”. A UK internal debate on future RES support schemes was launched by a 
consultation on the UK Renewable Energy Strategy in June 2008 that refers also to the potential benefits 
of feed-in tariffs (BERR, 2008). 
98 This convergence was facilitated by the fact that the German environment ministry and Turmes were 
both advised by the German Öko-Institut. 
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ITRE committee to support his final report (EP, 2008a) (see also Table 4). This 
strengthened his position during the trialogue with the Council and the Commission. 
Turmes skilfully used the time pressure created by the French Presidency’s 
determination to obtain an agreement by the end of 2008, and insisted that the EP would 
rather aim for a second reading than a compromise at any price (Interview 27).  
 
Industry lobbying was subject to a particular pattern in relation to the RES directive, 
and the climate and energy package in general. With respect to the RES directive 
lobbying was focused upon sectoral, or even technology specific, interests and how to 
reach the RES target, i.e. flexibility mechanisms (Interview 35). EREC, as the umbrella 
group for RES, was dominated by RES-E and was therefore most interested in GO 
trading and less in biofuels. By contrast, RES-H/C interest groups were mostly 
interested in administrative measures (Interview 32).  
 
In general the RES industry was lobbying for the maximum support by the EP 
(Interview 46). In fact Turmes was in close contact with RES industry lobby groups, 
and most of his amendments were in line with their position (Interview 25, 26). In 
general, the RES industry was opposed to an EU-wide trading system and put forward 
studies on the potential detrimental effects of such a system and its legal implications. 
This proactive approach in opposing the Commission’s flexibility mechanism might 
have resulted in a higher visibility and stronger arguments against a Community-wide 
trading mechanism (Interview 45).  
 
By contrast, industry groups in favour of a trading scheme were not as vocal in 
expressing their support. Although Eurelectric was officially in favour of trading, as 
expressed during issue specification (see  6.4.1), this position was not unanimous among 
Eurelectric members. An increasing number of utilities recognised the investment 
opportunities in the renewables sector (e.g. offshore wind for which smaller developers 
do not have sufficient capital). As a consequence of these different opinions within 
Eurelectric there was less drive to oppose or change parts of the RES directive 
(Interview 44). This is reflected in a study commissioned by Eurelectric and written by 
Pöyry – the same consultancy firm that wrote the BERR study published in March 
2008. The study concluded that the cost of reaching the overall EU RES target would be 
€17 billion lower by 2020 with trading as opposed to national support systems 
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(Eurelectric, 2008). However, the public version of this study was published only in 
autumn 2008 and therefore too late to influence the decision-making process (Interview 
44). Similarly BusinessEurope did not maintain a strong position in favour of GO 
trading as expressed during issue specification (Nilsson, Nilsson et al., 2008: 16).  
 
Among organisations that represented and defended pro-trading positions, EFET and 
RECS were considered as most visible in the policy process (Interview 38). Both argued 
strongly in favour of market mechanisms to achieve the 20% RES target in order to 
achieve the target at least additional cost (EFET, 2007; 2008; RECS, 2008a; b). 
However, instead of supporting the Commission’s proposal published in January 2008, 
EFET and RECS were critical because the opt-out clause was considered as 
unsatisfactory. This critical stance was regretted later when they realised that this 
proposal could have constituted an important step towards an EU-wide trading 
mechanism (Interview 43). 
 
A Commission official expressed the view that the lack of strong outside supporters of 
an EU-wide market-based trading system considerably weakened the position of pro-
trading Commission officials (Interview 41).  
 
Once broad agreement on flexibility mechanisms was reached, discussions focused on 
other parts of the climate and energy package (Interview 37, 39). The RES directive was 
considered as less complex than the other directives of the climate and energy package, 
particularly the revision of the ETS directive. As a consequence, negotiations on the 
ETS directive took more time, whereas the RES directive was already agreed before the 
December summit (Interview 47). Some observers suggested that the complexity of 
other parts of the climate and energy package might have helped to facilitate a quicker 
agreement on the relatively less complex RES directive (Interview 29, 33). 
6.5.3 Issue definition: Community vs. national control 
The alternative proposal put forward by the UK, Poland and Germany redefined the 
problem and thus affected the dominant frames in the discussion. The need for 
flexibility was acknowledged and remained a key issue on the agenda, but the internal 
market as “master frame” was gradually replaced by the question where RES support 
schemes should be controlled, i.e. at the Community or national level.  
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While the question on the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of different RES support 
schemes remained an important issue, the national leverage on RES support schemes 
became predominant in the discussion and in the positions of individual Member States. 
The arguments related to cost-efficiency by proponents of an EU-wide certificate 
trading scheme were questioned by the empirical evidence on the past performance of 
different national RES support schemes. Studies showed that FiTs were, in most cases, 
more cost-efficient and effective than certificate schemes.  
 
During issue expansion the discussion therefore moved away from the question of 
which support scheme was most appropriate towards which level of control was most 
appropriate. This was a precondition to open up the policy process for a compromise 
across different ‘camps’ of support schemes that combined two objectives: no 
harmonisation of support schemes at EU level, and flexibility in target compliance. 
6.5.4 Institutional venues: high politics limiting actors’ access  
The time pressure under which the RES directive was negotiated influenced the role of 
institutional venues, which in turn affected the outcome of the negotiation process. 
While the process was characterised by discussions within and between all levels as 
reflected in various kinds of informal contacts, the formal trialogues and COREPER 
were the key institutional venues at this stage of the policy process.  
 
The European Council maintained its influence on the negotiation process. This was 
also ensured by the agreement under the French Presidency that heads of state would 
have the final say on the agreed climate and energy packages at the European Council in 
December 2008 (Interview 46). For the EP it was however difficult to accept that every 
Member State would have another say at the December summit before signing the 
political agreement. 
 
The role of institutional venues, and thus access of policy entrepreneurs to the decision-
making process, was strongly influenced by the agreed first reading procedure. Very 
early in the process, ahead of the French Council Presidency, French officials got in 
touch with important MEPs to accelerate the process and lobbied for a first reading 
procedure (Interview 27). In addition French president Sarkozy’s suggestion to reach 
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consensus in the Council reinforced the pressure to agree on compromises (Interview 
28, 47). From September 2008 onwards there were many intensive discussions in 
COREPER on the RES directive. After the UK-DE-PL paper was integrated into the 
proposal, COREPER had to find a common position for the formal trialogue 
negotiations with the EP under first reading procedure. The process was much more at 
the political than the technical level at that stage. Although it could have been dealt with 
at a technical level within the Working Party, COREPER had more power and authority 
to take responsibility to reach a deal (Interview 31). 
 
In November and December 2008 there were seven trialogue meetings between the 
Council, the EP and the Commission on the RES directive (Interview 46). Every week 
COREPER dealt with the state of the negotiations and agreed on the negotiation 
mandate for each step of the negotiations. The key challenge was the time pressure in 
this process since there were normally only 24 to 48 hours for the Presidency to 
evaluate the flexibility it could ask from Member States, while the EP was always 
calling for the maximum (Interview 46). There was no time to discuss proposals in 
detail in the working groups. Therefore the Presidency had to know national positions 
very well to assess what would be acceptable to all Member States. Before the formal 
trialogue between September and November, there were several COREPER meetings 
on key questions that allowed Member States to outline their national positions 
(Interview 46). The French government had a very good knowledge of national 
positions having conducted many bilateral meetings during the first half of their 
Presidency (Interview 34). In addition, the French deputy ambassador held several 
bilateral meetings with every Member State to assess national positions (Interview 47).  
 
One national official expressed the view that COREPER had a particular institutional 
advantage in this process because COREPER deals with all political issues. It therefore 
covers both energy and environment issues, whereas the ministerial level is divided in 
different Council formations on energy and environment. COREPER enabled 
ambassadors to agree quickly on compromises across the whole package (Interview 47).  
 
By contrast, within the EP responsibilities were shared between different committees. 
The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety was leading on 
ETS, burden sharing and the CCS proposals, while the Committee on Industry, 
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Research and Energy was leading on the RES directive. From this perspective the EP 
was institutionally disadvantaged because the different elements of the climate and 
energy package were dealt with by different rapporteurs and in different committees, 
making it difficult for the EP to find compromises across the whole package (Interview 
47). 
 
The first reading procedure led to particular institutional dynamics. Although first 
reading procedures have become common use in EU policy-making since their 
introduction by the Amsterdam Treaty – in fact between 1999 and 2008 nearly 60% of 
Community legislation was adopted under the first reading procedure (Council, 2009b) 
– the procedure has predominantly been used for technical matters and less on proposals 
in “’mainstream’ policy areas” (Nugent, 2006: 409). Due to the high attention paid to 
the climate and energy package the first reading procedure was therefore not the 
obvious choice. Some MEPs were hesitant to agree to first reading procedure process 
because it meant negotiating with the Council without a plenary vote (Interview 31). 
The strong ITRE-majority was therefore a crucial source of support for Turmes during 
the trialogue negotiations. Initially many participants in the policy process had preferred 
a second reading procedure to build up more pressure (Interview 26, 28), or to prevent 
agreement (Interview 27). Thus, the first reading procedure prevented conflict 
expansion and clearly restricted actors’ access to decision-making.  
6.5.5 Summary 
The issue expansion phase was characterised by extreme urgency for political 
agreement, as underlined by the commitment taken at the spring summit 2008 to find a 
political agreement by the end of 2008. This was due to the end of the EP’s legislative 
period in May 2009, the ambitions of the French Presidency, the rather sceptical 
position of the Czech Presidency on the climate and energy package, as well as the 
international climate change negotiations. This time pressure had important 
ramifications for the policy dynamics at this stage of the policy process. The urgency 
for agreement from the top level made it very difficult for Member States to formulate 
opposing positions as far as the overall agreement was concerned. Long discussions on 
details related to national preferences by questioning brokered compromises between 
the Presidency and the EP, would have made agreement under the French Presidency 
impossible. Throughout the issue expansion phase, the RES directive as part of the 
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climate and energy package remained at the level of high politics, or was closely 
observed by the top level as illustrated by the strong involvement by COREPER. 
 
Since negotiations on sustainability criteria for bioenergy were delegated to an ad hoc 
working group due to its technical nature, flexibility mechanisms were predominant in 
the political discussion. Any attempts by some Member States to put national targets on 
the agenda were blocked by the Presidencies. The alternative proposal put forward by 
Germany, the UK and Poland brought together three Member States that reflected 
different interests within the Council. The proposal was therefore credible as a basis for 
a compromise. The Commission very quickly accepted this alternative, and supported it 
after a key ally of its certificate trading scheme, the UK, changed its position. This 
enabled the Commission to play an important role as a credible policy broker during the 
trialogues with the Council and the EP. Institutional key players were the French 
Presidency and EP rapporteur Turmes. The French Council Presidency had the capacity 
to push things forward, and EP rapporteur Turmes had a strong majority behind him and 
was recognised as a knowledgeable person in this field.  
6.6 Chapter conclusions 
The agenda-setting process of the RES directive was characterised by a gradual 
convergence of low-level and high-level politics. The 2001 RES-E directive’s reporting 
requirements on targets compliance against the 2010 targets, and on RES support 
schemes in view of introducing a Community-wide framework, initiated important low 
politics processes. At the same time the lack of EU legislation on RES-H/C attracted 
much attention from the EP and the RES industry during policy initiation. The 
Commission responded by drafting a separate RES-H/C directive in the second half of 
2006, but this drafting process was undermined by high politics processes. Contextual 
factors, particularly the global climate change debate, were very significant variables 
during policy initiation in that they strongly accelerated the RES policy process as part 
of the climate and energy package. However, financial and economic crisis as another 
important contextual factor could slow down or even stop the policy process at the issue 
expansion stage. This suggests that the political priority assigned to the proposal was 
too high, and the institutional process too advanced for potentially countervailing 
contextual factors to have effect. It could be argued therefore that the influence of 
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contextual factors on the EU agenda-setting process depends on the policy stage of an 
issue career.  
 
Throughout the policy process, high-level politics provided an important institutional 
venue with ramifications for policy outputs. The Spring Council 2007 provided crucial 
legitimisation for the Commission’s policy objective of binding RES targets during the 
drafting process. After the publication of the RES directive proposal, the discussions 
remained at a high political level. The proposal was regularly discussed at COREPER 
level, particularly during the final stages of issue expansion and the Council’s Working 
Party lost significance. As a result there was restricted access to the negotiation that was 
reinforced by the trialogue under first reading procedure. This helped to secure political 
agreement by the end of 2008. 
 
The timing of the Council Presidencies and their agenda shaping powers (Tallberg, 
2003) were an important factor in influencing the dynamics of this process by agenda 
exclusion (targets) and agenda-setting (alternative proposal). The latter was strongly 
facilitated by entrepreneurial preparatory activities by key Member States in the 
Council. Although national positions played an important role the analysis points to the 
importance of how these national positions were channelled through to the decision-
making process at the EU level in order to influence agenda-setting and thus policy 
outputs. 
 
High-ranking Commission officials failed with their proposal to introduce an EU-wide 
GO trading mechanism. This could be explained by conflict expansion strategies among 
opponents to this mechanism, and by the lack of strong outside allies in support of this 
mechanism. The analysis illustrates the importance of distinguishing between different 
positions and policy entrepreneurs within the Commission. It has been shown that 
differences on GO trading within the Commission were not only apparent between 
different DGs (Nilsson, Nilsson et al., 2008), but also between Piebalgs’ cabinet and 
DG TREN officials. Piebalgs’ cabinet had a different view from officials in the leading 
unit D1, whose position was backed by powerful policy entrepreneurs including 
Germany, Spain, MEPs and the RES industry lobby.  
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Despite the strong opposition towards the Commission’s proposal on GO trading and 
the successful alternative proposal put forward by the Council, the Commission was 
able to maintain an influential role as policy broker during issue expansion. This was 
because the Commission was prepared to retreat quickly from its initial proposal after it 
became clear that there was no majority in the Council. It strategically adapted its 
position away from a harmonised trading scheme in order to ensure agreement on the 
Commission’s major objective: binding national RES targets. Although a binding 
overall RES target had already been politically agreed at the Spring Council 2007, it 
would have been very unlikely that the RES directive proposal, which was to translate 
these overall target into a legal instrument and mandatory national overall targets, 
would have been accepted by a majority of Member States if the GO trading mechanism 
as put forward by the Commission had been maintained. 
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7 Comparative analysis of two policy processes: the nuclear package 
and the RES directive 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw comparative conclusions from the two case 
studies analysed in the previous two chapters on the basis of the theoretical framework 
developed in Chapter  3. The chapter intends to bring together the main results from the 
previous empirical chapters, identifying more generalisable conclusions by assessing 
the explanatory value of the variables used in the empirical analysis. Whilst the context-
dependent knowledge generated in both case studies is an important contribution to the 
literature (see  4.4), this chapter aims to go one step further by assessing how the results 
from both case studies can serve for analytical generalisation in view of the propositions 
identified in Section  3.3.  
 
The comparative analysis is structured along the key concepts of the theoretical 
framework: low politics and high politics as EU agenda-setting routes, contextual 
factors, policy entrepreneurs, issue definition, and institutional venues. The sub-research 
questions summarised in Table 2 (see  4.5) served as a guideline for this chapter. 
7.2 EU agenda-setting routes: low politics and high politics 
Princen and Rhinard (2006) distinguish between high and low politics as two agenda-
setting routes in EU policy-making. ‘High politics’ is more political (e.g. issue initiation 
by the European Council) compared with ‘low politics’, which is more technocratic 
(e.g. issue initiation by officials or expert communities). Both routes are assumed to 
follow the four stages of an issue career: initiation, specification, expansion, and 
entrance. Depending on how the issue is initiated, they distinguish different 
characteristics for each stage in the issue career.  
 
Drawing upon this framework, in the high politics route political leaders initiate an 
issue due to a politically salient event, and they seek a political consensus in the 
European Council. At the issue expansion stage the consensus is then ‘expanded’ 
towards lower levels of decision-making in the EU where the political momentum 
reached at high politics helps the issue to enter the formal agenda. By contrast, a low 
politics agenda-setting route is usually initiated out of professional concerns or interests 
by officials, expert communities or other stakeholder groups. Proposals are then further 
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elaborated and ‘expanded’ towards higher political levels to achieve entrance to the 
formal agenda (see Table 1 in Section  3.3.1). As was argued in Section  4.3 both case 
studies illustrate these two contrasting agenda-setting routes. 
 
The nuclear package was put on the agenda mainly through low politics processes. 
Despite high-level backing by the responsible Commissioner and Director-General, 
there were no preparatory high-level political discussions with Member States or MEPs 
to reach a political consensus as a basis for issue specification. It was specified at the 
technical level by Commission officials without the involvement of relevant expert, 
advisory or other stakeholder groups. Member States were taken by surprise when the 
nuclear package was published, which ultimately reinforced opposition against the 
proposed radical policy change. Issue expansion was characterised by a Council-led 
consultation process providing WENRA with access to the discussion process. The 
issue was kept predominantly at the technical level and thus at the level of low politics. 
However, at the same time the nuclear package began to follow a more inclusive 
approach to agenda-setting. The consultation process opened up the policy process to 
new actors such as national regulators organised within WENRA. This helped create 
input legitimacy (see  3.3.3) and build political impetus. The Commission’s follow-up 
strategy continued this approach by formally involving outside actors within the newly 
established HLG and ENEF as high-level institutional venues (see more detailed 
discussion below). Therefore a gradual build-up of “impetus” (Princen and Rhinard, 
2006) to expand this low politics agenda-setting process towards high politics could be 
observed. 
 
In contrast to the nuclear package, the RES policy process was predominantly a high 
politics agenda-setting route which could build on “political momentum” (Princen and 
Rhinard, 2006) benefiting from significant change in the policy context (see below). At 
the stage of policy initiation political leaders had already strongly supported the 
Commission’s initiative for an overall binding RES target at the 2007 Spring Council. 
On this basis, the Commission could elaborate a political agreement into a concrete 
policy proposal. Issue specification was characterised by political discussions on RES 
targets. However, the proposal of a GO trading mechanism was put forward by 
Commission officials without substantial prior political or technical discussions and was 
eventually rejected during issue expansion. During issue expansion the discussion 
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remained at the level of high politics as reflected in the attention paid to this process by 
the European Council and COREPER. After the 2007 Spring Council and its support for 
a binding 20% EU RES target, the RES policy process was under continuous high-level 
attention among and within all EU institutions. The agenda-setting route of both case 
studies is summarised in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Stages of two agenda-setting processes: high vs. low politics 
 
 Nuclear package RES target and GO trading 
Issue initiation Commission internal initiation 
process 
Political leaders supported policy 
initiation by the Commission 
Issue specification No political or technical discussions 
in expert groups and working parties 
Political discussions on national RES 
targets but not on GO trading 
Issue expansion Council-led consultation process at 
the technical level providing access 
to WENRA  
Discussion remained on the agenda 
of high politics (European Council, 
COREPER) 
Issue entrance No gradual built-up of impetus Strong political momentum  
 
 
The case studies therefore broadly confirm Princen and Rhinard’s (2006) proposition 
that high politics initiation can create the necessary political momentum for successful 
agenda-setting, whereas initiation at the level of low politics can easily get stuck in the 
agenda-setting process if impetus is not gradually built up. The high-level political 
interest in the RES policy process created political momentum that had important 
ramifications for the decision-making process. The explicit and reaffirmed political 
ambition at the level of high politics created pressure that geared all actors towards 
finding political agreement, making substantial opposition nearly impossible after initial 
opposition in the Council of Ministers was overruled at the highest political level. By 
contrast, in the case of the nuclear package, the Council-led consultation processes 
resulted in a lengthy discussion process that took several years, preventing any formal 
decision and thus constituting a phase of non-decision.  
 
This confirms that “in the expansion stage, the complexity of EU institutional structures 
will offer opportunities for actors to steer proposals into certain venues, and to call upon 
sympathetic expert communities to build support” (Princen and Rhinard, 2006: 1123). 
This support can accelerate decision- or non-decision-making. The eventual expansion 
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of the nuclear safety issue to the high politics realm reaffirms the dynamic interaction 
and intersection of low and high politics which will be elaborated below.  
 
The nuclear package as a case study of agenda dynamics at the level of low politics, 
demonstrates that expert communities should not be considered as neutral actors in the 
policy process. Instead they acted as stakeholders and pursued their own objectives and 
interests. In the analysed process national nuclear regulators constituted the core of the 
expert community due to their expertise and knowledge. At the same time they had a 
strong interest in preventing a shift of institutional responsibilities from the national to 
the EU level, which would have limited their own influence.  
 
The EU agenda-setting framework put forward by Princen and Rhinard can explain key 
dynamics in both case studies. However, the empirical analysis confirmed that 
additional explanatory variables are necessary to fully explain the agenda-setting 
process in both case studies. Based on the agenda-setting and EU studies literature, four 
such variables were identified: contextual factors, policy entrepreneurs, issue definition, 
and institutional venues (see  3.3). The explanatory value of these variables is discussed 
in more detail in the subsequent sections. 
7.3 Contextual factors: policy windows 
Contextual factors can contribute to opening up policy windows that can be used by 
policy entrepreneurs to push their pet proposals ( 3.3.2). Policy windows are most likely 
to open up in the problems-stream (e.g. focusing events, new indicators/statistics) or 
politics-stream (e.g. public opinion) (Kingdon, 1995 [1984]). Earlier studies on EU 
energy policy showed that focusing events were particularly important in advancing 
European energy policy (Matláry, 1997). Furthermore focusing events can affect the 
level of politics at which energy policy in EU policy-making is dealt with: “As long as 
gas and oil flow and there are no nuclear accidents, energy issues remain largely a 
matter of ‘low politics’” (Matláry, 1996: 258). 
 
Although, in both agenda-setting processes analysed, contextual factors had a clear 
impact on policy initiation, the nuclear package could not build on a focusing event 
(problem-stream) or public opinion (politics-stream). EU enlargement – as the main 
contextual factor to justify the publication of the nuclear package – was more of a long-
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term contextual change than a focusing event that could have underlined the need for 
urgent policy action in this field. The Commission’s argument, that agreement on the 
nuclear package needed to be reached by the EU enlargement in May 2004, was not 
compelling enough to serve as a focusing event. In addition, the Commission’s 
reference to public opinion (politics-stream) in support of its proposals was not 
convincing. The Commission used public scepticism towards nuclear energy, mainly 
related to nuclear safety and radioactive waste management, to underline the need for 
the nuclear package. It was argued by Commission officials that changes in institutional 
structure, i.e. the expansion of Community jurisdiction, could contribute to a more 
favourable public opinion in order to keep the nuclear option open within the EU. 
However, the subsequent ‘revival’ of nuclear energy in the EU energy policy debate 
was less related to EU-level changes, but more to changes in the wider political context 
at the national level.  
 
In the case of the binding RES target a change in the political context helped policy 
initiation. This change in the political landscape was led by the UK where energy 
security and climate change were on top of the national policy agenda as expressed in 
the initiation of a new energy review and of the Stern review. These developments at the 
national level affected the EU energy policy agenda through the UK’s Council 
Presidency (see  7.4). This was reinforced by the Russia-Ukraine energy crisis at the 
beginning of 2006, which attracted high politics attention at the EU level. This was 
followed by the publication of the Stern review in autumn 2006 and an IPCC report at 
the beginning of 2007. In parallel Al Gore’s film “An Inconvenient Truth” contributed 
to a strong public and political awareness of climate and energy issues.  
 
The Commission’s climate and energy package could fully exploit these contextual 
factors as a policy window. As part of the climate and energy package, the RES policy 
processes could benefit from these changes at the very beginning of the agenda-setting 
process. Commission officials – supported by the incoming German Council Presidency 
– decided to go beyond an additional RES-H directive as announced earlier and to aim 
for a binding 20% EU RES target. Although it was too late for the nuclear package to 
fully benefit from these changes, the new policy dynamics at EU level also helped to 
keep key elements of the nuclear package on the EU agenda. The 2007 Spring Council 
conclusions supported the establishment of a High Level Group on Nuclear Safety and 
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Waste Management building on the earlier consultation process. Moreover in November 
2008 a new proposal on nuclear safety was published. 
 
It was therefore focusing events, new scientific evidence, and strong public awareness 
that significantly influenced agenda-setting dynamics. Public opinion was an important 
factor that influenced the Commission’s decision to propose an ambitious climate and 
energy package and the 2007 Spring Council’s decision to support binding RES targets. 
These results confirm recent contributions to EU studies that agree on the increasing 
politicisation of European integration since the early 1990s and the role of public 
opinion in European integration (Börzel and Risse, 2009; Hooghe and Marks, 2009; 
Schmitter, 2009).  
 
The political momentum achieved at the level of high politics in the RES policy process 
from the 2007 Spring Council onwards, supported by strong public opinion, led to an 
institutional momentum at EU level in that all EU institutions were working to achieve 
political agreement by the end of 2008. This momentum helped reduce the detrimental 
effect of other contextual factors, namely the financial and economic crisis that reached 
a low point in autumn 200899. While economic downturn blocked progress in past EU 
policy processes (Mazey, 1998; Wendon, 1998), the climate and energy package was 
institutionally too advanced to be halted by the financial and economic crisis that 
dominated the political agenda from the second half of 2008 onwards.  
7.4 The role of policy entrepreneurs 
Policy entrepreneurs aim for policy change or stability in line with their “pet proposal” 
(Kingdon, 1995 [1984]). In order to achieve this, policy entrepreneurs need to build 
coalitions around certain problem definitions and develop appropriate policy solutions 
(see  3.3.3). In the absence of strong or well-prepared policy entrepreneurs to seize a 
policy window, policy change is unlikely to materialise (Pralle, 2006). A formal 
monopoly on the EU agenda by the Commission (Majone, 2006) would suggest that the 
Commission is the primary target of policy entrepreneurs seeking to push for their 
policy objectives. By contrast, the lack of a monopoly on informal EU agenda-setting 
(Pollack, 2003), and the multiple access points in EU policy-making (Peters, 2001), 
                                                 
99 The investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on 15 September 
2008. 
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suggests that the Commission also needs to be considered as a policy entrepreneur in 
order to achieve its policy objectives.  
 
Both case studies strongly confirm that all EU institutions and other interested parties 
need to act as policy entrepreneurs to achieve their policy objectives. Moreover both 
case studies confirm that the stage of the issue career affects policy entrepreneurs’ 
influence on EU agenda-setting. Each policy entrepreneur’s role is discussed in this 
section.  
 
Some authors have argued that the Commission’s influence is focused upon the early 
stages of the issue career (Eising, 2002; Nugent, 2006), i.e. policy initiation and issue 
specification, due to its limited control over the later stages. Previous studies have 
identified various conditions for the Commission to act as a successful agenda-setter: 
the build-up of “winning coalitions” (Nugent, 2006), consensus-building (Pallis, 2006), 
strong majorities (Princen and Rhinard, 2006), broad consultation with stakeholders 
(Hennessy, 2007a), and selling its proposal (Wendon, 1998). Both case studies tend to 
confirm the proposition that Commission officials themselves need to act as policy 
entrepreneurs “by identifying policy problems, proposing and selling policy proposals 
and brokering compromises” (Wendon, 1998: 344).  
 
In the case of the binding RES target (an example of successful Commission agenda-
setting), key Commission officials engaged in political discussions with Member States 
in order to sell their proposal of a binding RES target and to build winning majorities – 
except for the proposal for a GO trading scheme. This process was backed by high 
politics dynamics after the 2007 Spring Council. By contrast, in the case of failed 
Commission agenda-setting there was little attempt to build a coalition with key 
participants or to consult stakeholders in advance. Existing Commission advisory 
groups were excluded from the drafting process and controversial issues such as the 
timetable for national radioactive waste management programmes were kept on the 
agenda and the Commission was not prepared to split the package into its key 
components to reach agreement on certain elements of the proposal.  
 
Both case studies confirm that the early stages of an issue career are the key stages for 
Commission agenda-setting to build majorities and legitimacy for new proposals. 
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However, the later stages of the nuclear package with the establishment of the HLG and 
ENEF as well as the publication of a revised proposal for a nuclear safety directive 
indicate that the Commission can have important influence at the later stages of an issue 
career by establishing and using suitable institutional venues. This will be discussed in 
more detail below. 
 
In particular, the Euratom-based nuclear package underlines that the Commission needs 
to act as a policy entrepreneur, not only in policy areas where the Commission is in a 
legally weak position as demonstrated in the case of social policy (Wendon, 1998), but 
also in areas where the Commission enjoys a legally strong position. Despite the 
Commission’s institutional strength under the Euratom Treaty, Commission officials 
could not impose their proposals. Instead they had to accept that majorities need to be 
built in order to reach political agreement. 
 
The agenda-shaping powers of the Council Presidency (Tallberg, 2003) were strongly 
visible in both policy processes. Tallberg distinguishes between three mechanisms of 
agenda-shaping of the Council Presidency: agenda-structuring influences the attention 
on a given issue already on the agenda by determining the frequency of meetings within 
a policy area, by arranging informal meetings or by the structure of actual meeting 
agendas; agenda-exclusion influences the agenda by not dealing with a topic, by 
removing it from the decision agenda or by tabling unacceptable compromise proposals; 
and agenda-setting has an impact on the agenda by raising awareness to new policy 
problems, by developing concrete proposals for action or by developing new 
institutional practices.  
 
Each of these mechanisms is manifest in the case studies. In the case of the nuclear 
package the agenda was significantly (re-)structured by the WPNS consultation process 
and the subsequent HLG and ENEF consultation process, while the revised nuclear 
package tabled by the Commission in September 2004 was excluded from the Council’s 
decision-agenda. The French Council Presidency influenced agenda-setting by 
encouraging the Commission to put forward a new proposal on nuclear safety, which 
was published in November 2008. The agenda of the RES policy process was structured 
by the French Presidency by frequent meetings and an ambitious deadline for political 
agreement, while the German Presidency strongly supported agenda-setting by its 
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commitment to push through ambitious climate and RES targets. Agenda exclusion was 
used to prevent discussion on RES targets during issue expansion.  
 
The comparative analysis suggests that Council Presidencies’ leverage for agenda-
shaping can be strongly supported by entrepreneurial Member States in the Council, by 
building coalitions, and proposing alternative policy solutions. In both policy processes 
key Member States built ad hoc coalitions and presented alternative proposals in the 
form of non-papers. These non-papers were then used by the Council Presidencies as 
the basis for new compromise proposals that significantly influenced the agenda-setting 
and decision-making process. 
 
The EP proved to be an important agenda-setter in both case studies. Before the 
publication of the nuclear package it put the issue of decommissioning funds on the 
formal agenda, and in the RES policy process it requested legislative action from the 
Commission. The EP can influence the agenda-setting as a policy entrepreneur by 
interlocking its own agenda with that of the Commission, and by building informal 
contacts between Commission officials and the rapporteur (Jones and Clark, 1999). The 
scope for such interlocking depends, however, on the willingness of both actors and 
might be influenced by party politics. Commission officials did not actively seek the 
support from the EP for the nuclear package, and the EP’s report on the nuclear “Safety 
Directive Proposal” was interlocking with the opposing Member States’ agenda rather 
than the Commission officials’ agenda.  
 
By contrast, on the RES directive Commission officials and the rapporteur Turmes were 
in close contact throughout the process and shared the objective of binding RES targets 
and the continuation of national support schemes. As opposed to the RES policy process 
in the late 1990s, where the Council and the Commission were the key players (Lauber, 
2005), the EP was a dominant actor in the analysed RES policy process due to its full 
involvement under co-decision, Turmes’ expertise and negotiation skills, a strong ITRE 
committee majority, and its veto position under the first reading procedure. The latter 
was reinforced by the fact that a second reading procedure under the Czech Council 
Presidency in the first half of 2009 would have made an agreement before the EP 
elections in May 2009 very unlikely. 
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Interest groups constitute a key group of policy entrepreneurs in EU policy-making as 
they can legitimise Commission proposals (Greenwood, 2007). Factors that influence 
their success include control of key information, adequate resources as well as their 
economic and political weight (Nugent, 2006: 313ff). Foratom and Eurelectric 
represented powerful lobbying groups in terms of their resources and their economic 
importance. However, Foratom and Eurelectric did not take a clear position in support 
of the nuclear package and the GO trading mechanism respectively. Neither group could 
put forward a strong unanimous position because of diverging views among its 
members. Commission officials could therefore not count on their support as some of 
them might have expected and hoped for. By contrast, the RES industry proved to be a 
key player in the RES policy process also due to its increasing economic weight. This 
was important support for Commission officials who were in favour of binding RES 
targets and against GO trading mechanisms.  
 
The main agenda-setting mechanisms observed in both case studies in relation to policy 
entrepreneurs are summarised in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Comparing policy entrepreneurs’ influence on agenda-setting 
 
 Nuclear package RES target and GO trading 
Commission No attempt to build winning coalitions 
or to sell proposals to Member States; 
Controversial issues kept on the 
agenda; 
Exclusion of existing advisory 
committees and working groups; 
Policy learning and gradual opening-up 
Winning coalition around binding 
RES target and selling national RES 
targets, but not on GO trading 
Council / Member 
States 
Non-papers as alternative proposals by 
blocking minority 
Non-paper as alternative proposal to 
GO trading 
Council Presidency Agenda exclusion (revised nuclear 
package), agenda-structuring 
(consultation process) and agenda-
setting (new proposal on nuclear 
safety) 
Agenda exclusion (discussion of RES 
targets), agenda-structuring 
(acceleration of decision-making 
process) and agenda-setting 
(alternative to GO trading) 
EP No interlocking with the Commission’s 
agenda but with blocking minority in 
the Council 
Strong supporter of ambitious RES 
policies; 
Strong opposition to GO trading as 
part of a coalition  
Interest groups No clear support for Commission’s 
proposal 
Strong support for RES targets by 
RES industry; 
No clear support for GO trading 
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Although not a policy entrepreneur itself, the ECJ can perform an important role in EU 
agenda-setting (Tömmel, 2008b). In the case of the nuclear package the ECJ ruling was 
an important push for the Commission during policy initiation and issue specification in 
that it helped weaken opponents’ legal arguments against the nuclear package (see 
 5.3.2). This was, however, only a supporting element that could not counter-balance the 
above-mentioned other shortcomings related to the initiation and specification of the 
nuclear package. The RES policy process showed that the ECJ cannot only be in a 
supporting role for the Commission, but also for other policy entrepreneurs such as 
Member States. The ECJ’s ruling in 2001 in support of FiTs strengthened pro-FiT 
positions and weakened the Commission’s arguments on the necessity of a GO trading 
mechanism (see  6.2.4). 
 
Both case studies provide insights into the role of expertise on EU agenda-setting. For 
the Commission, expertise can be an important tool in agenda-setting (Marks and 
Hooghe, 1996). In the highly technical issue of nuclear safety standards and radioactive 
waste management, the Commission did not have strong in-house expertise at its 
disposal. This is why the Commission had established expert groups for advice on these 
issues. However, instead of using their expertise during the nuclear package drafting 
process, these expert groups were sidelined and eventually discontinued. This 
contributed to weakly designed policy proposals providing opponents with multiple 
reasons to withhold their support. However, the RES policy process shows that 
Commission officials’ strong expertise on market-based policy instruments (see  6.4) 
was not sufficient for pushing the proposed GO trading mechanism through the EU 
policy-making process. The involvement of experts and other stakeholders is therefore 
not only important in order to gain access to information and expertise but also to build 
legitimacy for new policy proposal at an early stage. 
 
The empirical analysis in this thesis suggests that expertise in EU agenda-setting is most 
important for those actors without a formal role in the agenda-setting process. External 
expertise can be an important source of information for the Commission services during 
legislative drafting. Stakeholders can gain access to the decision-making process 
through their knowledge, and influence the early stages of the agenda-setting process. 
This can provide output legitimacy and input legitimacy as long as equal access granted 
to different stakeholders and interests.  
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Stakeholders’ influence is not restricted to the drafting process but can also affect the 
later stages of the agenda-setting process. As the case of the nuclear package showed, 
national nuclear safety authorities, informally organised within WENRA, could 
influence the policy process after the nuclear package was published on the basis of 
their expertise, reinforced by their political weight in national policy-making.  
7.5 Issue definition and framing 
Issue definition predetermines possible solutions to the problem and influences the 
access of actors to the decision arena (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Frames go one 
step further in that they include problem definition, a solution to the problem, rules 
about who should be involved, and a justification for action at the EU level (Princen, 
2007). Framing can serve different purposes, including consensus building or restricting 
interest groups’ access to the policy-making process (Nylander, 2001). It has been 
argued that frames in EU policy-making can be influenced by institutional settings 
including organisational, procedural, and normative structures (Lenschow and Zito, 
1998) (see  3.3.4). 
 
In the two case studies analysed, institutional structures influenced the framing of the 
proposals, and thus not only the solution to the problem but also actors’ access to 
decision-making. In order to be able to propose the nuclear package under the Euratom 
Treaty’s consultation procedure, with a limited role for the EP, Commission officials 
chose nuclear safety as the package’s primary policy objective. While the inclusion of 
provisions for decommissioning funds, as required by the EP, helped prevent a separate 
co-decision procedure under the EC Treaty and thus restricted actors’ access, it 
increased opposition among Member States and interest groups. Although the broad 
problem definition might have helped to put the issue on the agenda, it did not facilitate 
the adoption of the intended policy (Dery, 2000). The Commission’s approach was 
based on various issue definitions and raised doubts about the actual objective of the 
proposals and how they would address the identified problems. 
 
In the case of the RES directive the normative power of the internal market as “master 
frame” (Nylander, 2001) was apparent in the proposition of the GO trading mechanism. 
Trading mechanisms were strongly supported by DG ENV which preferred a market-
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based mechanism that would be compatible with or build on the EU ETS system. 
However, the justification for a Community-wide RES trading scheme to provide 
flexibility to Member States, and to ensure the implementation of the RES target at 
lowest cost, was subject to strong opposition among Member States and within the EP. 
Based on the economic success of the RES industry, opposing Member States and 
MEPs could refer to competing frames such as the effectiveness of national support 
schemes. Opponents reframed the envisaged EU-wide harmonisation from being an 
efficient policy instrument to an instrument that was ineffective and expensive. It would 
also prevent Member States from deciding on their national support schemes and thus 
lead to a competence shift to the Community level. In both cases opponents to the 
Commission’s proposals framed the debate in relation to the intended competence shift 
from the national to the Community level. 
 
Commission officials as “frame entrepreneurs” (Nylander, 2001: 293) can put forward 
different frames even if they belong to the same DG or unit. The concentration of 
nuclear competences within DG TREN before the drafting of the nuclear package 
prevented major frame contestation within the Commission that had occurred in the past 
between DG TREN and DG ENV on nuclear issues. The RES policy process revealed 
contrasting frames between DG TREN and DG ENV, and between energy 
Commissioner Piebalgs’ cabinet and the responsible unit in DG TREN, in relation to the 
assessment criteria and objectives of RES support schemes.  
 
New entrants to the policy arena can contribute to issue redefinition and thus support 
policy change (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). In both policy processes there were no 
new entrants that would have supported the Commission’s issue redefinition to support 
the intended policy change. In the case of the nuclear package new Member States were 
new actors who had formal access to the decision-making process after the EU 
enlargement in May 2004. New Member States were opposed to the Commission’s 
reference to EU enlargement as a rationale for new nuclear safety regulations, and 
aligned with opposing Member States when COREPER adopted a common position in 
June 2004. In the RES policy process there were no ‘real’ new entrants, but the RES 
industry became an increasingly powerful player due to its economic success. 
Moreover, some incumbent players, such as traditional utility companies, increasingly 
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benefited from national FiT support mechanisms. They were therefore not in favour of 
the Commission’s changes to existing support systems but opposed them.  
 
The observed agenda-setting mechanisms in relation to issue definition and framing are 
summarised in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Issue definition and observed agenda-setting mechanisms  
 
 Nuclear package RES target and GO trading 
Institutionalisation of 
frames 
Nuclear safety as key objective on 
the basis of Euratom 
Different frame entrepreneurs within 
the Commission 
Predetermination of 
solutions 
Lack of binding safety principles as 
issue definition  
Internal market as “master frame” for 
GO trading 
Influence on actors’ 
access 
Euratom directive put EP in a 
consultative role 
Strong involvement of EP and 
‘normal’ access for interest groups 
New entrants to 
redefine issues 
New Member States questioned EU 
enlargement as justification for 
nuclear package 
Emerging RES industry underlined 
the importance of the effectiveness of 
RES support schemes 
 
7.6 Institutional venues: actors’ access and issue definition 
Framing can result in ‘venue shopping’ (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) by influencing 
the strategic choice of institutional procedures and venues. As argued above, the 
Commission’s decision to base the nuclear package on the Euratom Treaty (including 
provisions on decommissioning funds) can be interpreted as a venue shopping strategy. 
While the EP as a pro-integrationist EU institution (Tsebelis, 1994) might, in general, 
be helpful for the Commission if a proposal seeks expansion of its jurisdiction, the 
rather explicit pro-nuclear stance of the nuclear package was sceptically received by the 
majority of MEPs at the time.  
 
Commission officials, however, drew lessons from the failed venue shopping approach 
for the nuclear package. The Commission’s approach during issue expansion can be 
interpreted as an example of a strategy taken by “political entrepreneurs” (Broscheid 
and Coen, 2003). Commission officials used process legislation (Cram, 1993) to 
establish alternative institutional venues, and thus used the EU institutional structures’ 
opportunities to steer issues in venues sympathetic to their policy objectives (Princen 
and Rhinard, 2006).  
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The establishment of HLG and ENEF as institutional venues can be interpreted as an 
attempt to address factors that contributed to the failed agenda-setting in the case of the 
nuclear package: consultation with (favourable) stakeholders, pre-testing problem 
definition and building legitimacy. Moreover, Commission officials sought to integrate 
the venues established and successfully used by other policy entrepreneurs, notably 
WENRA and its parallel harmonisation process.  
 
The policy process on the nuclear package therefore confirms that institutional fora in a 
technical policy process with low political salience can generate high-quality 
information and thus improve the basis for policy making (Broscheid and Coen, 2003). 
The consultation process initiated at the end of 2004 and WENRA’s work contributed to 
a better level of information that could be used for follow-up processes from 2007 
onwards. 
 
Advisory committees and working groups as institutional venues can provide new 
proposals with access to independent information and legitimacy (Hooghe and Marks, 
2001). Both of these functions were fulfilled by the Council’s consultation process and 
the inclusion of WENRA. The Council’s WPNS consultation process put WENRA and 
thus national regulators in a central role, which predominantly reinforced sceptical 
views on the Commission’s nuclear package. Although WENRA, as an expert group, 
did not have the political authority to take decisions, its technical authority (Gehring, 
Kerler et al., 2008) made it difficult for political actors such as the Commission to 
ignore, or to seriously question, their conclusion.  
 
The change in venue can therefore be less explained by a change in the policy image 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) than by the expertise of national regulators and their 
position in national policy-making. By co-opting this parallel process Commission 
officials tried to increase its leverage on (re-)setting the agenda. This process supports 
previous studies that argued that EU institutions can use formal arenas to select certain 
interest groups that are “most in-line with [their] agenda” (Mahoney, 2004: 462). 
 
Apart from technical and political discussions in advisory committees or working 
groups the European Council as an institutional venue can legitimise the Commission’s 
policy preferences (Nugent, 2006). Princen and Rhinard (2006) argue that such 
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legitimisation from high politics can help to overcome administrative barriers. 
Interviewees involved in the RES policy process asserted that political agreement by the 
heads of state and government at the 2007 Spring Council was a key factor in disarming 
opposition to binding RES targets during issue specification. The agreement at 
Hampton Court to work towards an energy policy for Europe, confirmed by the 2006 
Spring Council, was already an important initial driver in this process. 
 
This legitimacy provided by the European Council was absent in the case of the nuclear 
package. For the latter, the Commission tried to use the Laeken summit conclusions to 
legitimise the nuclear package, but some Member States clearly stated that they regard 
nuclear safety as a national rather than a Community competence. There was thus no 
consensual agreement on how to proceed on nuclear safety, despite its recognition as a 
key Community policy objective. Yet, while this first attempt in the nuclear policy 
process to legitimise a policy proposal by reference to the European Council failed, the 
European Council’s agreement at the spring summit 2007 to establish HLG and ENEF 
constituted important political support for the follow-up process.  
 
The increasing tendency of the European Council to set long-term strategic goals can be 
interpreted as qualifying the Commission’s formal right of initiative, and as putting the 
Commission in “a more bureaucratic role of fulfilling the Member States’ agenda” 
(Rasmussen, 2007: 250). However, neither of the case studies confirms that European 
Council involvement restricts the Commission’s leverage on the agenda. Instead it 
could be argued that the European Council helped achieve the Commission’s policy 
objectives by overcoming administrative barriers. The European Council’s support of 
binding RES targets against the earlier opposition of two Councils of Ministers (energy 
and environment), and its increasing involvement at the later stages of the nuclear 
package, does not appear to support the idea that the Commission is increasingly 
fulfilling Member States’ agenda. On the contrary, the political support by the European 
Council helped secure political agreement against the initial opposition of some national 
administrations. When political leaders agreed to the binding RES target, national 
officials had to accept this agreement and had to work towards it. 
 
In the RES policy process with high political salience, the key role of COREPER and 
the “unofficial” trialogue meetings helped to restrict actor access. The Council 
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Presidency, the EP rapporteur, and Commission representatives were key actors and 
could focus on the remaining key issues to ensure political agreement by the end of 
2008. This points to the opportunities of the Council’s vertical differentiation to 
overcome conflicts (Eising, 2002). COREPER as the key institutional venue at the final 
stages of the negotiations on the RES directive helped to find political compromises. 
This strategy failed in the case of the nuclear package, where there was no clear 
commitment from all Member States to find political agreement by a fixed deadline. 
Although COREPER always plays a key role in politically salient issues, and trialogues 
are used more regularly in EU policy-making to reach first reading agreement (see 
 6.5.4), the speed and the public interest can be considered as rather unique in the 
analysed RES policy process. 
 
Before the limitation of the policy process to key institutional fora and actors, conflicts 
were expanded by policy entrepreneurs to other institutional venues in both cases. 
Conflicts were expanded in order to include new or additional institutional venues and 
thereby changing actors’ access (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). The discussions on the 
nuclear package between the Council and the Commission were transferred to new 
consultation processes. This reframed the debate away from the EU enlargement context 
to the added value of new Community legislation in this area. As a consequence the 
agenda was substantially restructured as incorporated in HLG and ENEF, which led 
eventually to a new policy proposal on nuclear safety that was significantly different 
from the Commission’s initial proposal. This process indicates considerable policy 
learning within the Commission on how to use procedural legislation for its own policy 
objective in a legally strong position on the basis of Euratom Treaty. This learning 
process was supported or enabled by administrative changes between 2004 and 2006, 
including the replacement of the DG TREN’s Commissioner, Director-General, and the 
Head of Unit responsible for the dossier. 
 
With respect to Princen and Rhinard’s two expectations (see  3.3.1), this thesis supports 
the claim that institutional structures strongly influence the framing of new proposals 
due to multiple EU venues. This was strongly asserted in the case of the nuclear 
package. Moreover framing processes in the RES policy processes point to the 
importance of normative structures, namely the role of internal market and cost 
efficiency frames. Princen and Rhinard’s second expectation was that, during the 
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expansion stage, EU institutional structures enable venue shopping. Again the nuclear 
package process strongly supports this expectation as illustrated by the WPNS 
consultation processes and HLG and ENEF as follow-up venues. 
 
The observed agenda-setting mechanisms in relation to institutional venues are 
summarised in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Institutional venues and observed main agenda-setting mechanisms  
 
 Nuclear package RES target and GO trading 
Venue shopping NP based on Euratom; 
Consultation processes 
European Council 
Legitimisation No legitimisation from the European 
Council or other institutional venues 
Strong legitimisation by Spring 
Council 2007  
Process legislation Establishment of HLG and ENEF  
Restriction of access 
under high political 
salience  
 Trialogue strongly reduced actors’ 
access 
Delivery of high 
quality information 
under low political 
salience 
Council consultation process and 
HLG 
 
Technical authority of 
institutional venues 
WENRA  
 
7.7 Chapter conclusions 
The results of the comparative analysis in this chapter can be summarised in several 
generalisable conclusions. The results reiterate the dynamics of low politics and high 
politics agenda-setting. Low politics agenda-setting was characterised by venue 
shopping strategies by policy entrepreneurs, whereas the high politics process showed a 
high level of political momentum that helped to overcome administrative inertia. The 
comparison suggests that contextual factors were particularly important for high politics 
dynamics. Political salience, backed by public opinion, helped high politics policy 
initiation. The political momentum could eventually be translated into institutional 
momentum that prevented the process from being stopped by concurrent salient issues 
such as the financial and economic crisis. 
 
Despite its role as formal legislative agenda-setter, the comparative analysis points to 
the importance of Commission officials’ policy entrepreneurship to gather majorities 
  
193
and legitimacy. This is not only the case when the Commission is in a weak legal 
position, but applies equally to policy processes where the Commission enjoys a 
particularly strong position as under Euratom. The agenda-shaping powers of the 
Council Presidency were strongly visible in both policy processes including all three 
dimensions: agenda-structuring, agenda-exclusion and agenda-setting. The EP’s 
influence on the agenda was most pertinent under the co-decision procedure due to its 
veto position in the first reading negotiations. Moreover, it was shown that expertise can 
be an important means for actors without a formal role in the agenda-setting process to 
influence agenda dynamics. Dominant frames were institutionalised in both case studies 
and predetermined the proposed policy solutions. At the same time it was shown that 
the influence of a certain policy solution on the access of certain policy entrepreneurs to 
the decision-making process can affect the choice of a policy solution. Venue shopping 
approaches enabled the marginalising of actors and their policy objectives.  
  
194
8 Conclusions 
This final chapter draws together the main empirical and theoretical findings of the 
thesis. After answering the research questions and summarising the contribution of the 
thesis to knowledge, limitations and possible directions for future research are outlined. 
The thesis closes with some tentative policy implications. 
8.1 Answering the research questions 
Two key research questions were addressed in this thesis as outlined in Section  3.4.3. 
The first research question was formulated as follows: 
 
• How did agenda-setting routes (low politics vs. high politics) affect policy 
change and stability in EU energy policy-making? 
 
The analysed policy processes on the nuclear package and on the RES Directive clearly 
confirmed that agenda-setting routes affect EU energy policy-making. The mutually 
contrasting features of the case studies revealed mechanisms by which agenda-setting 
routes can affect change and stability in EU energy policy-making.  
 
One key difference between the nuclear package and the RES policy process was how 
the legislative proposals were initiated. While the nuclear package was drafted by a few 
Commission officials without the involvement of outside players, the RES Road Map 
enabled the Commission to pre-test a key policy objective, i.e. a binding EU RES target, 
before issue specification. The unexpected political agreement by the European Council 
to a binding 20% EU RES target provided the Commission with strong legitimacy 
during the drafting process. The high politics agenda-setting route created political 
momentum that helped to overcome administrative barriers and national opposition to 
binding RES targets as previously expressed at the ministerial level. The analysis of the 
RES policy process indicates that it was important that high politics remained involved 
in this policy process throughout the issue career. This was illustrated by the 2008 
Spring Council’s commitment to reach political agreement by the end of 2008 and by 
regular discussions at COREPER level. It is, however, important to note that the RES 
policy process clearly benefited from being part of the climate and energy package 
which as a whole attracted attention by high politics. 
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In contrast to this high politics agenda-setting route on binding RES targets, the nuclear 
package and provisions concerning an EU-wide GO trading mechanism as part of the 
RES proposal were initiated at the level of low politics by Commission officials. Both 
Commission initiatives were rejected and blocked in the subsequent decision-making 
process. The analysis does not suggest that low politics are doomed to fail in the EU 
decision-making process, but points more specifically to the lack of legitimacy that 
characterised both low politics processes at the early stages of the agenda-setting 
process. Neither initiative was backed by expert communities, advisory groups or 
interest groups that could have provided the proposals with input legitimacy. There was 
no gradual build-up of impetus that could have supported the intended policy change, 
e.g. by engaging outside actors in policy discussions. 
 
The analysis shows that the distinction between low and high politics agenda-setting 
routes would have been insufficient alone to explain the observed agenda-setting 
dynamics and policy outputs. The later stages of the nuclear package, for instance, could 
not have been sufficiently understood on the basis of this distinction. It was necessary to 
analyse each agenda-setting route in more detail. Agenda dynamics of EU energy 
policy-making needed to be further disentangled in order to identify causal mechanisms. 
This was addressed by the second research question: 
 
• How did contextual factors, policy entrepreneurs, issue definitions and 
institutional venues influence agenda-setting dynamics in EU energy policy-
making? 
 
The answer to this question is structured along the four variables identified in Section 
 3.3: contextual factors, policy entrepreneurs, issue definitions and institutional venues. 
 
Changes in the policy context opened important policy windows that were used by 
policy entrepreneurs to put issues on the agenda. This confirms earlier studies on EU 
energy policy that showed that external factors had a strong influence on EU energy 
policy initiative (see  2.2). EU enlargement brought the issue of nuclear safety to the 
agenda in the early 1990s. In parallel, increasing concerns about global climate change 
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and energy security helped keep the nuclear option open. However, these contextual 
factors were not sufficient to create a strong policy window for new policy initiatives.  
 
While this was due to a variety of factors, an important weakness was the lack of a 
focusing event that could have underlined the urgency for policy action. Such a 
focusing event – the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis in 2005/06 – was an important trigger 
during the initiation of the climate and energy package, and an essential factor from the 
very beginning in the agenda dynamics of the RES policy process and only at the later 
stages of the nuclear package process. This crisis was supported by an increasing 
awareness of dangerous climate change and the need for policy action, as emphasised 
by IPCC reports and Al Gore’s film “An Inconvenient Truth”. Strong public opinion 
was identified by many interviewees as one key factor that made the Commission 
choose climate and energy as its headline topic in 2006/07 after the failure of the 
renewed Lisbon Strategy. 
 
Policy entrepreneurs used a variety of mechanisms to influence the agenda-setting 
process. The empirical analysis underlines the importance of using a broad definition of 
policy entrepreneur in EU agenda-setting that takes account of the influence of different 
actors on the EU agenda. The Commission is an important policy entrepreneur as it does 
not have control over the EU agenda. The Commission’s failure as policy entrepreneur 
was most striking in the nuclear package process where the Commission possessed a 
potentially strong position on the basis of the Euratom Treaty. However, Commission 
officials failed to build a strong enough case for the proposals and did not succeed in 
building a coherent problem definition. Apart from insufficiently addressing the policy 
context, the Commission gave virtually no consideration to whether and how majorities 
could be secured in the Council and the EP. Similarly, there were no majorities 
supporting an EU-wide GO trading mechanism as part of the RES proposal. Both 
‘failures’ indicate the need for strong majorities and the need for the Commission to 
pre-test problem frames at the early stages of the agenda-setting process. 
 
Council Presidencies proved very influential agenda-shapers in both policy processes. 
The strong signal by the incoming German Council Presidency was an important factor 
for the Commission to propose a binding 20% EU RES target and to maintain this 
proposal despite opposition in two Councils of Ministers. A similarly strong agenda-
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shaping power by the Council Presidency was visible when France encouraged the 
Commission to propose a new legislative act on nuclear safety in the second half of 
2008. Moreover, the Council Presidency’s influence on the agenda was illustrated by 
the establishment of the Council-led consultation process on the nuclear package that 
resulted in new policy priorities and non-decision on the nuclear package (see also 
below). France used its Council Presidency in the second half of 2008 to secure political 
agreement on the climate and energy package including the RES Directive. This was 
strongly facilitated by the Council’s structure since COREPER as a political forum 
could reach consensus across different elements of the climate and energy package in 
relatively short time frames. 
 
The EP proved to be an important agenda-setter in both policy processes. In the case of 
the nuclear package it used the parallel discussion on the second liberalisation package 
to call for legislative action on decommissioning funds. This was picked up in the 
nuclear package, although the EP was no longer involved due to the consultative 
procedure under Euratom. The issue was dropped in the subsequent stages of the 
process. Also in the RES policy process MEPs pushed strongly for further legislative 
action and requested that the Commission put forward a proposal on RES-H/C and 
supported ambitious RES targets beyond 2010. The latter strengthened the Commission 
at the early stages of the agenda-setting process against a strong majority of Member 
States opposed to an ambitious binding RES target. The EP was an essential player 
contributing to rapid political agreement on the RES Directive. This was also made 
possible by interlocking the EP’s agenda with that of key Member States. 
 
Interest groups’ influence on the agenda would be expected to be higher at the early 
stages under a low politics agenda-setting route by using expert or advisory groups as 
fora to put forward their objectives. However, in the case of the nuclear package no 
interest group influence could be identified at the early stages of the agenda-setting 
process. Although a few consultation meetings took place, Commission internal 
advisory committees and other stakeholders were excluded from the drafting process. 
The exclusion of expertise contributed not only to policy proposals being weak but also 
questioned the input legitimacy of the nuclear package. By contrast, the RES industry 
strongly contributed to the initiation of a policy discussion on RES targets beyond 2010.  
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Expertise proved to be an important instrument enabling policy entrepreneurs to gain 
access to the decision-making process as exemplified by national safety authorities’ 
access via WENRA to the Council-led consultation process. WENRA’s technical 
authority, backed by national nuclear authorities’ influential position in Member States, 
enabled it to restructure the agenda and to put forward new issue definitions.  
 
Issue definitions and frames played a key role in how policy entrepreneurs influenced 
the agenda in both policy processes. The analysis showed how the institutional 
framework and normative structures affected the framing of policy proposals. The 
institutional dimension of framing was most visible in choosing nuclear safety as the 
key problem that the nuclear package was supposed to address. By including provisions 
on decommissioning funds in this proposal, based on the Commission’s nuclear safety 
competences under Euratom instead of internal market competences under the EC 
Treaty, ensured that the EP was only in a consultative role. Normative structures that 
influence frames could be identified in the RES proposal. The internal market as 
normative ‘master frame’ was used to justify an EU-wide GO trading mechanism, 
although policy experience with national RES support schemes and the success of the 
RES industry seriously undermined this normative frame.  
 
Institutional venues affected agenda dynamics in both case studies by channelling 
actors’ access to decision-making and by legitimising policy proposals. These two 
mechanisms were at work at various stages of both policy processes. Issue specification 
on the basis of the Euratom Treaty restricted the EP’s role in the expansion stage of the 
nuclear package. The Council-led WPNS consultation process granted access to the 
national nuclear regulators who contributed to legitimising the conclusions of this 
process on the basis of their expertise. This was then used as basis for the establishment 
of the HLG and ENEF as follow-up venues. Similarly the trialogues in the final stages 
of the RES policy process restricted access to key policy entrepreneurs from the 
Commission, the Council and the EP. In the case of the RES policy process, the 
European Council proved the most important institutional venue for legitimising the 
RES targets. 
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8.2 Contribution to knowledge 
The contributions to knowledge from this thesis can be divided into empirical (context-
dependent) and theoretical (context-independent) contributions (see  4.4). The research 
design of this thesis aimed for more generalisable knowledge by choosing two polar 
case studies of EU energy policy-making. However, caution is needed when 
generalising across different policy areas or jurisdictions on the basis of qualitative case 
study research of policy processes (see  4.2). A key objective of this thesis was therefore 
not only to generate context-independent knowledge, but also to better understand 
causal mechanisms of EU agenda-setting in EU energy policy-making as social 
phenomena.  
 
The key empirical contribution of this thesis is to provide insights on EU energy policy-
making by an in-depth analysis of two energy policy processes at the EU level. As the 
literature review in Section  3.4.2 showed, only a very limited number of scholarly 
studies have so far analysed EU energy policy-making. Most of them have taken a 
multi-level perspective with a strong focus on national energy policy-making and its 
ramifications for EU energy policy processes. Furthermore, studies on EU energy 
policy-making in the field of nuclear energy are virtually absent from the literature. This 
thesis helps to fill this knowledge gap.  
 
As for its theoretical contribution to knowledge, this thesis confirms that an agenda-
setting framework can be a useful theoretical approach for the analysis of EU policy-
making. The thesis, moreover, strongly supports comparative approaches to EU studies. 
The results show that EU institutions cannot only be regarded as instruments of national 
interests as intergovernmentalist accounts of EU integration would suggest; the findings 
point to the independent influence of EU institutions in EU policy-making throughout 
all stages of an issue career. Policy entrepreneurs from all EU institutions affected both 
agenda-setting processes with a direct impact on policy outputs. However, these policy 
entrepreneurs need to act within a favourable policy context deriving from focusing 
events, public opinion, national and international agendas. 
 
Princen and Rhinard’s (2006) distinction between low and high politics proved to be a 
useful heuristic for explaining agenda-setting processes and policy outputs. As assumed 
in their model, the RES target-setting confirmed that high politics created political 
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momentum that contributed to political agreement. However, the analysis indicated that 
continuous attention at the level of high politics was a pre-condition for political 
momentum. The failure of both low politics processes was explained not by the fact that 
it was initiated at low level of politics but by the way in which policy proposals were 
initiated and developed. The results suggested that legitimacy is a key function in 
agenda-setting. While the European Council, backed by strong public opinion, provided 
legitimacy for the Commission’s issue specification on binding RES targets, input 
legitimacy, that could have been built up by the inclusion of expert communities and 
stakeholders, was not available in either of the low politics processes. Procedural 
elements in EU agenda-setting can make an important contribution to the legitimacy of 
a policy process by involving relevant stakeholders. 
 
Most importantly, the thesis underlines how the integration of the agenda-setting and 
EU studies literature can be a fruitful starting point for revealing causal mechanisms in 
EU agenda-setting and thus explaining policy outputs. The theoretical framework 
developed in Section  3.3 improved Princen and Rhinard’s heuristic by integrating 
contributions by EU studies on the role of contextual factors, policy entrepreneurs, issue 
definitions and institutional venues in EU policy-making. All of these additional 
variables helped to explain policy outputs in both case studies.  
 
A key result of the empirical analysis is that policy entrepreneurs’ formal position in the 
EU agenda-setting can be as important as their informal role. This was most visible in 
the Commission’s failed agenda-setting for the nuclear package and the nuclear 
regulators’ success in increasingly determining agenda-setting and policy output. 
Contextual factors, issue definition and institutional venues can expand or limit actors’ 
access to the decision-making process. Policy entrepreneurs can be frame entrepreneurs 
using certain issue definitions to achieve agenda-status and push for their own pet 
proposals. Venue shopping strategies can help policy entrepreneurs to put forward their 
issue definitions.  
8.3 Limitations and future research 
The research questions of this thesis were ambitious as they were deliberately aimed at 
providing a rather broad perspective on EU policy-making. That is, the research design 
refrained from picking certain actors or institutional venues to explain ‘only’ parts of 
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EU energy policy-making. This macro perspective on policy processes had 
ramifications for the level of detail of the empirical research. For instance, the internal 
(agenda-setting) dynamics of each EU institution could not be investigated. The 
analytical interest was how different players at the EU level interacted, and how these 
interactions were influenced by the four key factors of the theoretical framework 
developed in Section  3.3. 
 
Moreover, since the analysis was designed as an analysis of policy – instead of an 
analysis for policy – the endeavour was to explain policy outputs with respect to key 
features of the analysed policy proposals. It could not provide a qualitative assessment 
of the policy output with respect to its policy objectives. Therefore, failure or success in 
agenda-setting does not imply any judgement on the merits of the policy output. Future 
agenda-setting research might put more emphasis on how an agenda-setting route and 
specific agenda dynamics affect the quality of a policy proposal with respect to policy 
outcomes. A retrospective analysis could span from policy initiation to policy 
evaluation. It might be investigated how political momentum achieved by high politics, 
that can enable rapid political agreement, can at the same time ensure an effective 
political agreement. This raises the question of whether such an agreement is more 
likely through a low politics agenda-setting route on the basis of expert advice than 
through a high-politics route. Future research might also investigate how contextual 
factors and political salience affect the causal relationship between agenda-setting 
dynamics and the effectiveness of policy outputs. 
 
National factors and positions and their influence were visible in both processes at 
various stages of the issue career, but could not be analysed in great detail due to the 
macro perspective of the research design and space constraints. National interests 
determine national positions at the international level, and national policy processes 
affect EU level processes in a multi-level governance setting. However, the central 
claim of this thesis is that policy outputs in the analysed case studies could not have 
been explained by putting national interests at the centre stage of the research design. 
The explanatory power of a theoretical framework that puts more emphasis on the EU 
level confirms Matláry’s (1997) conclusion that explanations of EU energy policy-
making need to move beyond a state-centric view. 
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In the case of the nuclear package national positions could have explained the blocking 
minority in the Council. However, it was the analysis of the agenda dynamics and the 
venue shopping strategy around the WPNS consultation process, WENRA, HLG and 
ENEF that could provide insights on the subsequent policy process and the publication 
of a new nuclear “Safety Directive Proposal” in November 2008. After this proposal 
was adopted in June 2009, it would be of particular interest to analyse how agenda 
dynamics enabled such a relatively quick political agreement.  
 
Future research should aim at providing further empirical insights into the relationship 
between contextual factors, policy entrepreneurs, issue definitions and institutional 
venues in EU energy policy-making, and in EU policy-making more broadly. This 
thesis might serve as a basis to further developing, verifying or falsifying the above 
propositions. 
8.4 Policy implications 
The empirical analysis of the RES policy process shows how certain elements of energy 
policy have moved up from the national to the EU level. Despite the lack of explicit 
legal competences in energy policy until the Lisbon Treaty came into force, Member 
States seem to have increasingly accepted EU interference in energy policy-making. 
Setting aside 20% of the energy market for RES on a legally binding basis constitutes a 
substantial intervention in national energy policy, although it is left to Member States to 
choose which RES sectors and technologies are favoured. The acceptance of EU level 
activity is furthermore underlined by the fact that the RES directive was not adopted 
under unanimity voting as required under Art. 175(2) if a proposal is assumed to 
interfere significantly with the national prerogative of EU Member States to chose its 
energy supply mix. 
 
This study points to some factors that explain how this shift in EU policy-making was 
possible, and can therefore serve as input for future EU policy initiatives. Contextual 
factors will remain a key element in future EU energy policy-making. Although 
focusing events which can serve as important triggers for progress in EU energy policy 
are contingent, there are areas where such events are highly likely. This includes sudden 
rises in the level or volatility of energy prices, supply disruptions, climate change 
related events or new scientific evidence on the latter. Policy entrepreneurs at the EU 
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level need to be prepared to respond to these problems by developing convincing 
solutions or policy alternatives, and put them forward when their time has come. Public 
opinion and awareness on these issues might constitute a fruitful ground for further 
policy action. 
 
The Commission as formal agenda-setter has a key role to play in this process, but its 
influence will depend heavily on the support of other policy entrepreneurs. Commission 
officials need to build strong majorities in the early stages of the policy process with 
Member States, key MEPs and relevant interest groups. For this purpose the 
Commission can establish institutional venues that are favourable to its policy 
objectives. Such venues can be technical or political, as both can provide an information 
basis and enhanced legitimacy to new proposals. Council Presidencies play an 
influential role in EU policy-making, and the Commission and other policy 
entrepreneurs need to anticipate if Council Presidencies are prepared to use their 
agenda-shaping powers to support new policy initiatives. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty, which came into force on 1 December 2009 with the new Title XX 
on energy policy and the establishment of a permanent Presidency of the European 
Council, will affect the institutional dynamics and thus agenda-setting. High politics 
agenda-setting is likely to be less influenced by rotating Council Presidencies; instead, 
the policy objectives of the President of the European Council might become more 
influential and thus also reduce the Commission’s leverage on high politics agenda-
setting. However, the rotating Council Presidencies will preserve their agenda-shaping 
powers in the Council of Ministers which is likely to remain of particular importance in 
EU agenda-setting. 
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10 Appendices 
Appendix A: Chronological overview of nuclear package policy process (1998-
2008) 
Date Key events Key issues 
 Policy initiation  
1998-
1999 
Various European Council 
Presidency conclusions 
Referring to the importance of nuclear safety in the 
context of EU enlargement. 
02/1999 ECJ procedure Commission 
vs. Council C-29/99 
Based on Art. 146 of the Euratom Treaty the Commission 
questioned the partial annulment of the unpublished 
Council Decision of 7 December 1998 approving the 
accession of the European Atomic Energy Community to 
the Nuclear Safety Convention. 
1999 Creation of Western European 
Nuclear Regulators 
Association (WENRA)  
Objectives: to develop a common approach to nuclear 
safety and regulation, in particular within the EU; to 
provide the EU with an independent capability to 
examine nuclear safety and regulation in candidate 
countries; and to evaluate and achieve a common 
approach to nuclear safety and regulatory issues. 
2000-
2001 
Assessment of nuclear safety 
in candidate countries 
Two parallel assessment processes: one led by the 
Council’s ad hoc Working Party on Nuclear Safety 
(WPNS) with strong involvement of WENRA, one led by 
the Commission. 
11/2000 Report from WPAQ to 
COREPER “Nuclear Safety in 
the Context of Enlargement” 
(13789/00) 
“Euratom Treaty does not offer a specific legal basis for 
the establishment of safety standards for nuclear 
installations” 
11/2000 Green Paper “Towards a 
European strategy for the 
security of energy supply” 
COM(2000)769final 
Nuclear energy is considered as important for the EU to 
become more independent from high and volatile fossil 
fuel prices, but also to achieve the EU’s climate policy 
objectives. 
12/2001 Opinion of advocate general 
Jacobs Case C-29/99  
“According to the current understanding of the health and 
safety provisions of the Euratom Treaty there is a 
significant overlap between radiation protection and the 
safety of nuclear installations” 
 Issue specification  
06/2002 Final report to the Green Paper The future of the nuclear industry is considered as 
dependent on “finding a clear and unequivocal answer to 
the question of the processing and transportation of 
radioactive waste”, it also mentions the need for common 
standards of nuclear safety within the EU. 
03/2002 EP amendment to second 
energy market liberalisation 
package 
highlights the potential market distorting effects of 
decommissioning funds 
11/2002 COM(2002) 605final: 
"Nuclear Safety in the EU" 
 
12/2002 ECJ decision C-29/99 “it is not appropriate, in order to define the Community's 
competences, to draw an artificial distinction between the 
protection of the health of the general public and the 
safety of sources of ionising radiation” (para. 82) 
01/2003 Presentation of COM (2002) 
605final to WPAQ (5377/03) 
• MS “agreed to the general objective of ensuring a high 
and converging level of nuclear safety throughout the 
Community and the need to be able to monitor this” 
• Recognition of need for long-term solutions to waste 
disposal 
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• Few MS “broadly sympathetic” to COM approach 
 Issue expansion  
05/2003 WPAQ preliminary discussion 
of COM (2003) 32 final  
(9699/03) 
“Certain delegations” reaffirm their reservations 
regarding the added value of the proposals and how they 
relate to existing international frameworks 
07/2003 WENRA paper “Common 
views on the significance of 
national responsibility for 
nuclear safety” 
• Strong national regulations as cornerstones for nuclear 
safety – also due to national regulators’ in-depth 
knowledge 
• No need for new technical regulations and definitions at 
the EU level, but global enforcement of IAEA standards  
09/2003 COM reply to delegations’ 
questions (12727/03) 
• Community system will supervise national safety 
authorities’ performance of their duties 
• “Safety Directive Proposal” does not aim to establish 
technical standards, but relays on CNS provisions 
• Independent verification system drawing upon experts 
from MS, no permanent Community inspectorate 
09/2003 FIN-SE-UK non-paper on 
non-legally binding alternative 
on safety (12951/03) 
• Emphasises the role of the existing international regime 
and questions how a harmonisation process of national 
standards could take place within the EU 
• COM should support harmonisation process with the 
help of NRWG 
• COM should elaborate how the IAEA peer review 
could be further developed 
09/2003 FIN-SE-UK non-paper on 
non-legally binding alternative 
on waste (12994/03) 
• “each Member State remains responsible for the 
management of all spent nuclear fuel and radioactive 
waste under its jurisdiction and for selecting the most 
appropriate method and time frame for its long-term 
management” 
09/2003 Blair/Schröder letter to COM-
president Prodi 
 
09/2003 Revised draft proposal on 
nuclear safety (13109/03) 
• Addresses the following issues: common safety 
standards, decommissioning funds, national responsibility 
for the safety and monitoring 
10/2003 Revised draft proposal on 
radioactive waste (13537/03) 
• Underlines that MS remain “fully” responsible for the 
management of all spent nuclear fuel and radioactive 
waste (recital 12) 
• No deadlines to be set at Community level 
11/2003 COREPER II: policy debate 
on “issue of principle” 
(15576/03) 
Majority of MS is supportive of legally binding 
instruments despite the resistance of some MS.  
12/2003 FIN-SE-UK position paper 
(16317/03) 
In favour of non-legally binding instrument  
01/2004 EP legislative resolution on 
safety proposal 
(P5_TA(2004)0012)  
• Strongly supports amendments made by the Council  
• Calls for stronger wording on DF provisions and calls 
for new legislation under EC Treaty (Amendment 30) 
01/2004 EP legislative resolution on 
waste proposal 
(P5_TA(2004)0011) 
• MS to prepare detailed programme for long-term waste 
management and to present to COM no later than 2006 
01/2004 FI, SE, UK, DE table non-
legally binding Council 
Resolution as alternative 
(5821/04) 
Reflects largely the non-paper presented in 2003 
05/2004 Note to COREPER (9091/04) • “a large number of delegations support in principle the 
instruments of Directives as well as the approach 
reflected in the Presidency texts” (para 7) 
• Safety proposal: “very small number of delegations” 
seek clarifications on its scope, level of detail on DF 
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provisions, and provisions on the consultation of 
population 
• “a number of delegations” are still in support of non-
binding approach 
• COREPER could mandate WPAQ “with the finalisation 
of the texts as a matter of priority”  
05/2004 COREPER meeting (9322/04 
and 10823/04) 
COREPER mandated WPAG to prepare Council 
conclusions by the end of June. 
06/2004 COREPER meeting 
(10823/04) 
Council conclusions call for the assessment of what has 
been achieved so far at the international level 
(CNS/IAEA, WENRA, NEA; and EU) within a "wide 
ranging consultation process" 
09/2004 Amended proposals by COM 
(COM(2004)524final) 
Never discussed in the Council 
12/2004 WPAQ meeting (15954/04) • WENRA Chairman presented WENRA objective to 
implement harmonised reference levels by 2010 which 
was generally welcomed in the Council 
• WPAQ should take regular note of WENRA’s work  
12/2004 Note to delegations “Nuclear 
Safety and Safe Management 
of Radioactive Waste 
- Follow-up to the Council 
conclusions of June 2004: 
Action Plan” (15955/04) 
Action plan for consultation process: “actions should lead 
to improved consistency and transparency of the 
Community approach in the field of nuclear safety and 
safe management of radioactive waste” 
01/2005 Note to delegations: First draft 
of the WPNS working 
programme (5574/05) 
First draft WPNS working programme identified two 
main issues: assessment of progress on harmonisation of 
safety standards achieved by other fora and assessment of 
DF provisions 
12/2005 WENRA declaration on 
harmonisation 
Summarises WENRA’s objectives for a harmonisation by 
2010. 
12/2006 WPNS Final Report 
(15475/2/06 
REV 2) 
“any new instrument at the EU-level has to build on the 
existing high level of cooperation and take into account 
the usefulness of all the existing international contexts” 
12/2006  “Consultation process on 
Nuclear Safety and Safe 
management of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste - Parameters 
and Options” (DS916/06) 
• WPNS report “as basis to engage in a wide ranging 
consultation” for the choice of instruments or specific 
actions and measures 
• to give “national regulators a fuller role and ensure their 
inclusive participation” 
12/2006 Note to delegations 
“Consultation process on 
nuclear safety and safe 
management of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste” (17020/06) 
• Consultation process should cover all three issues: 
nuclear safety, safe management of waste and spent fuel 
and financing of decommissioning and safe management 
of waste and spent fuel 
01/2007 PINC for EESC opinion 
(COM(2006) 844 final) 
Suggests “setting up a High Level Group on Nuclear 
Safety and Security with the mandate of progressively 
developing common understanding and, eventually, 
additional European rules on nuclear security and safety” 
01/2007 Note to delegations on 
Consultation process 
(5407/07) 
A revised more detailed draft paper on the follow-up 
consultation process. 
01/2007 WPAQ meeting (5938/07) • need to clarify task (policy-making and/or a regulatory 
body) and scope (safety not security and the inclusion of 
decommissioning financing) 
• broader membership of senior regulators group 
including policy-makers if needed and to ensure inclusion 
of MS without formal regulatory authorities 
02/2007 WPAQ meeting (6235/07) “strong support to limit the tasks of the group to nuclear 
safety, waste management and decommissioning, 
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excluding policy-making and nuclear security issues”  
03/2007 European Council  Conclusions supporting HLG on nuclear safety 
04/2007 Note to COREPER/Council 
(8784/07) 
Council Conclusions on Nuclear Safety and Safe 
Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive 
Waste  
07/2007 COM decision on HLG (OJ L 
195/44, 27.7.2007) 
• 27 competent national representatives + COM 
representative 
• to inform the European Nuclear Energy Forum on a 
regular basis 
• shall advise and assist the COM in progressively 
developing common understanding and eventually 
additional European rules in the fields of: safety of 
nuclear installations and the safety of the management of 
spent fuel and radioactive waste 
10/2007 1st HLG meeting  
11/2007 1st ENEF meeting  
01/2008 2nd HLG meeting 
HLG_M(2008-02)_FINAL 
Creation of four working groups 
04/2008 3rd HLG meeting 
HLG_M(2008-03)_Final 
“The aim is to improve nuclear safety, regulation and 
national responsibility, then to present a report to the 
Council and Parliament about group's achievements in a 
one year time frame.” 
05/2008 HLG Working Programme 
HLG_p(2008-04)_10.v1 
“Working groups should report to the HLG about the 
progress of their work towards the end of 2008 and 
prepare the draft for inclusion in the HLG report for the 
Council and Parliament, by Spring 2009. The summary 
report should be submitted to the Council and Parliament 
by the HLG before July 2009.” 
05/2008 2nd ENEF meeting Strongly in favour of the adoption of EU legislation on 
nuclear safety and waste management based on common 
fundamental safety principles for nuclear installations. 
With such a legal framework, it was argued, Europe 
could became “a real model also for possible nuclear 
newcomers” 
09/2008 Report from the Commission 
to the EP and the Council: 
Sixth situation report on 
radioactive waste and spent 
fuel management in the EU 
COM(2008)542 final 
• HLG Working Group to develop a common 
understanding and, if appropriate, suggest a common 
approach in the field of the safety of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste management 
• Restart of the discussion in the Council and in the EP 
on an EU legislation 
11/2008 3rd ENEF meeting  
11/2008 COM(2008) 790 final 
2008/0231 (CNS) 
Proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) setting up a 
Community framework for nuclear safety 
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Appendix B: Chronological overview of EU RES policy process (2004-2008) 
Date Key event  Key issues 
Policy initiation: Berlin Conference 2004 – RES Road Map 2007 
01/2004 Berlin Renewables 
Conference jointly organised 
by the RES industry and the 
European Commission, 
supported by the German 
government 
A target of at least 20% of gross inland energy 
consumption by 2020 for the EU is considered as 
achievable. A binding 20% RES target by 2020 was 
confirmed by an EP resolution. 
05/2004 RES communication 
COM(2004)366 
RES-H/C target is considered as difficult to establish. 
New RES targets beyond 2010 require a new assessment 
on their global economic effects. This assessment should 
start in 2005 in order to set a target beyond 2010 in 2007. 
09/2005 EP resolution on 
COM(2004)366 
(P6_TA(2005)0365) 
• Calls on the Commission to set ambitious but realistic 
targets for ultra-low or non CO2 emitting and CO2 neutral 
energy technologies to supply 60% of EU electricity 
demand by 2020 
• Stresses the importance of mandatory targets for 2020 
12/2005 COM(2005)627: support of 
RES-E 
“The Commission will closely monitor the state of play 
in EU renewable energy policy and, not later than 
December 2007, make a report of the level of Member 
States systems for promoting renewables electricity in the 
context of the on-going assessment related to 2020 targets 
and a policy framework for renewable energy beyond 
2010.” (p. 18) 
02/2006 EP resolution 
P6_TA(2006)0058 
• “Requests the Commission to submit to Parliament by 
31 July 2006, on the basis of Article 175(1) of the EC 
Treaty, a legislative proposal on increasing the share of 
renewable energy for heating and cooling”  
03/2006 Green  Paper COM(2006)105 • If the EU is to meet its longer term climate change 
goals and reduce its dependence on fossil fuel imports, it 
will need to go beyond existing targets 
• Announcement of Renewable Energy Road Map that 
will address new targets or objectives beyond 2010 and a 
new Community Directive on heating and cooling 
03/2006 European Council conclusions 
(7775/1) 
“considering raising, by 2015, the share of renewable 
energies, considering a target of 15%, and the proportion 
of biofuels, considering a target of 8%” 
12/2006 EP resolution on Green Paper 
P6_TA(2006)0603 
• “asks the Commission to […] set binding sectoral 
targets for renewables in order to achieve 25% of 
renewables in primary energy by 2020 and a road map at 
Council and Commission level for reaching a target for 
renewables of 50% by 2040” (para 37) 
• “Calls on the Commission to present a proposal for a 
directive on heating and cooling from renewable energy 
sources as soon as possible” (para 43) 
01/2007 An Energy Policy for Europe 
COM(2007)1; RES Road Map 
COM(2006)848 
• proposes p a binding overall RES target of 20% by 
2020 
02/2007 COREPER (6155/07) • indicative targets are preferred by a “large number of 
delegations” 
03/2007 Spring Council (7224/07) • political agreement on binding target of a 20% share of 
renewable energies in overall EU energy consumption by 
2020 and a 10% binding minimum target for the share of 
biofuels by 2020 
Issue specification: Spring summit 2007 – RES proposal 2008 
09/2007 EP resolution RES road map • calls for RES legislative framework proposal by the end 
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P6_TA(2007)0406 of 2007 to be adopted by co-decision on the basis of 
Article 175(1)  
• existing legislation for the renewable electricity and 
biofuels sectors should be maintained, but strengthened 
and improved  
• binding sectoral targets 
01/2008 RES directive COM(2008)19 • Overall binding 2020 targets and non-binding interim 
targets 
• GO trading mechanism 
Issue expansion: RES proposal 2008 – political agreement end 2008 
03/2008 Spring Council Political agreement to be reached by the end of 2008 
05/2008 Note (9648/08) • In view of the ambitious timeline and the complexity of 
the package, informal contacts with the EP have been 
established 
• An enhanced cooperation procedure with ENVI 
Committee is foreseen.  
06/2008 UK-DE-PL proposal Three flexibility mechanisms put forward as alternative 
to GO trading mechanism 
09/2008 ITRE report adopted 
(P6_A(2008)0369) 
Amendments included: 
• MS remain responsible for national support mechanism 
• Support of alternative flexibility mechanisms 
• Priority access and priority during dispatch for 
renewable energy 
• Mandatory interim targets 
09/2008 Note (French Presidency to 
COREPER) (12883/08) 
 
Key issues in relation to RES directive: 
• Inclusion of aviation in the denominator for the 20% 
target 
• Indicative trajectory 
• "Large projects" clause 
• Importing electricity from third countries 
• Reinforcing measures (administrative barriers, building 
regulations, certification and installers training, GOs, grid 
access) 
• Rendez-vous clause 
10/2008 Energy Council (13649/08) • reaffirms the timetable that the directive should be 
adopted by the end of 2008 under 1st reading procedure 
10/2008 Preparation for the informal 
trialogue (14673/08) 
Controversial issues: 
• inclusion of the aviation sector in the method for 
calculating the 20 % target 
• the appropriateness of a "large projects" clause  
• rendez-vous clauses 
12/2008 Informal agreement on RE 
directive between Council, EP 
and Commission 
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Appendix C: List of interviews conducted for this thesis100 
 
Interview 1: Independent consultant, June 2008 
Interview 2: former MEP, June 2008 
Interview 3: Official, European Commission, June 2008 
Interview 4: Official, European Commission, June 2008 
Interview 5: Official, European Commission, June 2008 
Interview 6: Official, Council of the European Union, July 2008 
Interview 7: MEP, July 2008 
Interview 8: Representative, European nuclear industry, July 2008 
Interview 9: Official, BMLFUW (Austria), July 2008 
Interview 10: Representative, EURELECTRIC, July 2008 
Interview 11: EU energy policy consultant, July 2008 
Interview 12: Independent energy and nuclear policy consultant, July 2008 
Interview 13: Official, European Commission, June 2008 
Interview 14: Officials, DEFRA (UK), August 2008 
Interview 15: Official, BERR (UK), August 2008 
Interview 16: Representative, STUK (Finland), August 2008 
Interview 17: Official, TEM (Finland), August 2008 
Interview 18: Representative, SSM (Sweden), August 2008 
Interview 19: MEP, August 2008 
Interview 20: Official, European Commission, August 2008 
Interview 21: Official, Finish Permanent Representation to the EU, September 2008 
Interview 22: MEP, September 2008 
Interview 23: Official, DEHLG (Ireland), September 2008 
Interview 24: Official, Swedish Permanent Representation to the EU, September 2008 
Interview 25: Official, BMWI (Germany), October 2008 
Interview 26: Representative from BEE e.V., February 2009 
Interview 27: Representative from EREC, February 2009 
Interview 28: Representative from EREF, February 2009 
Interview 29: Official, European Commission, March 2009 
Interview 30: MEP policy advisor, March 2009 
Interview 31: Official, Council, March 2009 
Interview 32: Official, European Commission, March 2009 
Interview 33: Former official, European Commission, March 2009 
Interview 34: Official, IDEA (Spain), March 2009 
Interview 35: MEP policy advisor, March 2009 
Interview 36: Official, DECC (UK), April 2009 
Interview 37: Official, DECC (UK), April 2009 
Interview 38: Representative from Greenpeace Brussels, April 2009 
Interview 39: Official, MG (Poland), April 2009 
Interview 40: Official, European Commission, April 2009 
Interview 42: Representative from EFET, May 2009 
Interview 43: Representative from RECS, May 2009 
Interview 44: Representative from Eurelectric, May 2009 
Interview 45: Former official, European Commission June 2009 
Interview 46: Officials, French Permanent Representation to the EU, June 2009 
Interview 47: Official, German Permanent Representation to the EU, June 2009 
 
                                                 
100 The views expressed by the interviewees are their personal views and not necessarily those of their 
institution they represented. 
